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RACE TO THE EUROZONE:  
WHY LATVIA JOINED BEFORE LITHUANIA1
Anastazija Markevičiūtė,
Vytautas Kuokštis
ABSTRACT
Why did Latvia join the Eurozone in 2014, while Lithuania only acceded a year later? The two 
countries’ diverging experiences are surprising. Latvia suffered a more pronounced economic crisis from 
2008 to 2010, which created greater euro adoption challenges in terms of meeting fiscal criteria. This 
article argues that, while the willingness to adopt the euro increased in both countries during and after 
the crisis, the will to seek euro adoption was stronger, clearer and more consistent in Latvia than in 
Lithuania. In examining this divergence, we argue that relying on aggregate economic costs and benefits, 
identity considerations, geopolitical considerations, societal support, and interest group preferences does 
not produce a satisfactory explanation of fluctuations in these countries’ willingness to adopt the euro. 
Instead, we propose that changes in this willingness can be traced to domestic political processes, such as 
the timing and results of elections and the magnitude of the economic crisis’s impact.
Keywords: Eurozone, accession, Latvia, Lithuania 
INTRODUCTION
Latvia and Lithuania both joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, which entailed a commitment 
to eventually adopt the euro. Despite numerous pertinent similarities between Latvia and 
Lithuania, such as country size, economic structure, level of development, and even monetary 
regime (a currency board system in Lithuania and de facto currency board arrangement in 
Latvia), their paths towards the adoption of the euro were not identical. In 2004, World Bank 
representative Lajos Bokros predicted that Lithuania, together with Estonia and Slovenia, would 
be among the first countries to adopt the euro (International Monetary Fund, 2004). Lithuania 
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joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) in 2004—a year earlier than Latvia. Furthermore, 
Lithuania was planning, and had a realistic opportunity, to adopt the euro as early as the start 
of 2007. This had been Lithuania’s plan since 2003, as stated in its Pre-Accession Economic 
Programme (PEP). To the north, Latvia’s PEP mentioned 1 January 2008 as the earliest possible 
date for euro adoption (Dean, 2004, p. 761). The years that followed the development of the 
two countries’ PEPs brought increasing inflationary pressures and a subsequent economic crisis 
that precluded euro adoption in both countries.
In response to the Great Recession, all three Baltic countries sought to preserve fixed 
exchange rates, and therefore implemented internal devaluation by adopting rapid fiscal 
consolidation. All three countries also emphasized their willingness to adopt the euro, though 
their degrees of willingness varied.  Estonia adopted the euro as early as 2011, largely as a 
result of its prudent pre-crisis fiscal policy, but also due to Estonia’s better tax collection results 
during the crisis. Latvia and Lithuania struggled, much more than Estonia did, to achieve fiscal 
consolidation and fulfil the fiscal criteria. Yet the most important and interesting difference 
between the former two was Latvia’s display of a greater willingness and a firmer commitment 
than Lithuania displayed to adopt the euro during and after the Great Recession (although the 
determination to seek euro adoption increased in both countries during this time). Latvia’s 
willingness translated into specific policy actions that, in the end, meant that Latvia acceded to 
the Eurozone before Lithuania.  Latvia adopted the euro before its southern neighbour despite 
the fact that Latvia faced tougher economic challenges than Lithuania and had to put in more 
effort to achieve Eurozone accession.
In this article, we aim to answer why the willingness to adopt the euro varied over time and 
between the two countries, a difference that resulted in their different dates of euro accession 
despite sharing similar economic, historical, social, and political conditions. To answer this 
research question, we draw on the most popular approaches in economic and political-economic 
literature to explain preferences for euro adoption. Further, we use aggregate economic cost-
benefit calculation of joining the Eurozone based on optimum currency area (OCA) theory and 
we consider the impact of a collective identity and of geopolitics, of interest group pressures, 
and of societal opinion.  We adopt a perspective that focuses on domestic political processes 
to determine why Latvia acceded to the Eurozone before Lithuania did. Finally, we also take 
into account a factor that has not been explored extensively in the literature: the role of the 
economic crisis. We find that the fluctuations in the willingness to adopt the euro (and the 
ultimate dates of Eurozone accession) in Latvia and Lithuania cannot be accounted for fully 
by aggregate economic arguments, interest group pressure, societal opinion, or identity and 
geopolitical factors. Instead, our explanation of changes in the values of our dependent variable 
is based on domestic political developments. First, we argue that the timing and results of 
elections in Latvia enabled the Latvian government to consistently focus on its euro adoption 
strategy. Second, the economic crisis was more profound in Latvia, which led to a higher sense 
of vulnerability and a desire to seek perceived safety within the single currency zone. Finally, 
Lithuanian authorities were less willing to make a strong commitment to a specific euro adoption 
date, partly due to Lithuania’s failed first attempt to join the Eurozone.
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1. FLUCTUATIONS IN LAT VIA AND LITHUANIA’S WILLINGNESS TO ADOPT THE EURO: 
VALUES OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE
It is necessary to first look at the dynamics of Latvian and Lithuanian positions vis-à-vis euro 
adoption over time—in other words, to describe the values of the dependent variable. Our 
period of analysis starts in 2004, when Latvia and Lithuania acceded to the EU and made a 
commitment to adopt the euro at some point in the future. The cut-off point of our period of 
analysis is 2014, Lithuania received its official invitation to join the Eurozone on 1 January 2015.
At the beginning of this period, prior to 2007, Lithuania was more active in seeking to 
adopt the euro than Latvia was. Between 2004 and 2013, Latvia and Lithuania each underwent 
four evaluations. In 2006, only Lithuania applied for evaluation as it had joined the ERM II 
earlier than Latvia. The differences between Latvia and Lithuania’s pursuits of the euro at the 
beginning of this period can largely be attributed to exogenous factors, namely, the ability to 
meet the Maastricht criteria, and more specifically, to meet the inflation criterion (all other 
criteria were comfortably met by both countries during that period). Prior to 2007, Lithuania’s 
inflation level was fluctuating around the reference value, while in Latvia it was well above the 
reference value (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: Inflation in Latvia, Lithuania (twelve-month average inflation rate), and the Maastricht 
reference value, in percent. 
Sources: for national inflation rates, Eurostat database; for the reference value, Convergence Re-
ports, (European Central Bank, 2013; European Central Bank, 2014).
 
Although both Latvia and Lithuania were experiencing economic overheating driven 
by EU aid inflows, credit bubbles, and excessive optimism at the time, the differences in 
inflation between the two countries can be explained by the fact that the process of economic 
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‘overheating’ had started earlier and advanced more rapidly in Latvia. Thus, one could conclude 
that a willingness to adopt the euro at the beginning of the analysed period was similar in 
Latvia and Lithuania. Overall, both countries were, in principle, in favour of euro adoption, but 
did not see it as a priority and were not willing to sacrifice other objectives (such as growth) 
or write specific policy actions—in terms of government expenditure, tax policies, or price 
regulation policies—to achieve their euro adoption goals. This is well illustrated by Lithuania’s 
failed attempt to join the Eurozone in 2007.
In March 2006, Lithuania submitted an application to adopt the euro, despite it being 
“already clear that the risk to breach the inflation criterion was high” (Vilpišauskas, 2014, 
pp. 225–226). Slovenia also submitted an application in March 2006. EU institutions confirmed 
Slovenia’s application and rejected Lithuania’s due to its breach of the inflation criterion. The 
decision was controversial; Lithuania’s inflation was only 0.1 percentage point higher than 
the reference value, but the decision was additionally justified by judging Lithuania’s inflation 
unsustainable (European Commission, 2006, p. 9). According to Vilpišauskas (2014, p. 226), “it 
is possible that Lithuanian politicians had not delved deeply [enough into the situation] and 
followed the suggestions [made] by diplomats and higher officials, which was in contrast to 
the opinion prevailing in EU institutions and informal forecasts regarding the possible negative 
evaluation of Lithuania”.
Although Lithuania declared its eagerness to adopt the euro, it did not pursue a policy that 
was coordinated enough to achieve this goal. Specifically, it conducted a procyclical fiscal policy 
that contributed to inflation. Furthermore, inflation increased in Lithuania not only because of 
external circumstances, but also due to deliberate policy decisions, such as hikes in regulated 
prices (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 228). In summary, Vilpišauskas concludes that Lithuania’s failure to 
achieve euro accession was due to the “ambivalent stance of the political elite, uncoordinated 
actions in several functionally related fields of economic policy, as well as a very strict evaluation 
of Lithuania provided by the EU institutions” (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 228).
The Great Recession changed the stances of the Baltic governments towards euro adoption. 
In response to the economic downturn, Latvia and Lithuania (as well as Estonia) sought to 
defend their currency pegs with the euro and implemented rapid fiscal consolidation. As 
fiscal revenue contracted, public deficits soared (see Figure 2). In contrast to Estonia, neither 
Latvia nor Lithuania had accumulated fiscal reserves, and they were forced to borrow to cover 
governments financing. They did this in different ways. Lithuania turned to the bond market, 
Latvia applied for international financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund and 
the EU. This difference can be attributed to the collapse of Latvia’s important domestic bank, 
Parex, in late 2008, an event that further complicated Latvia’s situation.
In both Latvia and Lithuania, euro adoption was seen as part of a crisis exit strategy. 
However, in Latvia, the willingness to adopt the euro was firmer and clearer throughout the 
crisis and post-crisis years. The head of Latvia’s central bank, Ilmārs Rimšēvičs, “in nearly 
every public statement insisted on the fixed exchange rate and a budget of 3 percent of GDP 
in 2012 to qualify for euro adoption in 2014” (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 2011, p. 68). In a co-
authored book written in 2014, Dombrovskis argues that the Latvian government’s 2009 plan 
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FIGURE 2: Public deficits in Latvia and Lithuania, in percent of GDP, and the Maastricht reference 
value (three per cent of GDP). 
Sources: for public deficit data for Lithuania up to and including 2012, (European Central Bank, 
2014, p. 134); for Latvia up to and including 2012, (European Central Bank, 2013, p. 54). For 2013 
and 2014, Eurostat database. Different data sources were used because the methodology of cal-
culating the budget deficit was changed in 2014, and earlier figures were recalculated.
and commitment to adopting the euro in 2014 seemed realistic (Åslund and Dombrovskis, 
2011, pp. 109-110). In his annual report in 2012, Dombrovskis emphasizes that the country’s 
foreign policy was focused on the EU, that further euro integration was in line with Latvia’s 
interests, and that the government’s goal was to garner support for Latvia’s euro accession 
from other EU countries (Dombrovskis, 2012a). According to former Lithuanian Minister 
of Finance Ingrida Šimonytė, Latvia displayed a stronger willingness to seek euro adoption 
during the crisis and recovery periods. Šimonytė (2014) argues that, in Latvia, euro adoption 
had been seen and discussed as a key part of the anti-crisis program since the start of the 
crisis. Not only was the Latvian government clearer on its public commitment to the euro, 
the government also took concrete policy steps to achieve euro adoption. First, the Latvian 
government pressed more forcefully for fiscal consolidation, and as a result, its budget deficit 
was already well below the Maastricht reference value by 2012 (see Figure 2). Furthermore, 
Latvia’s strategic tax policies—cutting the VAT rate in 2012 to slow inflation—maximized 
Latvia’s chances for a positive evaluation of its 2013 Eurozone application (Seputyte, 2012; 
Bukovskis, 2014).
The Lithuanian case was different. The so-called crisis government of Kubilius, which came 
to power at the end of 2008, declared euro adoption as its goal. It even sought to meet the 
public deficit criterion of three per cent of GDP in 2009 and planned the budget accordingly, 
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but those plans were abandoned due to a much more dramatic economic contraction during 
the crisis than expected (Šimonytė, 2014). Later, the government was less clear about 
Lithuania’s euro adoption date, although it argued that euro accession remained its goal. 
During an interview in 2012, President Grybauskaitė stated that despite earlier plans to 
adopt the euro in 2014, there was no specific date of adoption set (BNS, 2012). To preserve 
Lithuania’s chance to join the Eurozone, Kubilius’s government had also planned the 2012 
budget so that the deficit would be below three per cent of GDP (Šimonytė, 2014). However, 
by 2012, the deficit was 3.2 per cent of GDP (see Figure 2). The new government, led by 
Social Democrats, came to power in 2012. Before the elections and immediately after the 
new coalition was formed, the new government was silent on euro adoption until  early 2013 
when Prime Minister Butkevičius named introducing the euro the government’s strategic goal 
(Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 231). Vilpišauskas observes that, “increasingly intensive efforts for euro 
introduction. . . [and] political rhetoric strengthened with the culmination in January 2014 
when the Prime Minister declared he would resign if Lithuania does not adopt the euro from 
2015” (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 231). All in all, during the crisis and post crisis years, Lithuania 
did not pace itself as consistently as Latvia did, opting instead for a more cautious, “wait and 
see” approach towards euro adoption.
The values of our dependent variable are summarized as follows: At the beginning of the 
analysis period, both countries were in favour of euro adoption, but did not set it as a priority 
and were not willing to take concrete policy steps or make significant sacrifices to adopt the 
euro. The crisis years prompted a change in both countries’ policy stances and euro adoption 
emerged as an important goal and as part of their crisis exit strategies. Nevertheless, euro 
adoption was communicated more clearly and sought more strongly and consistently in Latvia. 
Lithuania’s stance was vaguer, and less firmly committed. As a result of these differences, Latvia 
joined the Eurozone a year earlier than Lithuania.
2. AGGREGATE ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS
According to the aggregate economic costs and benefits perspective, a willingness (or 
reluctance) to adopt the euro should stem from how well (or poorly) a country’s economy 
“fits” with the single currency zone. This perspective builds on the optimum currency area 
(OCA) theory (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963) and holds that countries will be willing to enter 
the Eurozone if the aggregate economic benefits of membership—increased trade, higher 
efficiency, and lower transaction costs—exceed the aggregate costs of membership, such as 
losing exchange and interest rate policy as a tool to respond to asymmetric shocks and improve 
competitiveness (Caporale, Ciferi and Girardi, 2011, p. 432; Frieden, 2002, pp. 831–832). In 
general, a country should be reluctant to join the Eurozone if it faces different (asymmetric) 
shocks than other members of the currency union, or if it will take a long time for a country 
to adjust to those shocks without recourse to monetary and exchange rate policies. Hence, 
the following factors should ceteris paribus make countries more eager to adopt the euro: 
economic openness, a large share of trade and a high degree of business cycle synchronization 
with other members of the currency union, flexible prices and wages, mobile capital and 
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labour, and economic convergence with other members of the currency zone as reflected in 
real GDP per capita, labour productivity, and economic structure (Angeloni, Flad and Mongelli, 
2007; José and Larribe, 2008)2. 
From this vantage point, were Latvia and Lithuania good candidates for membership in the 
Eurozone? On the one hand, both Latvia and Lithuania lagged markedly behind the Eurozone 
in terms of economic development (see Figure 3) and labour productivity; furthermore, their 
business cycles were not synchronized well with the Eurozone’s, as revealed by very large booms 
and busts in the two countries during their decade of EU membership. On the other hand, 
both countries were exceptionally flexible, an important factor in overcoming the crisis of 2008 
to 2010 (Purfield and Rosenberg, 2010; Kuokštis, 2015). Apart from nominal wage flexibility, 
this also encompasses labour mobility and firms’ abilities to adapt to changing circumstances 
(Kuokštis, 2015). Besides, Latvia and Lithuania both have relatively small and open economies 
(and Lithuania’s, despite its larger size, is actually more open).3 As for trade with Eurozone 
countries, Latvia and Lithuania’s shares comprised a substantial, but not a dominant part of 
2  In this section, we focus on the so-called real convergence factors as nominal convergence criteria are 
already covered in the Maastricht criteria.
3  For instance, in 2007, the exports of goods and services to GDP ratio in Latvia and Lithuania stood at 39 and 
50 per cent respectively; in 2012, this measure was 61 and 82 per cent respectively, (Eurostat).
FIGURE 3: Real GDP per capita in Latvia and Lithuania from 2004 to 2014, in Purchasing Power 
Standards (PPS), Index EU 28=100. 
Source: Eurostat database.
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the two countries’ overall trade—with 32 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively, during the 
analysis period of 2004 to 2012.4
Overall, OCA theory has a hard time explaining variation in the values of our dependent 
variable, especially the divergence in Latvia and Lithuania’s willingness to adopt the euro at the 
end of the analysed period. First, whether or not Latvia and Lithuania were, or have become, 
good candidates for participating in the euro area is debatable. Although it is true that both 
countries saw rather rapid real convergence towards the Eurozone throughout the analysed 
period (see Figure 3), the very high volatility of Baltic economies—as manifested by their massive 
booms after entering the EU and large contractions during the Great Recession—revealed 
the dangers of sticking to exchange rate pegs and common monetary policy. In hindsight, it is 
evident that the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy was not in line with the needs 
of the Baltic economies.
Furthermore, Lithuania actually met OCA criteria better than Latvia did. Throughout the 
period of analysis, Lithuania had a higher GDP per capita and also converged more quickly to 
the Eurozone than Lithuania did (see Figure 3). Secondly, Lithuania’s economy was arguably 
more flexible; during the last recession, the country dealt with the crisis more successfully. 
This flexibility was manifest in Lithuania’s substantially faster growth in exports.5 Thirdly, the 
pre-crisis boom was less pronounced in Lithuania. Thus, based on a country’s “fit” with the 
Eurozone, Lithuania should have been the more willing one to adopt the euro, but empirically 
this did not turn out to be the case.
3. IDENTITY AND GEOPOLITICS
An alternative explanation of a country’s willingness to adopt the euro is based on the 
importance of a country’s collective identity (Risse, et al., 1999; Risse, 2003). Currency affairs 
have always been closely tied to issues of national identity and statehood (Helleiner, 1998). 
Thus, according to Risse, et al. (1999,  pp. 148–149), only those countries whose elites treat 
euro integration as part of the country’s national identity will move forward with euro adoption, 
especially since there are often good economic arguments both for and against becoming a 
Eurozone member. Risse, et al. (1999, p. 148) argue, “the Euro is about European union and 
political order rather than only lowering transaction costs or creating exchange-rate stability”.
Turning to the empirical cases of Latvia and Lithuania, it would be hard to completely dismiss 
this identity-based argument. In the Baltic countries, European integration has always been at the 
core of their external economic and political orientation (Austers and Bukovskis, 2013, p. 30), and 
entering the Eurozone could be regarded as yet another step towards returning to the West—two 
key steps in this process were attaining memberships in the EU and NATO. This stemmed from 
these countries’ geopolitical anxieties, their relatively small sizes, and being vulnerable states 
close to traditionally hostile Russia, but is also related to both states’ identities being built on a 
4  Calculations based on data on Latvia and Lithuania, (Statistics Lithuania; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia).
5  Between 2007 and 2013, Latvian exports grew by 56 per cent and Lithuanian exports grew by 95 per cent 
(authors’ calculations based on statistical data from Eurostat database).
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sense of Europeanness. According to Bukovskis (2014), “Latvia has traditionally been very pro-
European, at least on the elite level”.  Feldmann (2008, p. 247) agrees, “in the second half of the 
1990s European integration became the main focus of policymaking. Full membership of the EU 
was the main goal, and most political activity was subordinated to this objective”. Furthermore, 
on an even more pragmatic level, entrance into the Eurozone was also associated with the desire 
to have a stronger voice at the EU decision-making level, to be at the core of this project (Austers 
and Bukovskis, 2013, p. 31). All in all, for the Baltic countries, euro accession has always been as 
much about foreign policy considerations as it was about economic objectives.
However, this foreign policy orientation of “returning to” and integrating with the West has 
been present in both countries ever since they regained independence. Thus, it cannot explain 
why the desire to adopt the euro increased during the last economic crisis or why it intensified 
more in Latvia than it did in Lithuania. Of course, one could also point out that an identity-
based perspective in general has a hard time accounting for short-run shifts in policy views 
and actions, as “collective nation-state identities are usually rather sticky and only gradually 
subject to change” (Risse et al., 1999, p. 156).
A related, although distinctive, explanation could be based on the changing perceptions 
of the intensity of geopolitical threats due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine in 2014. Vilpišauskas 
explains that euro adoption could satisfy ‘the need to be in the group (core) of most integrated 
EU countries, thus aiming to increase the economic and political (institutional) relations with 
EU countries with the expectation that this could bring more security in the case of Russian 
threat” (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 210). Austers (2014) also argues that efforts to increase security 
against Russian threats motivated euro adoption. Furthermore, politicians in both countries 
publicly named geopolitical security as a reason to enter the Eurozone. For example, during 
his term as Latvia’s Finance Minister, Andris Vilks stated, “We are in a very fragile geopolitical 
situation. We should be as deeply integrated as possible into European institutions” (Milne, 
2013). However, the timing of changes in the values of the dependent variable does not fit 
this explanation well, as the firm commitment to adopt the euro emerged in Latvia well before 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Second, from this vantage point, it is not clear why Latvia had a 
firmer commitment despite Lithuania sharing a similar sense of geopolitical threat. In fact, 
Lithuania arguably showed more concern regarding an increased Russian threat, as revealed 
by its more vocal opposition and the decision to reintroduce conscription.
4. INTEREST GROUP PREFERENCES
According to Frieden (2002), an explanation of a country’s position regarding euro adoption 
should take into account the preferences of its most powerful interest groups. This argument 
builds on the notion that while adoption of the euro (as a form of fixed exchange rate) is often 
difficult to evaluate from an aggregate efficiency point of view, the distributive consequences 
for different groups in a country are usually much clearer. In particular, import-competers 
and exporters (especially those specializing in the production of standardized goods) stand to 
benefit from the flexible exchange rates that could be used to boost their competitiveness, 
and thus are expected to oppose euro adoption. On the other hand, cross-border investors, 
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the financial sector, and exporters of specialized manufacturing should favour euro adoption 
due to greater certainty, the elimination of exchange rate volatility, and favourable effects on 
financial and trade flows (Frieden, 2002). One could further expect that countries with more 
influential sectors interested in euro adoption will be the countries more willing to accede (the 
influence is usually proxied by sector’s share of employment or value added).
Certain predictions of this interest group explanation are corroborated by the Lithuanian and 
Latvian cases. The banking sectors unequivocally supported euro adoption; this was due to lower 
balance sheet risk (most loans were in euros, while most income came in national currencies) 
and due to unlimited access to ECB liquidity resources (Šimonytė, 2014). In addition, one could 
also point out that the importance of the financial sector in the economy has been higher in 
Latvia than in Lithuania.6 However, one problem with this explanation is that it cannot account 
for the timing of changes in preferences in both countries—in fact, the share of the financial 
sector was higher in both Latvia and Lithuania before the crisis than it was during the downturn. 
Other businesses have also been mostly supportive of euro adoption in both countries 
(Feldmann, 2008, p. 251; Swedbank Analysis, 2012, p. 15; on Latvia (Bukovskis, 2014); on 
Lithuania (Besagirskas, 2014; Arlauskas, 2014)). According to Besagirskas (2014), both Latvian 
and Lithuanian firms adopted a pragmatic position which posited that euro adoption was 
economically beneficial, as businesses “made calculations related to the benefits this would 
bring, [and] how much lower the risk and borrowing costs would be”. It should be noted that 
there was also some opposition to euro adoption. Negative opinions towards euro introduction 
were expressed mainly by smaller firms concentrating on the domestic market, and were 
largely due to currency switching costs (Arlauskas, 2014; Bukovskis, 2014) and an element of 
patriotism (Besagirskas, 2014). Furthermore, to the extent that euro adoption risk was related 
to the possibility of currency devaluation during the economic downturn of 2008 to 2010, the 
business community was slightly less enthusiastic about euro adoption in Latvia as there were 
more voices calling for currency devaluation in this country, while no businesses expressed 
support for such a move in Lithuania (Kuokštis, 2013, p. 77).
To summarize, the Latvian and Lithuanian business communities in general, and especially 
their financial sectors, supported Eurozone membership. However, their stances or relative 
influence did not change markedly throughout the period of analysis or between the two 
countries. Therefore an interest group based perspective does not lead us to an answer to our 
research question.
5. SOCIETAL OPINION
Another factor that could potentially explain the willingness (and eventual decision) to adopt the 
euro is societal opinion. After all, in a democracy, government policies should be influenced by 
the preferences of the majority.  Flash Eurobarometer surveys provide information about several 
6  Over the period of 2006 to 2015, the share in value added in GDP fluctuated between 3.0 per cent and 
5.0 per cent in Latvia, and between 1.9 per cent and 3.1 per cent in Lithuania (authors’ calculations based on 
statistical data from Eurostat database).
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questions pertaining to society’s views towards the euro. The general picture that emerges from 
these data is that Lithuanians and Latvians have been largely sceptical of euro introduction. 
Except for a brief period during the last crisis in Lithuania, the proportion of respondents who 
thought that euro accession was negative for their countries was higher than those who held 
the opposite opinion. Asked about whether they were generally in favour of euro adoption 
in April 2012 (European Commission, 2013, p. 65), 46 per cent of Latvians were “very much” 
or “rather in favour,” and 53 per cent were “very much” or “rather against” euro adoption. In 
Lithuania, the corresponding figures were 44 per cent and 51 percent. Last but not least, when 
asked specifically about the desired timeframe of euro adoption, both Latvians and Lithuanians 
overwhelmingly preferred to delay euro introduction for as long as possible. In March 2012, 
49 per cent of Latvians and 41 per cent of Lithuanians said they wanted the euro introduced 
“as late as possible”; as few as 9 per cent of Latvians and 14 per cent of Lithuanians wanted to 
adopt the euro “as soon as possible” (European Commission, 2013, p. 68).
Politicians understood this scepticism regarding euro adoption. In fact, this could have been 
one of the factors affecting the lack of willingness to press for euro accession at the beginning 
of the period analysed, when sacrifices to achieve this would have been necessary in Lithuania 
(on Lithuania (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 230); on Latvia (Bukovskis, 2014; Austers, 2014)). It is also 
telling that in both Latvia and Lithuania, the government refused to hold referendums on euro 
adoption. Nevertheless, societal opinion does not explain shifts in the willingness to adopt the 
euro during or after the crisis. First, Latvians and Lithuanians did not generally become more 
supportive of euro adoption—most importantly, both countries’ citizens preferred to delay 
euro adoption for as long as possible. Second, the prevailing societal opinion was similar in 
Latvia and Lithuania, and thus cannot account for the subsequent divergence. Third, in the 
Baltic countries, euro integration policies are generally an elite-driven affair, as has been the 
case generally in other countries (Dyson, 2008a, p. 3). In the Baltic States, this is generally true 
of economic affairs and of macroeconomic policy in particular. 
6. DOMESTIC POLITICS: ELECTIONS, CRISIS, AND RISK-TAKING
According to Dandashly and Verdun (2010, p. 3), “for a complete understanding of the euro 
adoption strategy in NMS [new member states] one needs to look at the domestic political 
situation.” (see also Dandashly, 2012). Specifically, they name “government policies, elections, 
electoral cycles as well as constitutional rules” as potential driving forces of euro adoption 
(Dandashly and Verdun, 2010, p. 3). As Dandashly and Verdun notice, this perspective might be 
particularly helpful in explaining “the timing of euro adoption” (2010, p. 8; see also Dandashly, 
2012, p. 5). Drawing from this perspective, we outline how domestic politics played out in Latvia 
and Lithuania, leading to different levels of commitment towards euro adoption.
To begin with, one should take into account their divergent developments in terms of election 
dates and results. The first “crisis” government in Latvia, led by Prime Minister Godmanis, was 
formed in December 2007 and collapsed in March 2009 following massive protests over the 
government’s policies. Subsequently, Dombrovskis took over as Prime Minister and won the 
2010 elections as the leader of the Unity (Vienotība) alliance. According to Salines and Bērziņš 
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(2012, p. 155), “notwithstanding these stringent measures [the austerity program], Prime 
Minister Dombrovskis was re-elected in October 2010 with an even stronger parliamentary 
majority”. In the 2011 Parliamentary election, Dombrovskis’s party lost seats and took third 
place, while the ethnic Russian party, Harmony Centre (Saskaņas Centrs), won first place. Despite 
this, Dombrovskis’s Unity alliance formed a coalition with a party recently founded by former 
President Zatlers and Dombrovskis remained Prime Minister. He remained in this position until 
the beginning of 2014. Thus, Dombrovskis had an opportunity to introduce the euro during 
his reign and claim it as his own achievement. It should also be noted that Dombrovskis was 
a rather exceptional figure in the Latvian political context— he was generally regarded as an 
honest and competent politician when politicians were generally perceived as incompetent and 
corrupt. Dombrovskis’s re-election can be considered an approval of the government’s policy. 
According to Šimonytė (2014), while “there had been a lot of tension with creditors and also 
domestically in 2009 to 2010 . . . the elections gave new breath and a new mandate to the Latvian 
government to finish the job”. In Bukovskis’s opinion, the fact that Dombrovskis kept his position 
and the same government remained in power after the elections greatly influenced Latvia’s 
achievement of euro adoption in 2014 (Bukovskis, 2014).  Austers and Bukovskis (2013, p. 31) 
observe, “Eurozone membership began to be advocated as the ‘prize’ for overcoming financial 
and economic problems through austerity”. In 2012, Dombrovskis himself writes, “one of the 
lessons we have learned is that in every crisis situation one has to have a clear exit strategy. For 
us the exit strategy was and still is joining the Eurozone in 2014” (Dombrovskis, 2012b, p. 7).
In contrast, in Lithuania’s first post-crisis elections in 2012, the ruling coalition that had 
presided over the austerity program lost to the opposition. As a result, Prime Minister Kubilius 
was replaced by Social Democrat Butkevičius. The prospect of the 2012 elections also led 
Kubilius’s government to be less enthusiastic about pressing for more expenditure cuts and less 
willing to focus on euro adoption; given the very low approval ratings of the government and of 
the Prime Minister the possibility of losing power was very realistic (Swedbank Analysis, 2012, 
p. 2). As mentioned above, although Kubilius’s government planned the 2012 budget with a 
deficit of under three per cent of Lithuania’s GDP, it eventually turned out to be higher. Tauraitė 
(2013) observes, “Kubilius’ government, although pro-euro, was rather reserved. Apparently, 
the upcoming Parliament elections and associated doubts about the continuity of policy course 
was one of the reasons for this”. Furthermore, Social Democrats, as mentioned before, were 
also reluctant to give a firm opinion on euro accession before the elections and they committed 
to adopting the euro only after they secured power. By contrast, when Latvia applied for euro 
membership, some Eurozone members doubted whether Latvia should be allowed to join, and 
thus “[Latvia’s] entry was far from assured” (Milne, 2013). It is also noteworthy that Kubilius’s 
and Butkevičius’s governments essentially did not differ in their stances regarding euro adoption, 
except for some radical public declarations made by certain members of Butkevičius’s coalition 
(Šimonytė, 2014; Besagirskas, 2014).
Another factor that contributed to differing opinions regarding euro adoption in Latvia and 
Lithuania was a difference in how the crisis impacted them. It is true that both countries were 
among the hardest hit during the crisis, in 2009 their real GDPs contracted by double digits. But 
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the crisis in Latvia was harsher due to its higher pre-crisis vulnerabilities and the collapse of its 
important domestic bank, Parex. As a result, Latvia was forced to apply for international financial 
assistance, while Lithuania tested the bond market. Furthermore, Latvia was the primary object 
of discussion in financial circles and in the media. Paul Krugman (2008) even dubbed Latvia 
the “new Argentina”. Political repercussions were also more pronounced in Latvia; protest 
activities were more intense there and their effect on the Latvian political system was greater. 
According to Salines and Bērziņš (2012, p. 164), “the crisis was so severe that it went beyond 
the economic realm to revive political fears. Many felt that the very survival of the nation was 
at stake, not least due to the accelerating emigration trend.” Besides, “the crisis reinforced 
the existential doubts about the future of the nation which had fought so hard for regaining 
its independence and sovereignty” (Salines and Bērziņš, 2012, p. 164). The risk of devaluation 
and financial meltdown in Latvia was more substantial than in Lithuania, the austerity program 
significantly more painful. Dombrovskis (2012b, p. 8) remarks, “introduction of the euro will 
put an end to all speculations about devaluation of the lats”. Both the objective and subjective 
impacts of the crisis were greater in Latvia, leading to a greater sense of vulnerability, which 
induced a stronger determination to seek safety within the single currency zone. Interestingly, 
Spendzharova has argued along similar lines on a related integration dimension, transferring the 
regulatory power of the financial sector to the EU level. She hypothesises that “the economic 
vulnerability of the region may prompt new EU Member States to be more open to supranational 
solutions” (Spendzharova, 2012, p. 324).
Finally, there is one more factor that dampened Lithuania’s enthusiasm for adopting 
the euro. Lithuania’s failure in its first attempt to join the Eurozone back in 2006 made 
Lithuanian authorities relatively more risk averse and they sought to avoid another potential 
embarrassment (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 233). To this day, Lithuania remains the sole country to 
have been denied Eurozone membership upon initial application. It is worthwhile to point out 
that, until the beginning of 2013, it was not clear whether Lithuania would meet the inflation 
criterion (Tauraitė, 2013). The fact that Lithuania eventually complied with the inflation 
criterion, beginning in September 2012, was due to two factors: the fall of oil prices and the 
EU institutions’s decision to exclude Greece’s inflation from their criterion value calculations 
(Tauraitė, 2013). Thus, Lithuanian authorities were only willing to commit to euro adoption 
when the probability of another failure was sufficiently low.
CONCLUSIONS
While economics sets boundaries and creates opportunities for euro adoption, ultimately 
the decision to enter the single currency area depends on political will. Latvia and Lithuania’s 
experiences during the decade following their EU entrances shows that this political will—driven 
by opportunities created by economic conditions and by political developments, which can also 
to some extent influence economic conditions—wax and wane over time. While Lithuania was 
more eager to join the Eurozone in the early years of EU membership than Latvia was—largely 
as a result of favourable, though exogenously granted, economic circumstances—the economic 
crisis of 2008 to 2010 changed the stances of the two Baltic countries in two important ways. 
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First, both Latvia and Lithuania became more committed to euro adoption. Second, and even 
more interesting, this commitment was more evident and firmer in Latvia throughout the 
crisis and post-crisis years. As a result of its faster and stronger fiscal consolidation, and due 
to other specific policy steps, Latvia joined the Eurozone in 2014. Euro adoption served as 
Latvia’s “exit” strategy from the harsh crisis and years of austerity. Lithuania only joined a year 
later, in 2015. Prior to the beginning of 2013, Lithuania made no firm commitment to an exact 
euro adoption date; furthermore, Lithuania did not undertake “precautionary” measures to 
maximize its chance to adopt the euro.
This empirical case of the Baltic countries demonstrates the limits of: economic-structural 
arguments based on OCA theory, interest group preference interpretation, the influence of 
identity, and geopolitical considerations. These factors are by no means irrelevant. In fact, one 
could make a strong case that the relative smallness and openness of the Baltic economies, 
their generally Western orientations, and their geopolitical insecurity explain why Latvia and 
Lithuania (and Estonia) have generally been more in favour of euro adoption than most other 
new member states. Nevertheless, these approaches do not explain Latvia and Lithuania’s 
fluctuations in their willingness to adopt the euro; and most importantly, do not uncover Latvia 
and Lithuania’s different euro adoption paths during and after the economic crisis of 2008 to 
2010. To reach a convincing explanation, one needs to look at domestic politics, namely electoral 
processes combined with the impact of the crisis. Our conclusions are thus in support of those 
authors who call for more focus on domestic political situations to explain preferences for and 
the timings of euro accession (Dandashly and Verdun, 2010; Dandashly, 2012; Dyson, 2008b).
Based on our analysis in this article, we suggest focusing more on the roles of crises in future 
scholarship. Economic crises can affect euro adoption in a complex manner. First, and most 
obviously, they can shape the nature of bids for euro adoption. As the Latvian and Lithuanian 
cases demonstrate, the economic crisis made it much easier for these countries to meet 
the inflation criterion, but at the same time, a new challenge of fulfilling fiscal requirements 
arose. Second, economic crises can strengthen a country’s resolve to accede to the Eurozone. 
Both Latvia and Lithuania demonstrated a firmer willingness to adopt the euro during the 
crisis, and Latvia was the more eager of the two. This could in turn be attributed to the more 
substantial impact of the crisis in Latvia. In contrast, other countries—such as Poland and 
the Czech Republic—who suffered much less from the downturn have since communicated 
reluctance regarding Eurozone membership (Vilpišauskas, 2014, p. 208; Dandashly, 2012, pp. 
252–254). Third, economic crises can bring about the need for fiscal consolidation. Austerity 
enables a country to fulfil euro adoption criteria by reducing public deficit, debt, and possibly 
inflation—with euro entrance as both a prize for the political leaders in power and a marking 
of the end of anti-crisis policy.
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INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE: FROM FACADE DEMOCRACIES TO 
VELVET DICTATORSHIPS
Attila Ágh
ABSTRACT
Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential election has launched a wave of discussions 
in the international media and political science literature on “authoritarian populism” and a “populist 
explosion.” Although this paper also reflects on this new wave of populism in the West, it concentrates on 
the connections between democracy’s decline and the so-called populist explosion in eastern central Europe 
(ECE) and closely investigates the Hungarian case within the context of ECE. This paper describes 
populism in ECE as a product of the transition from fading facade democracies to emerging velvet 
dictatorships. These velvet dictatorships rely on the soft power of media and communication rather on the 
hard power of state violence. Paradoxically, the ruling anti-elite populist parties have developed a system 
of populism from above, managed by the new politico-business elite. Populism (social and national) and 
Euroscepticism are the two most basic, and twin, terms used to describe these new (semi)authoritarian 
regimes. Populism and Euroscepticism are convertible; they are two sides of the same coin as they express 
the same divergence from the EU mainstream. Therefore, this paper introduces the term: Eupopulism.
Key words: decline of democracy, comparative ECE populism, three periods and types of populism
INTRODUCTION: INCREASING EUPOPULISM AS A MEGATREND IN EAST 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
Populism’s many faces change within different socio-political environments, therefore it is 
very difficult to give a comprehensive definition of populism. All approaches to populism, 
however, converge at a general condition for populism: two homogeneous and antagonistic 
groups—the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite—face off in a political contest based on this 
people-versus-elite dichotomy. In this Manichaean vision of society, a decision-making shortcut 
between the people and the elite emerges in the form of a charismatic and honest leader, who 
with sizeable popular support, makes all decisions—eliminating the need for the intermediary 
institutions as the general will of the people is evident. Populism is messianic, the charismatic 
leader offers salvation to the people by defeating society’s internal and external so-called 
enemies. “Although vague and ill-defined, the concept of ‘populism’ does a better job than 
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any other currently circulating well-defined concepts of capturing the nature of the challenges 
facing liberal democracy today.” (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p.7). Thus, there is a paradox in the 
academic research: despite the large amount of literature on populism, content on populism’s 
nature is missing or minimal. Because populism is a thin and eclectic ideology, it can easily be 
combined with thicker ideological counterparts such as conservatism, liberalism, and socialism.1
Populist parties can be analysed more deeply by examining the contrasts between responsive 
and responsible parties, between short-term and long-term approaches, and between direct 
political action and strategic vision (Bardi et. al, 2014). Actually, according to the seminal work of 
Mény and Surel (2002), populism is a pathology of representative democracy because populism 
always reveals the primary national and regional deficiencies of a representative democracy. 
As most studies mention, populism is difficult to conceptualize because its varieties depends 
on context, time, and local conditions.2
As populism has a different form for every period of democratic malaise and a face specific 
to different countries, regions, and continents, and as the definitions and descriptions of 
populism as a pathology hinge on the standards of democracy in a given period and reflect the 
features of a particular country or region, this paper—though it relies on mainstream literature 
on populism—deals only with populism particular to ECE.3
Populism has been a megatrend in eastern central Europe since the onset of systemic 
changes in the region in 1989. Populism has been, to some extent, an endemic feature of all 
parties in the region—including the mainstream parties—and reached its peak in the populism-
from-above of the currently ruling parties. The basic statement of this paper is that the main 
reason behind ECE’s populism is the region’s failure to catch up to the West and “return to 
Europe.” This unsuccessful attempt to achieve the so-called central European dream (Darvas, 
2014) has defined the region’s last quarter century. In reaction to the global crisis, “countries like 
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and [the] Czech Republic appeared to take a ‘populist turn’ . . . the 
incidents of threats to the EU’s democratic principles and values has increased” (EPC Discussion 
Paper, Balfour and Stratulat, 2012, p. 2). Hence, the populist drug has been instrumental to the 
ECE’s survival of a long triple-crisis and to bridging the gap between unrealistic expectations 
1  As Richard Youngs indicates, we have to “reframe the debate on populism” after its victory in the United 
Kingdom and United States. On the new wave, see Judis (2016a,b) and Mishra (2016). There have also been 
two waves of politics of memory in the West, first Patterson and Monroe (1998) and Winter (1998), and second, 
Lebow et. al. (eds) (2006), Mark (2010) and Blacker et al.(2013).
2  From the massive collection of Western mainstream literature on populism, see Barr (2009), Chwalisz (2015), 
Degan-Krause and Haughton (2009), Giusto et al. (2013), Haughton (2014), Herman (2015), Kessels (2015), Krastev 
(2007), Kriesi (2014), Kriesi and Pappas (2015), Laclau (2007), Ladrech (2014), Lewis (2014), Mair (2002), Mény 
and Surel (2002), Mudde (2002,2007), Painter (2013), Pytlas (2016), Rupnik (2007a,b), Wolinetz and Zaslove 
(2016), and Woods (2014). The academic history of populism since the late 1960s has been presented by Pappas 
(2015). For international literature on ECE, and on populist parties, see Cabada et al. (2014), Casal Bértoa (2012), 
Gherghina (2014), Haughton (2014), Kopecky et al. (2012), Lewis (2014), and Sedelmeier (2014).
3  The populist drive has been stronger in ECE than in the Baltic states, since the latter have been much more 
internationally competitive, as indicated by ranking institutes like Bertelsmann and others. The Baltic states have 
not suffered from a decline in democracy to that extent that ECE’s states have. Unlike ECE’s states, the Baltic 
states still stand a reasonable chance of integrating into the European core. Thus, this paper deals only with 
five ECE states and focuses on the Hungarian case, which has been regarded as the worst case by international 
political scientists and the media (BF, 2016a,b).
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and the region’s worsening realities. ECE’s populism has been an international and domestic 
product of at least two of the West’s fallacies: 1) that traveling the road to the West would be 
an easy journey; and 2) that ECE’s states would rise from Soviet repression ready to become 
European overnight with the same ease that Sleeping Beauty awoke from the witch’s spell.4
Populism may be an important feature of the party system in the West, but it has been 
much more influential in eastern central Europe where there has been a megatrend in party 
development due to ECE’s populations’ high and unmet expectations. In fact, eastern central 
Europe was a semi-periphery of western Europe for centuries and, after regaining independence 
from Soviet repression, the region has indeed “returned to Europe,” but only with a new form 
of semi-peripheral status. Increasing populism in ECE is the political price the region has paid 
for its transition from socialism to various forms of semi-western market economies and formal-
legal macro-democracies. Thus, this paper will not engage in a discussion on the definition of 
populism in general, but it will pursue the specificities of populism in ECE. This paper contributes 
to the rich academic literature on populism in ECE by both widening the topic first to the ECE’s 
general features based on the region’s common historical trajectory, and by narrowing the 
topic later to describe the successive stages and types populism.
Of course, populism is not a new phenomenon in ECE, populism has a long history in 
the region and its path, characteristically, includes many forms of populist movements and 
narratives. ECE’s populism—or the populism of individual countries in ECE—is an organic 
extension of traditional forms of populism from the region’s former periods. The region’s 
historical turning point occurred around the late 1980s and early 1990s. The collapse of the 
bipolar world rendered systemic change in the region that were so drastic a new kind of populism 
was born. A new period of hopes and expectations began and the path dependence motives 
returned with a vengeance. I will discuss this return-to-history scenario, in lieu of a return-to-
Europe scenario, as the re-emergence of a traditional narrative articulated in the region’s new 
situation. The path dependence motives, however, just scratch the surface in reframing this 
narrative as a freedom fight against the EU (Orbán, 2016), which is evident in the absolutely 
new approach of confrontational, anti-EU, hard populism.
Finally, ECE’s case demonstrates how populism traditionalizes an anti-EU narrative with 
soft power by manipulating the masses with simplistic traditionalizing narratives—the main 
weapons of populist parties and actors, both oppositional and in government. The populist 
parties in ECE are often prisoners of history, they use the politics of historical memory as their 
main ideological weapon in domestic politics. After the so-called illiberal turn (Rupnik, 2012), 
the newly emerging velvet dictatorships have been modernized. Hence, as Smilov and Krastev 
point out, instead of using physical violence, their main instrument of repression is the capture 
and abuse of soft-power: “There are certain long-term changes in the political process, which 
4  This paper follows my recent publications on ECE (Ágh, 2015a,b, 2016a,b). I do not deal here with the socio-
economic causes of increasing populism, I have written a series of papers on the triple crisis (transformation crisis 
in 1990s, post-accession crisis in 2000s and global crisis in 2010s) and ECE’s failures in the  catching-up process 
in socio-economic and competitiveness terms (see Ágh 2015c). Data on the general impoverishment in ECE due 
to the global crisis are available in IMF (2014, 2016) and ILO (2016). The democratic malaise in ECE can also be 
seen in Pew survey results (2009, 2014, 2016).
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seem to facilitate the spread of populism. First, politics has become much more media-centred 
and personalized. The importance of loyalty to ideas and programs is diminishing . . . Populist 
parties, with their focus on communications and personalities, are much better suited for such 
an environment, than ‘traditional’ parties . . . it has almost made the concept of [a] ‘party 
program’ devoid of meaning” (2008, p. 10).
Even democracy itself has been included in the simplistic traditionalizing narratives 
incumbent ECE governments frequently abuse. The ruling politico-business elites have narrowly 
defined democracy as a government with free elections, despite the fact that the most recent 
elections in Hungary, in 2014, may have been free, but they were certainly not fair. At every 
step of the decision-making process, ECE’s governments seem to argue, “We are entitled to 
make this decision because we won the election and this is a democracy.” Therefore, ECE’s 
populations are understandably suspicious of democracy and may be thinking, “If this system 
of governance is democracy, I don’t like it.” It is no wonder that ECE’s populations have serious 
reservations about their experiences with such so-called democracies. These formal, electoral 
democracies, instead of have becoming substantial liberal democracies, have turned into 
facades of democracy.5
1. SOFT AND HARD POPULISM: PERIODS AND TYPES OF POPULISM IN ECE
ECE’s populism departs from general populism’s people-versus-elite dichotomy and Manichaean 
approach to political contestation in a manner specific to the region’s historical trajectory and 
to the emergence of ECE’s facade democracies over the last quarter-century. The issue most 
specific to populism in ECE is the merging of political elites and business elites that resulted in 
a drastic reduction in the number of political actors, a narrowing of the very sphere of politics, 
oligarchization, and state capture. Accordingly, there are three forms and periods of populism 
in ECE—shy, soft, and hard-populism—following the reduction of politics. And there are three 
main types of populism, marginal, business-centred, and the politics-centred, which follow 
specific forms of oligarchization in a given country in ECE.
I apply the term shy populism to describe the ECE’s first period of populism in the 1990s 
when a naïve optimism dominated public discourse and populism was weak and marginal. The 
distinction between soft and hard populism in ECE dates back to the 2000s. “Soft populism is 
the challenge to the existing system of representation and mainly to existing party system . . 
. Hard populism is characterized by more severe threats to the constitutional framework: it 
challenges not only the existing structure of representation but also some of the fundamental 
principles of liberal democracy such as the protection of individual and minority rights, etc,” 
(Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 9). Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism is 
rather fluid, the ECE’s parties move back and forth across the grey zone between populist and 
non-populist actions. Hence in general, all parties are populist to some extent.6
5  The Journal of Democracy has published a series of special issues on democratic backsliding , see 27(1), 
January 2016. The term free but not fair has been used to describe elections by experts (see Mudde, 2014), and 
also by official institutions, such as the Council of Europe (Muiznieks, 2014) and OSCE (2014).
6  I do not deal here with the early form of shy, marginal, and weak populism in the 1990s, when there was 
still belief in an upcoming horn of plenty, since the deviation from the EU mainstream basically began in the late 
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Before the global economic crisis, there was a wide range of grey, in-between positions 
instead of polar cases. But after the crisis, there have been clear, classic moves from soft to 
hard populism. Thus, soft and hard populism have to be distinguished not only analytically, 
but also historically. Soft populism emerged with its deep people-versus-elite dichotomy 
due to the narrowing of the political arena. This reduction in politics was due to the socio-
economically based exclusion of the masses from politics, which also led to partocracy. Finally, 
the emergence of hard populism—in the region’s third period of populism—and the rise of an 
aggressive populist elite is strongly connected to the protracted global economic crisis, which 
contributed to the people’s deep dissatisfaction with an impotent political elite. In the Polish 
and Hungarian cases, hard populism has appeared in its classic form in response to the global 
economic crisis; whereas in the Czech and Slovak cases, soft populism didn’t harden until the 
2010s. Altogether, since the early 2010s, mainstream analysts have pointed out a common 
tendency towards populism in ECE, a populism that shares a common essence but varies by 
individual country (EPC, 2012; EPC, 2016).7
These three periods of populism have been closely connected with the types of populism in 
ECE. Abby Innes’s analysis of the various types of populism in ECE contributes to descriptions of 
the present period of populism. Specifically, Innes identifies two types of political developments 
in ECE. In a corporate state capture, economic motivations dominate and powerful corporations 
and almighty oligarchs appear on the political scene rather directly—as they did in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia—and produce business-centred populism. In this model, neither 
party politicians nor oligarchs endeavour to make long-term ideological changes to the state 
machinery as an expression of their values and expectations, but instead strive to institute 
short-term, rent- or profit-seeking changes driven to the fore by business oligarchs active on 
the political scene. In Innes’s opposite model, party state capture, political motivations drive 
the new elite. In this scenario, parties want long-term control of state machinery in order 
to transform the state according to their values and expectations. Poland and Hungary have 
produced politics-centred populism. In Slovakia, the ruling Social Democratic party, Smer-SD, 
tried to build a closer version of the “political” populism, but this attempt failed at the March 
2016 elections. In this model, oligarchs are less prominent and less likely to play direct political 
roles, but they enjoy the privileges of state capture nevertheless. Rent- or profit-seeking drives 
appear first in domination over the state. Therefore, “the EU’s leverage is necessarily limited 
in the cases of party state capture” (Innes, 2014, p. 101).
In my view, the common denominator shared by party state captures and corporate state 
captures is democracy capture, which occurs when the dominant parties in the hegemonic 
1990s with soft- and hard-populism. I have analysed the ECE countries here using the term facade democracy, 
which has been widely used in international political science, and I have introduced the term Golem parties to 
describe political organizations that extend into or capture large parts of the economy and the media.
7  Increasing populism in ECE has been analysed extensively, see Meseznikov et al. (2008), in which the authors 
treat ECE’s populism as a region-specific political issue, rather different from that of other regions and continents. 
There are some recent papers on the populism written by Bugaric (2008) and Enyedi (2015, 2016a,b). The Policy 
Solutions Institute has also published a general report on ECE (2015). Bertelsmann’s report on the Czech Republic 
(pp. 2,4) points out that “the increasing public disenchantment with political parties” leads to “the fluidity of party 
system.” The report describes President Zeman as the main figure of populist politics. See also, Klíma (2015).
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party system abuse their majority to legally transform the democratic polity into a facade 
democracy. This democracy capture has recently appeared in ECE as a form of populism from 
above. In these appearances, strong elite rulers transform the basic social, economic, and 
political structures and colonize civil society in a “society capture.” The current governments 
in ECE have been based on tight networks formed by a joint politico-business elite, a privileged 
political class with tough party discipline and high incomes.  These joint politico-business elites 
have organized statocracies. The statocracizing of populist democracy has been based on nativist 
state capitalism, state capitalism combined with a parasitic national capitalism created by 
drastically intervening with the market economy. There have been many detailed analyses on 
the oligarchization of market economies and emerging negative informal institutions comprising 
a large clientele for joint political and business networks, resulting in the uncontested rule of a 
power-hungry politico-business elite. This nationalist anti-elite ideology, in fact, represents and 
defends its own elite rule with unlimited power, as checks and balances have been reduced to 
a mere facade. There has been a wide variety of populist parties and movements, populism has 
increased in all countries in ECE. All in all, populism has been a megatrend in ECE, accompanied 
by its twin process, Euroscepticism.8
In general, the deepening socio-economic crisis has led to “populist polarization” in ECE 
(Enyedi, 2016a,b). One objective of populism is to provide a strong, charismatic leader with 
unquestionable authority with an enemy—the incumbent elite or foreigners—for political 
exploitation in black-and-white populist narratives. ECE’s countries’ failure to catch up in the EU 
has become clearer given global crisis management in these countries and has been the driving 
force of populism nowadays. Consequently, serious conflicts between the EU and domestic 
ruling populist elites in ECE have surfaced. Hence, the new politico-business elites have found 
images of an enemy inside the country and also outside the country: the EU. Again, populism 
and Euroscepticism are twin phenomena, since it is particularly true in ECE that “populists can 
easily project these problems onto ‘Europe,’ which in this case merely represents fear of the 
outside world in general . . . What has taken the form of an anti-EU vote constitutes in reality a 
protest against socio-economic problems at home“ (Gros, 2014, pp. 2-3). Populism has emerged 
basically, although not exclusively, as Eupopulism, an anti-EU movement and mentality: “On 
both sides, an increasing national focus and a rise in populism as well as anti-EU sentiment are 
evident in all parts of society. The EU is more and more perceived as a problem. The weakest 
hold that the EU, and especially core countries in the euro zone, are imposing too much on 
them and asking too much from them.” (Emmanouilidis, 2011, p. 13).
As usual, the ruling populist parties try to divert the political agenda from vital socio-
economic issues to nationalist-nativist narratives about refugees and international conspiracy 
theories. Above all, the populist governments thrive on international crises, times when it is 
8  Policy Solutions (2015, pp. 26-30) counters that in 2014 and 2015 support for populist parties increased and 
explicitly named ECE’s relevant populist parties: HU 72% (Fidesz and Jobbik); CZ 48.2% (Czech Communist Party, 
Party of Free Citizens, Dawn-National Coalition, Freedom and Direct Democracy, and ANO 2011); PL 51.18% 
(Law and Justice, Congress of the New Right, Kukiz, Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic), SK 7.1% (Slovak 
National Party, but Smer is not included).
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easy to find enemies. Recently, new issues have come up such as anti-refugee rhetoric in a 
campaign allegedly defending a country—or sometimes more generally, Europe as a whole—
from Muslim arch-enemies or from inevitable invasions due to the declining West’s inability 
to protect a country or Europe. It proves that, even in the present period, the governments in 
ECE have been successful in getting popular support by opening or closing new issue niches, by 
entering issue niches into the political arena or by supporting niche actors with the ownership 
of resonant frames.9 Lubomir Zaorálek, the Czech minister of foreign affairs rightly notes:
In today’s jarred climate, no member state is immune to the temptations of inward-looking 
populism, though it may feed off different sources and manifest itself in different forms. In 
Central Europe, the legacy of communist rule casts a long shadow— but so do the mistakes 
of the transition period, with its overreliance on technocratic modes of change, often at the 
expense of social cohesion, inclusive development and democratic accountability. It has left 
too many of our citizens on the losing side of economic transformation, alienated from what 
they perceive as a closed system shot through with corruption. In today’s time of distress 
and uncertainty, past failures are coming back to haunt us, empowering far-right extremists, 
polarizing our societies and undermining trust in Europe’s liberal order” (2016, p. 2).
In the political turmoil in east central Europe, populists often win elections easily by 
mobilizing public support with simplistic populist slogans. The people, enchanted by messianic 
populist appeals, distance themselves from parties that do not use populist slogans. A closer 
analysis of the periods and types of populism in ECE leads to a discussion of the weak and 
volatile party systems in ECE; Eupopulism as a megatrend has penetrated the political system 
as a whole in ECE, although it characterizes the ECE countries to different extents and in various 
ways. This common populist disease can be seen in oppositions to the EU mainstream in the 
refugee crisis, such as the V4 Prague Declaration (2015).
2. CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND VICTORIOUS POPULIST-PROTEST PARTIES IN ECE
The countries in ECE had not fully completed their process of adjusting to EU membership 
when the global economic crisis struck.  Because the crisis closely followed their EU accessions, 
the global crisis hit ECE’s countries harder.  There, the crisis provoked popular dissatisfaction, 
giving populist parties an edge in ECE. In the last decade, increasing populism has also led 
to the rise of Eurosceptic parties. In the three European Parliament (EP) elections held in 
ECE—in 2004, 2009, and 2014—five countries in ECE sent a total of forty-three parties to 
EP seats. ECE’s representation of mainstream party members in the European Parliament 
(MEPs) is relatively small, only about half (123 of 237)mainstream MEPS hail from ECE. 
These numbers reveal a tsunami of small populist-protest parties winning EP elections and 
clearly show a Eupopulism trend. The basic issue, from a bird’s-eye view of ECE’s historical 
9  The protracted social crisis has created a high level of xenophobia in ECE. Two Hungarian institutes, Political 
Capital (see www.politicalcapital.hu) and Policy Solutions (see www.policysolutions.hu), have been deeply involved 
in international research on DEREX (Demand for Right-Wing Extremism, see www.derexindex.eu) and published 
many papers on extreme-right parties, including Jobbik.
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trajectory is the decreasing popularity of political elites and low participation in elections 
with very high party volatility.10
The West’s usual typologies of parties and party systems do not work in ECE, and a formal-
legal approach to the region’s narrow political history does not help either, since the historical 
trajectory of countries in ECE has been determined to a great extent by the socio-economic 
history of the region. It is important to identify the special role parties and party systems 
have played in ECE during its quarter-century of systemic changes. After the first decade of 
EU membership, countries in ECE had still not effectively institutionalized parties as the main 
actors of both representative and participative democracy. All of the eastern central European 
countries’ formal-legal institutions have been built like sand palaces—without solid social 
backing or patterns of civic culture. When these countries failed to achieve unrealistically high 
expectations, of some kind of welfare society, national-social populism offered the population 
a mirage of a new age and ideological drugs as recompensation. Thus, in ECE, the population’s 
perceived reality differs very much from the genuine socio-economic reality, and this contrast 
between dream and actuality grew during the region’s first decade of EU membership. In the 
EU, a deep democratic malaise has appeared in both the so-called East and in the West, but in 
very different ways. ECE has been haunted by the nightmarish and increasing gap between the 
core and the periphery and by the threat of deepening peripherialization. Hence, the region’s 
disappointment over not being able to easily and rapidly catch up during the global crisis has 
led to much deeper democratic malaise in ECE than in the West.
EU membership in ECE brought a series of achievements, but it also caused region-specific 
negative externalities. First of all, the eastern enlargement developed dependency by closely 
integrating ECE’s production structures to the West. The East has become an economic 
semi-periphery of the near West, especially of Germany and Austria (Galgóczi, 2016). This 
semi-peripheral status has produced marked underdevelopment by creating islands of poverty 
within eastern central Europe’s countries. The countries are deeply divided internally between 
their developing, modern regions and their backward, declining regions. A crucial issue for 
ECE is internal and territorial social cohesion; these countries need to be closely integrated 
not only with the EU, but also to unite their own modernized and backward regions. The rise 
of national-social populism as a megatrend in ECE is based on deepening social-vertical and 
national-horizontal splits within ECE. Simply put, ECE’s democratic malaise has been caused 
by the profound social malaise of the last quarter-century.11
Thus, in the new political geography, ECE’s countries have been splitting into two groups: 
the west of the East and the east of the East. The former achieved some kind of western 
10  I provide only a rough estimation, since it is rather difficult both to identify the long-term mainstream parties 
in ECE—given that there has been a drastic change among the leading parties—and to qualify the short-term, 
smaller parties getting EP seats. Yet, this changing party landscape shows the fragility of the EP’s representation 
of mainstream parties and the relatively large representation of changing, smaller populist parties.
11  Many policy institutes—Bertelsmann (2016a,b), European Catching Up Index (2014) and FH, 2016—have 
analysed this contrast between the formal and substantive democratization in ECE. Ten years of EU membership 
has been evaluated in the introduction of Rupnik and Zielonka ‘s work (2013). See also Banac (2014). There 
are also some analyses emphasizing the lack of participatory democracy in ECE, see the chapter by Cabada in 
Demetriou (2013), and see Bugaric (2008).
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development, and relatively speaking, is catching up.  The latter group, however, has absolutely 
declined. The east of the East has lost its competitiveness, experienced high unemployment, 
and witnessed a worsening standard of living. Furthermore, national statistics relate wide 
territorial polarization there. Therefore, a distinction is needed to identify the relative and 
fragile—precarious—satisfaction of ECE’s populations in the west of the East and the deep 
dissatisfaction of eastern central Europe’s populations in the east of the East. Nonetheless, 
given this political geography, the general disappointment of ECE’s populations after ten years 
of EU membership has determined domestic party landscapes. This basic domestic territorial 
and social divergence has also been responsible for the distinctions between the soft and hard 
social movements, parties, and ideologies in the west of the East versus those of the east of the 
East within ECE’s countries. These differences can be easily detected on the countries’ electoral 
maps through the varieties of populism and Euroscepticism at national and EP elections. The 
hard populist and Eurosceptic parties have found popular support in the east of the East among 
the region’s so-called absolute losers, the unemployed. The soft populist and Eurosceptic parties 
in the west of the East are supported by the so-called relative losers: the declassed middle 
strata. This can be seen best on the electoral maps of Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, which 
are completely partitioned between East and West. All in all, due to the global crisis, ECE’s 
populations have generally been living in a state of permanent insecurity in these precarious 
countries and there is an increasingly real precariate class or strata in the middle (ILO, 2016).
Actually, to discover the secret history of ECE, one has to identify the political actors and 
define the parties and party systems in ECE in a manner that diverges from the standard 
definitions in the West. This history can be described as a negative tendency towards the 
emergence of Golem parties in hegemonic party systems. These strong parties have been the 
most relevant actors in the young, declining democracies in the last quarter-century of ECE’s 
history. The particular features of the parties, and their hegemonic party systems dominated 
by the strongest—by Golem parties—have structured political and social life as a whole. They 
have appeared in different ways in ECE’s countries as dominant actors of party landscapes. 
The biggest eastern central European parties, as monopolistic political actors, have become 
almighty, comprehensive social actors with large, strong, informal networks. These parties have 
also embraced the economy and media in a close merger between politics and business (see 
Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). Golem parties have created well-working country-size corruption 
networks based on public procurement and EU transfers. In this way, Golem parties have to 
a great extent controlled paralysed societies. Moreover, in systems of crony capitalism (The 
Economist, 2014a), Golem parties have organized their own special pseudo-civil society from 
above as well as a domestication of civil society. The social embeddedness of all of ECE’s parties 
has been very weak, hence socially and ideologically “unanchored political elites” have emerged 
and been controlled, to a great extent, by business oligarchs (Herman, 2015).
The large formal institutions—including parties as far as membership and relations to 
civil society and its organizations is concerned—have been organized without social support 
and participation. Therefore, paradoxically, the most institutionalized party systems are the 
most unstable. As Golem parties neglect support of their membership more and more, the 
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formal stabilization of party systems into huge parties actually means the cumulative social 
destabilization of party-political systems in ECE. From the outside, party hegemons or Golem 
parties look like big, strong, well-organized parties; in fact, they are cadre parties appointing 
only loyal followers to public posts and they lose public support at critical elections due to 
undelivered promises and high levels of corruption. In general, there has been an increasing 
alienation of the common people from the world of political promises and a growing lack 
of confidence in public institutions, parties, parliaments, and governments. As a result, due 
to cumulated social tensions, new parties appear abruptly in the old party systems. These 
critical parties—as deviations from mainstream parties—now represent a political reaction 
to the management of the global economic crisis, they express the masses’ suffering from 
the full, long-term effects of a triple crisis. The low levels of trust in the new democratic 
institutions—and above all in the parties—have generated their long-standing, cumulative 
negative effects.12
Although populists usually appeal to “the people” as a whole, as opposed to the corrupt 
and impotent elites, the populist parties do not appear only in oppositional roles. Populists 
offer an alternative to representative democracy in the form of strong-handed majoritarian 
rule and they propagate the belief that supporting the majority at elections gives government 
a free hand in decision-making. Therefore, populists oppose minority rights and interest 
intermediation. Paradoxically, populism, as an anti-elite movement and ideology, tries to 
establish an exclusive elite rule with a strong leader and a disempowered population. Populist 
parties and leaders refer to the people’s opposition against an impotent and corrupt elite, 
but actually they want to become the new elite and consolidate a new elite position. Thus, 
“central European populism is a longing for new elites.” (Smilov and Krastev, 2008, p. 10). Since 
populist parties also attract some traditional left-wing voters during periods of austerity, they 
have been very successful in ECE in gaining power with large-scale victories and have formed 
a new political elite.
From the late 2000s onward, the outbursts of populist protest and the rise of anomic 
movements have, more and more, taken the form of demonstrations led by extreme-right 
organizations. This negative tendency reached its peak in the 2010s with the emergence of all 
sorts of populist and extremist organizations and the volcanic appearance of protest parties. 
In the 2010s, the socio-economic shock of the global crisis contributed to a prolonged party-
political crisis in ECE with these Golem-type parties. Under the pressure of crisis management 
the first party system eroded in the 2000s and due to the large popular dissatisfaction, it finally 
collapsed in the 2010s. But efforts to organize hegemonic, Golem parties have continued after 
ECE’s critical elections, and the new, second party system emerged. This recent political crisis has 
been based on the worsening social crisis—impoverishment and social exclusion has led to social 
populism—from below and has culminated in the deepening identity crisis—renationalization 
12  The rankings of public trust in politicians in ECE are among the worst globally (of 144 countries): CZ: 138, HU: 
113, PL: 101, SI: 133 and SK: 121 (WEF, 2015: 409). Accordingly, there was very low turnout in ECE at the 2004, 
2009, and 2014 EP elections, the participation was 27.9-28.2-18.2; 38.4-36.2-28.9; 20.8-24.5-23.8; 28.3-28.3-20.9 
and 16.9-19.6-13.0 per cent in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia respectively.
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and xenophobia leading to national populism—from above. Indeed, the political science on 
ECE’s party developments is a dismal science as this short overview of ECE’s party systems 
clearly demonstrates.13
3. THE WORST CASE SCENARIO: THE HUNGARIAN DISEASE OR POPULISM  
FROM ABOVE
This course from aggressive opposition to a newly entrenched political elite is clearly 
demonstrated by the Hungarian case, in Hungary the global crisis led to a complete populist 
victory during the second and third Orbán governments. Hungary has been a worst case scenario, 
not only in illustrating democracy’s decline in general, but particularly in establishing an enduring 
and fake populist democracy. Hungary’s socio-economic crisis caused lagging confidence in the 
political elite and the mainstream’s lack of trust in Hungary’s democratic parties when these 
parties proved they were unable to manage neither the situation nor the global crisis and failed 
to deliver on their promises. Accordingly, Hungary’s triple crisis brought three populist waves 
in Hungary. In the first period, in the 1990s, the transformation crisis produced widespread 
social shock and dissatisfaction with the new democracy, which—in the early years—resulted 
in only shy or marginal populism in Hungary. However, by the second period, at the end of the 
decade, Hungary’s failure to achieve unrealistically high expectations brought the first Orbán 
government to power, resulting in an authoritarian attempt at light or soft populism. Because 
Orbán formed a coalition government, that from 1998 to 2002, had only a relative majority 
with limited power, he could not transform the constitutional order. In the 2000s, however, the 
post-accession crisis contributed to a much larger populist mobilization during the Socialist-
Liberal coalition governments of 2002 to 2010. Fidesz was in opposition, but this stage of 
populist mass mobilization was a very important preparation period for a complete populist 
takeover orchestrated through both social referendum, street violence, and the organization 
of so-called civil circles as mobilization devices directed against the incumbent government.14
In the late 2000s, due to post-accession and the onset of the global economic crisis, 
Hungary’s large, formally well-institutionalized, but socially weak, democratic parties collapsed. 
Thus, Hungary demonstrated clearly the ECE paradox: the most institutionalized party systems 
become the most destabilized political systems. On this period, Renata Uitz notes: “What 
makes the Hungarian case interesting is that populist devices are not used by newcomers or 
fringe parties to mobilize support in order to gain entry to mainstream politics. Rather, in the 
present day Hungary populist rhetoric is a means of communication for a large parliamentary 
party which resorts to this instrument not simply as a campaign device but also as a technique 
replacing—at least at one level of communication—the usual arsenal of opposition in everyday 
13  The cases of politics-centred hard populism in Poland and Hungary are parallel developments according to 
the international media. See the discussion on the Orbán-Kaczynski meeting and of a counter-cultural revolution 
against old Europe in The Financial Times (Foy and Buckley, 2016), or see Pytlas (2016) on Polish populism. I 
recently dealt with the parallel developments in Poland and Hungary (Ágh, 2016c,d).
14  Here I summarize briefly the Hungarian developments. It is not by chance that Pappas (2014, 2015) has 
made a parallel analysis of the Hungarian and Greek populism, both cases are outstanding. As I have mentioned 
in my former papers, many analysts consider Hungary the worst case of populism in ECE.
32  At tilA Ágh
parliamentary parties” (Uitz, 2008, p. 69). In this decade of aggressive populist mobilization, 
Fidesz—as an allegedly centre-right party—embraced and supported Jobbik by absorbing the 
narratives and slogans of the extreme right. Characteristically, Viktor Orbán and Gábor Vona, 
the presidents of Fidesz and Jobbik, come from the same cradle, from the same civil circle of 
populist organizations of the 2000s.15
As a result, in the third period, the velvet dictatorship has emerged as a full-fledged, 
hard-populist democracy. Nowadays, Hungary has a quasi one-party system, and as Fidesz has 
over-institutionalized, its party institutions are almost direct state and government institutions. 
All of Hungary’s other parties are weak and hardly institutionalized at all. The turning point for 
Hungarian populism occurred in 2010 when Fidesz received a two-thirds supermajority and 
the second Orbán government ruined democratic and constitutional checks and balances. 
This historical turning point can be modelled according to distinctions between soft and hard 
populism. Usually, the dividing line between soft and hard populism in ECE is rather fluid, but 
this transition between the second and third waves of populism in Hungary in 2010 destroyed 
the liberal democracy. Because Hungary experienced the region’s deepest social crisis, which 
resulted in the largest populist victory in ECE, the Hungarian case demonstrates the strongest 
populist course to power. Fidesz controls a large part of the economy through voluntarist 
legislation and by increasing state property, Fidesz also controls the economy by wielding 
hard political power and by using soft power in the media. Orbán—and the Fidesz regime in 
general—claim to be centre-right national-conservatives, but these terms do not fit Orbán or 
his regime. In fact, centre-right conservatives, preferring some kind of the West’s Christian-
democratic line, were shocked by Orbán’s second government in 2010. These centre-right 
conservatives, referred to in the Hungarian media as “orphaned conservatives” (Lantos, 2011), 
turned more and more against the Orbán regime before they finally publicly denounced Orbán’s 
populism (Dull, 2016).16
The Hungarian population tolerates a high level of cognitive dissonance; Hungarians are 
proud of being European and support Hungary’s EU membership, but they are also ready to 
blame the EU for the country’s socio-economic and political malaise. Fidesz has produced Janus-
faced narratives attacking the EU and defending Europe. Calls for a “freedom fight against the 
EU” defined populists’ slogans in Hungary during the Orbán governments, which have become 
the model cases illustrating the increase in populism in ECE. In the speech Orbán delivered 
on Hungary’s national holiday, 15 March 2016, Orbán—in the spirit of Eupopulism—extended 
15  Actually, in the 2000s Fidesz and Jobbik were close allies. Jobbik organized aggressive and violent street 
demonstrations, and Fidesz tacitly, behind the scenes, and indirectly supported them: “While street violence 
in the evenings was at its height in Budapest, Fidesz was calling mass demonstrations in Budapest during the 
afternoons . . . Throughout these days the reluctance of Fidesz to distance itself from rioters or from street riots 
was prevalent, with a well pronounced right-radical-right leaning” (Uitz, 2008, pp. 61-62).
16  Viktor Orbán has been the central figure of Hungarian populism and his most resonant declarations have 
voiced his support for “illiberal democracy” and “the decline of the West,” (2014,2015). After autocracy was 
elected, there was a great deal of reflection on Orbán in the media, see for instance Benner and Reinicke (2014), 
Bouillette (2014), Müller (2015), Nowak (2014), and The Economist (2014b). Orbán has been presented in the 
international press as the most important anti-EU actor in the refugee crisis, as “dictator light”, and as the model 
of divergence from European solidarity (on Orbán’s role as a “troublemaker” in the refugee crisis see EPC, 2016).
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a black-and-white populist model of the deep divide between the interests of the innocent 
people and the interests of the impotent elite, from the domestic level to the EU level. Orbán 
emphasized that the European population had fallen victim to the irresponsible EU elite’s 
mishandling of the refugee crisis, and he offered himself as a protector of the victimised 
European population (Orbán, 2016).17
Populist strategies are working well in elections and usually opt for slogans over programs; 
for instance Fidesz’s so-called electoral program, conceived in 2010, was a populist holy trinity: 
“work, family and order” (Fidesz, 2010). After winning the 2010 and 2014 elections, according 
to the operational logic of ruling populist elites, Fidesz drastically restricted the legitimate 
participation of political rivals in the public and political sectors by using legal-political, economic-
financial, and media instruments to strictly limit the actions of other political parties, political 
actors, and civil organizations. After the “octroy,” imposed upon the constitution in 2011—given 
manipulated electoral law and a captured media, Fidesz neglected to even concoct a populist 
electoral program. Instead, in 2014, the party simply declared “we continue.” The soft power 
of populist narratives had worked very well during the party’s governance. Fidesz’s narrative 
technique served to deepen the polarization of society, in which the socio-cultural frames 
of identity issues have replaced or derailed economic arguments about the pauperization of 
Hungarian society in the early 2010s.18
In the Hungarian case, the traditional return-to-history scenario instead of a modern return-
to-Europe scenario represents a basic populist soft-power narrative technique: reinventing the 
past. As the title of the article in the Financial Times by Norweigian minister Vidar Helgesen 
(2014), indicates, the Orbán government’s rule is indeed “Hungary’s journey back into past.” 
ECE’s common narratives are best illustrated by Fidesz’s national-nativist and anti-European 
narratives. The narratives reveal how public discourse is blanketed in historical myths that point 
to Trianon (the peace treaty signed after WWI in which Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory) 
as the main source of Hungary’s national trauma. Fidesz—and the even more the extreme-
right Jobbik—is warning the people of a second Trianon, instigated by Hungary’s domestic and 
international enemies in the EU. This age-old nativist narrative, retold by Fidesz, is a  politicized 
myth—a fairy tale of Great Hungary and a history that never was—based on a nineteenth-
century type of national mythology (Ádám and Bozóki, 2011). In the international arena, Fidesz’s 
narratives try to create a nativist-nationalist collective identity of Hungarians countering their 
strong European identity. At the same time, Fidesz wages value wars domestically; by redefining 
17  In his speech on 15 March 2016, a national holiday celebrating the 1848 revolution, Orbán called Hungarians 
to defend the sovereignty of Hungary against the EU. Nonetheless, according to Eurobarometer, 69 per cent of 
Hungarians declare a European identity, a number above the EU average of 64 per cent (2015, p. 32).
18  There has been a strong continuity in Fidesz’s political discourse since the 2000s: “The party which has 
consistently relied on populist rhetoric . . . is Fidesz . . . Hungarian public discourse has been captured by issues 
and rhetorical methods produced by populist-issue manufacturers. As a result, serious deliberation on other 
matters of public concern is replaced by rhetorical fireworks, display of symbols and empty slogans” (Uitz, 2008, 
p. 40). As an illustration of empty democracy, Fidesz has presented the results of the national consultations in 
the media as vox populi, although the return rate of letters has been very low and these processes have been 
neither transparent nor independently controlled.
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social divisions as cultural divides, the party creates two groups: 1) loyal followers, cast as true 
believers and patriots and; 2) enemies and political opponents, cast as traitors.19
Within this polarized Orwellian world of simplistic answers, Fidesz has successfully staged a 
democracy capture, and to a great extent, a language capture, by dominating public discourse 
with its slogans and terms. All public institutions have been named national and fake so-called 
national consultations have replaced the democratic decision-making process. So far, the soft 
power of words—a childish, oversimplified language in politics such as “Only Fidesz,” “One 
camp, one flag,” “Hungary is successful,” and “Hungary performs better”—and the soft power 
of manipulating or manufacturing data has worked well. The fragmented democratic parties 
have been unable to fight either the hard or soft power of Fidesz. Both mass intimidation, as 
a proxy for hard repression in an emptied democracy without checks and balances, and soft 
repression, with its aggressive agenda setting in the government-manipulated media, has worked 
well so far with the so-called Hungarian patient (Krasztev and van Til, 2015).
CONCLUSION: INCREASING POPULISM IN ECE POSES A SERIOUS CHALLENGE 
TO THE EU
The present success of populist parties in ECE refutes the idea that populists can only be 
successful in opposition and refutes the notion that populists cannot govern and are bound to 
fail when they are in power and have to deliver. At least, in this transitory period of the EU’s 
“polycrisis” (Juncker), ECE’s populist governments are not only successful, they demonstrate the 
systemic failure of a cohesive Europe by highlighting Europe’s increasing core-periphery divide. 
Orbán’s populist regime has contaminated the EU and contributed to “the rise of dystopian 
nationalist regimes . . . The recent victory of the conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party in 
Poland confirms a recent trend in Europe, the rise of illiberal state capitalism led by populist 
right-wing authoritarians . . . the popularity of populist, anti-EU, anti-migrant right-wing parties 
is on the rise” (Roubini, 2015, pp. 1-3). In Hungary’s latest wave of mass demonstrations, a 
popular student slogan announced on the molinos, “We are the first generation brought up in 
democracy. We do not want to be the last.” 
Former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton declared on 15 September 2011, the 
International Day of Democracy, “While democracy is the cornerstone of the European Union, 
it is clear that there is no single model for democratic government” (Ashton, 2011). But where 
are the borders of democracy’s variations? Populist facades of democracy and their changing 
forms, from soft populism to hard populism with the emerging velvet dictatorships, certainly 
do not fit with any variation of European democracy. Just to the contrary, populism is the main 
enemy of European democracy and should be defeated in ECE.20
19  The hegemonic position of Fidesz in the media has been one of the most discussed topics in Hungarian 
populism. According to experts’ estimates, Fidesz controls about 90 per cent of the media, with some free islands 
in Budapest and other main cities, but it has complete control of the media where the large part of the population 
lives. In a 2015 special issue of The Journal of Democracy, Kagan makes a special reference to Hungarian leaders 
who “crack down on press and political freedom” (2015, p. 29).
20  The fact that after the failed catching-up process, and under the pressure of the refugee crisis, the Visegrád 
Four (V4) states united in an unholy alliance in the EU to form a new kind of regional cooperation in ECE could 
be the topic of another paper (see Ágh, 2016c,d).
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CONTEMPORARY POPULISM AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN WESTERN EUROPE1
Maria Daniela Poli
ABSTRACT
Given a threatening new wave of populism crossing Europe, this article examines the link between 
populism and crisis as a Gordian knot and explores the relationship between contemporary populism and 
the Great Recession in Western Europe by underscoring how the principal feature of this relationship is 
the perception of the European Union as a common enemy.
Key words: Populism, crisis, Great Recession, political crisis, European Union
INTRODUCTION
The current economic crisis in Europe has changed the traditional panorama of political parties in 
the European Union’s member states. New formations have been forged and these new entities’ 
declarations of their direct relationships with the people, are often based on “a thin-centred 
ideology,” a contraposition between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004, 
p. 543). Or, to put it more mildly, these groups are based on “an ideology claiming that the political 
class has lost contact with the real will of people and promising to give it voice,” (Pinelli, 2011, p. 5). 
At the same time, older radical parties are being reinforced. Thus, it seems that a new spectre is 
haunting Europe: the spectre of populism. The concerns this phenomenon raises—the dominant 
liberal approach consistently attaches a negative connotation to populism and regards it as a 
democratic pathology2—are quite evident. In 2010, in an interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung, EU President Herman von Rompuy declared populism “the greatest danger for Europe” 
(Stabenow 2010). Rompuy’s statement remains relevant today. More recently, in a September 
13, 2015 interview with Corriere della Sera, President of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Laura 
Boldrini declared that “political integration is the only antidote to the populism” (Caprara 2015).
Hence, with some important exceptions like Italy,3 populism has historically been a 
marginal political phenomenon in Western Europe since the Second World War (especially 
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in comparison with Latin America). Yet, recent elections clearly reveal the rapid development 
of populism in Western Europe, where gains have been made by the National Front (FN) in 
France,4 the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany,5 the Five Star Movement (M5S) in 
Italy,6 the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP) in Great Britain,7 the Finns Party in 
Finland8 and, above all, the January 2015 triumph and more muted September 2015 victory of 
Greece’s Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left)9. The rise of populism is similarly evident in 
the success of Podemos in Spain10 and Juntos-Podemos in Portugal.11 The Brexit-referendum 
is also a clear sign of populism. The most cited significant cause of this wave of populism is 
the economic crisis spurred in 2009—a crisis that, by threatening the heart of constitutional 
state and the foundations of the European integration process, has also become an intense 
political crisis.
However, as Benjamin Moffitt (2015, p. 189 and p. 191) wrote, although “a focus on crisis 
is a mainstay of the literature on contemporary populism . . . the links between populism and 
crisis remain under-theorized and undeveloped . . . [and no journal article] directly addresses 
the relationship between populism and crisis as its central focus.” Given this, what is the relation 
between populism and economic crisis today in Western Europe?
4  In the 2012 presidential elections, the National Front achieved surprisingly good results with 17.9 per cent 
of the votes and two seats in the legislative elections held the same year. In the 2014 European Parliament 
elections, the National Front gained 24.86 per cent of the votes and shook the country by gaining 24 of France’s 
74 seats. In the first round of the departmental and regional elections, held in March and December 2015, 
respectively, the National Front’s winnings exceeded 25 percent and 28 percent of the votes, respectively before 
failing in the second round due to a strategic alliance against the National Front forged between Republicans 
and Socialists. In fact, Socialists withdrew their candidates and endorsed the mainstream rivals, the Republican 
party candidates.
5  Although Alternative for Germany did not overcome the 5 per cent electoral threshold in the 2013 federal 
elections, it did win 4.7 per cent of the votes. It was certainly “a remarkable debut in the comparatively very 
stable party system in Germany,” (Siemens 2013).
6  In the 2013 general elections, the Five Star Movement won 25.6 per cent of the votes for the Chamber of 
Deputies and 23.8 per cent for the Senate and, consequently, 109 deputies and 54 senators, earning the party 
the consent of the disillusioned left, the People of Freedom and Northern League voters.
7  In the 2015 general elections, UKIP won more than 1.3 million votes, becoming the third largest party in 
the United Kingdom. However, it gained only one seat in the House of Commons.
8  The Finns Party became the third largest party in the Finnish Parliament after the 2011 national elections 
and gained more ground in the 2015 elections when it became the second largest party and jointed the current 
government coalition formed solely of the Centre-Party, the Finns Party, and the National Coalition Party.
9  Syriza gained 36 per cent of the votes and 145 seats in January 2015; 35.5 per cent of the votes and 145 
seats in September 2015.
10  In the national elections in December 2015, Podemos became the third largest party in the Spanish Parliament 
with 20.7 per cent of the votes and 69 seats. Although the results of the national election held on June 26, 2016 
disappointed Podemos, they confirmed the political weight gained by this party: 21.1 per cent of the votes and 
71 seats. Furthermore, the Brexit-effect played an important role on this election, voters preferred the “safe” 
traditional parties—the People’Party (PP) and the Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE)—over the “adventurous” 
Podemos actors. The need for a stable executive remains, since the People’s Party did not obtain an absolute 
majority and building a government is proving to be very difficult.
11  Although the group has not developed into a party, in the October 2015 elections, Juntos-Podemos endorsed 
the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda), which became the third strongest force in Spain’s parliament with ten per cent 
of the votes, its biggest win in its sixteen years.
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1. POPULISM AND CRISIS: A GORDIAN KNOT?
The correlation between populism and crisis seems to be intuitive: populism rises from crisis 
and populism stokes crisis. Yet, despite this common perception, this populism-crisis link is not, 
from a scientific point of view, so simple. Because both the concept of crisis and the concept 
of populism are nebulous and somewhat indeterminate, some scholars doubt or criticize any 
connection between them. In his book on Europe’s populist radical right parties, Cas Mudde—
despite recognizing the validity of some empirical studies—clearly reveals his scepticism of a 
crisis-populism connection because of the difficulty of defining crisis.12 Furthermore, in his 
analysis on populism and neo-populism in Latin America, Alan Knight even denies that there 
is a nexus between populism and crisis, “Even more than ‘populism’, however, ‘crisis’, is a 
vague, promiscuously used, under-theorized concept which defies measurement and lacks 
explanatory power. To attribute ‘populism’ to ‘crisis’ may often be historically valid, but it does 
not afford a robust aetiology; and trying to explain one vague concept in terms of another is 
hardly a promising line of inquiry. Furthermore, this association is at best a rough tendency or 
correlation, not a definitional requirement or essential criterion. Populism, in short, can exist 
in ‘normal’, ‘non critical’ times,” (1998, pp. 227-228).
Another general counterargument holds that in the modern era there is always a political 
crisis in progress: the end of ideology crisis of the 1950s and 1960s, the participation crisis of 
the 1970s, the party crisis of the 1980s (Mudde 2007, p. 207) and 1990s, the globalization crisis 
of the second millennium, and those due to the ongoing economic crisis.
Although these objections are appealing, they do not stand up to the evidence. The 
dimension and the complexity of the two concepts, as well as their multiple faces, do not 
make their link weaker. And, if the problem of defining a nexus is the lack of a clear definition 
or either populism or crisis, we could not talk in general about populism. In fact, Isaiah Berlin’s 
so-called Cinderella complex,13 in which a prince seeks the owner of a shoe called populism, 
is yet to be overcome. Furthermore, historical data showing that populism takes its strength 
12  “Emphasis on the vital role of ‘crisis’ is a constant in studies of both historical and contemporary nativism 
and populism ... So far, the term ‘crisis’ has proven of limited use analytically because, although intuitively it may 
be easy to comprehend, it proves quite difficult to specify. Most authors do not even bother to try to articulate 
what constitutes a crisis, they simply state that a certain process has led to one, assuming that both the meaning 
of the term and the existence of the crisis are self-evident. Others define the term so broadly that virtually 
every period can be interpreted through the lens of the crisis. Finally, a number of authors seem to determine 
the existence of a crisis largely on the basis of the success of populist actors, which makes the relationship 
tautological. The definitional and operationalizational deficiencies in the crisis literature should not led an a priori 
rejection of the whole research in this field. In fact, in many instances the empirical research itself is quite sound, 
focusing on statistically significant correlations between various economic and political independent variables 
and the dependent variable of populist radical parties electoral success. The key problem in this literature is the 
relationship between these variables and the overarching concept of crisis,” (Mudde 2007, p. 205).
13  “There exist a shoe—the word ‘populism’—for which somewhere exists a foot. There are all kinds of feet, 
which it nearly fits, but we must not be trapped by these nearly fitting feet. The prince is always wandering 
about with the shoe; and somewhere, we feel sure, there awaits a limb called pure populism,” was pronounced 
in 1967, during the Government and Opposition conference organized by the review, at the London School of 
Economic and Political Science (LSE) and was later quoted by Canovan (1981, p. 7). For more on the difficulties 
of defining populism, starting from the Cinderella complex, see: Tarchi 2004 and 2013.
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from crisis in all its various forms cannot be taken lightly or ignored. As Ernesto Laclau (2005, 
p. 177) recalls, “Without the slump of the 1930s, Hitler would have remained a vociferous 
fringe ringleader. Without the crisis of the Fourth Republic around the Algerian war, De Gaulle’s 
appeal would have remained as unheard as it had been in 1946. And without the progressive 
erosion of the oligarchical system in the Argentina of the 1930s, the rise of Perón would have 
been unthinkable.”
Hence, the imputation of populism to the crisis cannot merely be regarded as a tautological 
tendency, though some do (Knight 1998, p. 227 nt. 22). Rather, “some degree of crisis in the 
old structure is a necessary precondition of populism” (Laclau 2005, p. 177). As Paul Taggart 
(2004, p. 275; 2002, p. 69) has written, “. . . populism is a reaction to a sense of extreme crisis. 
Populism is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity but comes as an accompaniment to 
change, crisis and challenge.” Very different experiences in diverse parts of the world clearly 
illustrate Taggart’s observation: the development of populist movements in America at the time 
of the Revolutionary War, the success of populism in Latin America against the backdrop of a 
highly unequal society, the diffusion of populism in Eastern Europe after the 1989 transition 
to pluralism, and the rise of Berlusconi in Italy (a paradigmatic example of media populism) 
due to the end of the political ideologies that had characterized Italian history—the so-called 
crisis of the First Republic.
Moreover, the fact that crises are permanent fixtures of contemporary politics does not 
demonstrate the contrary; it means only that a certain dose of populism is an inevitable 
element of modern democracies. The same can be said with regard to the existence of other 
external factors—such as corruption, inequality, and disenchantment—and the difficulty of 
distinguishing the impact of these factors on the rise of populism. In addition, these factors 
are often so inextricable from a crisis that they cannot be evaluated or examined in isolation.
Therefore, the first link between crisis and populism is causal. However, as Moffitt (2015, 
pp. 194-195) suggests, the relationship between crises and populism is not a simple cause-
and-effect relationship. What is important is not only the crisis itself, but perceptions of crisis, 
perceptions influenced by policy. Moffitt draws particular attention to this in his assertion 
that, “populist actors actively perform and perpetuate a sense of crisis, rather than simply 
reacting to external crisis,” (2015, p. 195). As Taggart (2004, p. 275) writes, populists use the 
sense of a crisis “to inject an urgency and an importance to their message.” They provide a 
particular interpretation of the causes of a crisis in order to distinguish the common people, 
whom they aspire to represent, from the elite whom they hold accountable for the status quo. 
The populist proposal is based on a mediation and internalization of the system’s exaggerated 
weak points; hence, crises are fertile ground for populist discourses. This game plan relies 
heavily on manipulating citizens’ feelings about the situation they live in to present a distorted 
reality. Racial discrimination provides an elementary example of this phenomena. In fact, racial 
discrimination is a permanent element of right-wing populism, which consistently scapegoats 
racial minorities. Today, populists campaign on strong anti-immigration platforms, scapegoating 
the influx of immigrants in much of Europe and relying on and perpetuating the perception 
that these newcomers are responsible for growing unemployment and increases in crime.
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So, in addition to its role as an external input, crisis is also an internal feature of populism 
(Moffitt 2015). It follows that the relationship between populism and crisis is so intrinsically 
tangled that their nexus can only be regarded as a Gordian knot. In fact, the relationship is dual, 
because populism emerges from crisis and takes advantage of crisis in order to gain success. At 
the same time, the relationship between populism and crisis is circular in nature—and occurs 
in a cycle of crisis-populism-crisis—because populism both feeds and fuels crisis, so much so 
that it is sometimes impossible to identify the boundaries between one and the other.
2. CONTEMPORARY POPULISM AND THE GREAT RECESSION IN WESTERN EUROPE
Today, driven by the ongoing Great Recession, the new wave of populism that emerged in 2009 
continues to cross Europe. According to the most recent and thorough study of this topic, Takis 
S. Pappas and Hanspeter Kriesi’s empirical comparative analysis, European Populism in the 
Shadow of the Great Recession,14 “during the Great Recession populism in Europe increased 
notably by 4.1 per cent,” (2015, p. 323). Is this 4.1 per cent increase a temporal coincidence 
or does it indicate a real connection between the rise of populism and the economic crisis?
Although isolating the economic factor is almost impossible, the direct relationship between 
populism and economic crisis is clearly illustrated in comparative analyses. The so-called PIIGS 
(Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, and Great Britain—Great Britain is sometimes included 
in the acronym with the addition of a second G to form PIIGGS) are the states most heavily 
affected by the economic crisis; they have seen a rise in the popularity of their populist parties. 
In contrast, this trend towards populism is quite moderate or even declining in northern and 
central western Europe that was not greatly affected by the economic crisis—with the exceptions 
of France and Finland. The success of France’s Marine Le Pen confirms the relationship between 
populism and the economic crisis, France suffered so seriously from the economic crisis that 
Patrick Allen suggested adding France to the PIIGS list (2012). Likewise, in Finland—a country 
that the economic crisis seems to have made into the “new sick man of Europe” (Rosendahl 
and Ercanbrack 2015; Khan 2015)—the populist Finns Party has fared well recently. In contrast, 
however, Poland is “a green island of stability in the EU economic crisis,” (Faggiani 2015). The 
Polish case, as Ben Stanley observes, “lends support to the expectation that economic crisis 
would stimulate populism . . . Poland did not experience an economic crisis, and at the same 
time did not experience an increase of populism,” (2015, p. 268).
The populism-crisis link is also sustained by the fact that the number and variety of 
contemporary populist parties has grown during the years of crisis. The National Front in France, 
the UKIP in Great Britain, the Northern League (LN) in Italy, and the Finns Party in Finland have 
14  The study—based on three variables: 1) GDP growth, 2) unemployment rates, and 3) national gross debt—
examines twenty-five populist parties in seventeen countries. Pappas and Kriesi divide the European political 
arena into five regions and identify each with degrees of crisis and populism: 1) the Nordic group (Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland)—incidental crisis, moderate populism; 2) the Western group (France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland)—modest crisis, declining populism; 3) the Southern group (Italy and Greece)—
strong populism fueled by grave crisis; 4) the CEE group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary)—varying 
crises, disparate populism; and 5) the Anglo-Saxon countries (United Kingdom, Ireland)—similar crisis, contrasting 
outcomes. For more, see: Pappas and Kriesi 2015, pp. 303-325.
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even gained consensus thanks to the crisis. Not only do parties like these continue to exist, but 
new formations were born such as:
  The Five Star Movement in Italy, a party launched by comedian Beppe Grillo in 2009;15
  The Alternative for Germany in Germany, founded in 2012 by publicists Konrad Adam 
and Alexander Gauland and economist Bernd Lucke;16
  Syriza in Greece—in 2013 the party united what had been a coalition of the left wing and 
the radical left parties since 2004;17
  Podemos in Spain, developed from the aftermath of the Indignados movement and 
instituted in 2014 by Complutense University of Madrid Political Science lecturer Pablo 
Iglesias.18
  Juntos Podemos in Portugal, a political movement led by psychologist Joana Amaral Freitas 
that has still not developed into a party, but supported the Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) 
during the October 2015 election.
The exception of Ireland—where a new populist party did not emerge despite the severity 
of crisis there—does not really constitute a contradiction in terms as populism is diffuse across 
all of Ireland’s opposition parties. O’ Malley and FitzGibbon note that “while Ireland after the 
crisis lacks a classic populist party, the political system is in fact resplendent with populist actors 
and rhetoric,” (2015, p. 288).
Obviously, another relevant aspect of the link between populism and economic crisis is 
the recurring use of the economic crisis in political discourse: all of the newly formed populist 
political groups exploit public perceptions of the economic crisis and frequently blame the 
European Union for their country’s economic woes. 
Contemporary populism in Western Europe, however, is not just a product of the ongoing 
economic, financial, and sovereign debt crisis (Pappas 2015). True, populism has grown in the 
shadow of the Great Recession, but it rides not only the recent wave of economic problems, 
but also travels on the backs of other crises such as the crisis of representation and the failures 
of the European welfare state, which the economic problems of the Great Recession brought 
to light. Populism’s intensity would be otherwise inexplicable, as would be the rise of populism 
in northern Europe and even Germany—countries that have suffered less of an impact during 
the economic crisis.
If, as Ernesto Laclau (2005, p. 137) remarks, the root of populism is a crisis of representation, 
this current root of populism has gained strength and depth due to dysfunctional representative 
mechanisms at two levels: the national level and the European level. In fact, on one hand, 
distrust of political parties (which the Germans refer to with their own efficacious word, 
Parteiverdrossenheit) and the decline of party democracies have become ever stronger. On the 
other hand, though the national parliaments ceded their decision-making power when they 
15  For more about the Five Star Movement, see: Corbetta and Gualmini 2013; Bartlett, Froio, Littler and 
McDonnell 2013; Diamanti 2014; Natale 2014; Biorcio 2014; Bordignon and Ceccarini 2014.
16  For more about the Alternative for Germany, see: Niedermayer 2014; Bebnowsky 2015.
17  Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014.
18  For more about about Podemos, see: Gomez-Reino and Llamazares 2015.
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transferred it to supranational institutions, the European Union still lacks democratic legitimation 
and a balance sheet of a suitable dimension. As a consequence, the most important decisions 
on controversial issues are made by the central banks and by the governments of economically 
stronger member states—a situation that Ulrich Beck’s appellation, German Europe, describes 
very well, (2012). Moreover, the European Union, which Laurent Baumel terms “the Trojan Horse 
of neoliberalism” (2014), is so unable to protect the middle and lower classes that, under the 
pressure of their worsening standards of living, these classes are supporting the charismatic 
populist leaders who position themselves as spokespeople ready to voice the people’s demands.
Moreover, in some countries, such as Greece and Italy, the economic crisis escalated internal 
and already severe political crises.19 As Takis S. Pappas and Hanspeter Kriesi confirm in their 
analyses (2015, p. 324), this tandem between economic and internal political crises intensified 
populism in these countries.
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AS A COMMON ENEMY
Generated in this framework, the contemporary relationship between populism and crisis in 
Western Europe is built on the endemic weaknesses of the European integration project. In 
effect, the crisis has been exploited by a rash of finger pointing at the EU’s primary institutions in 
Luxembourg and Brussels and at European Central Bank in Frankfurt, accusing them for spawning 
the Great Recession or of simply leading the popular dissatisfaction with these institutions.
This strategy of blaming the EU has been employed by all of the current populist parties, 
both old and new. As Matthew Goodwin points out, “ever since the arrival of the crisis in 2008, 
UKIP has moved to address public anxieties about the recession and its effects by framing the 
Eurozone crisis as validating its long tradition of hard Euroscepticism,” (2015, p. 282); this 
move supported UKIP’s principal goal of withdrawing the UK from the EU. According to Farage, 
the crisis makes the anti-democratic credentials of the EU more evident, as demonstrated by 
Greece and Italy’s puppet technocratic governments of Papademos and Monti (Ibid., p. 283). 
Similarly, in France, Marine Le Pen took advantage of the economic crisis to reinvent herself as 
“an uncompromising promoter of French sovereignty” poised to initiate “France’s exit from the 
Eurozone and the reintroduction of the franc [as] the cornerstone of her economic program,” 
(Betz 2015, p. 76 and p. 83). LePen proclaimed that “the euro was not only responsible for 
asphyxiating French economic growth and destroying whole industries; it was also the cause 
of the explosion of mass unemployment in France and elsewhere in the EU,” (Ibid., p. 83). At 
the same time, LePen, riding on English Euroscepticism, approves of the British referendum 
on EU membership, condemns the European Union as undemocratic, and wishes for France’s 
departure from the EU. LePen overtly presents herself as Madame Frexit: “I will be Madame 
Frexit if the European Union doesn’t give us back our monetary, legislative, territorial, and 
budget sovereignty. I believe that sovereignty is the twin sister of democracy. If there’s no 
sovereignty, there’s no democracy. I’m a democrat, I will fight until the end to defend democracy 
19  For more about Greece, see: Pappas and Aslanidis 2015. For more about Italy, see: Bobba and McDonnell 
2015, p. 170.
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and the will of the people. If I don’t manage to negotiate with the European Union, something 
I wish, then I will ask the French to leave the European Union. And then you’ll be able to call 
me Madame Frexit,” (Holehouse and Riley-Smith 2015). The Finns Party in Finland echoes this 
same rhetoric; they are also advocating for a “minimal EU” (Ylä-Anttila and Ylä-Anttila 2015, pp. 
61-62). Although the Finns Party has not explicitly called for Finland’s secession from the EU, 
the party opposes federal development of the European Union and fights against any mention 
of the country’s EU membership in the Finnish Constitution as such a mention would lead to a 
constitutional protection of Finland’s EU membership. Not surprisingly, the Finns Party—with a 
platform that criticizes technocratic European governance and the cost of EU membership—also 
demands a reduction in European interference and calls for measures to safeguard national 
sovereignty.20 The situation is not very different in Germany and Italy. Both the Alternative for 
Germany21 and the Five Star Movement22 consider abolishing the euro an essential step towards 
overcoming the crisis and returning competence to member states. Both groups question the 
democratic legitimacy of the European Union. Both movements blame the European elite and 
20  On the English-language version of the party’s website, under the heading “The Party’s EU Politics,” the 
position is synthesized as, “The Finns Party is a leading EU-skeptic party in Finland. The Party argues that the 
European Union is working far below its capability and much could be done for improvement. Its opinion is that 
the EU meddles too much into citizens’ everyday affairs and is creating excessive central governance in Brussels. 
The Party does not accept the over-centralisation of power to unelected technocrats and commissioners who 
are too distant from the citizens in the EU countries. Possibilities have to be increased for the people’s voice in 
local areas to reach the decision-makers. The Party also believes that the EU membership costs for Finland are 
too high and the calculation process needs re-evaluation and correction. The Party is committed to a continuous 
revision and renewal process for the EU – the dynamism of such a diverse community and a corresponding need 
for change must be recognized. The Party believes Finland should renegotiate its membership in the Union, 
transfer more power back to Finland from Brussels, reduce the power of the EU Commission, and diminish 
common responsibility in economic affairs. The latter is very important with regard to respecting the no-bailout 
clause of the Maastricht Treaty. The Party believes that distributing existing bank debt across Europe will result 
in an even wider crisis. It is NOT the function of the EU to rescue the financial disasters of the investment 
bankers! Other solutions must be found. With respect to the Euro single currency, the Party wishes to open 
and encourage discussion about various options. The current financial crisis has shown that the Euro is not 
only a financial project but also a political one. The Euro members differ too much with each other for the Euro 
to function properly without some kind of integrated financial framework. Any integration requires extremely 
creative solutions – taking into account both areas for common responsibility as well as the preservation of the 
members’ own economic environments” (Perussuomalaiset 2016).
21  On the website of Alternative for Germany, under the heading “Program and Background, Questions 
and Answers, EU and Europe”, it is written that: “The social upheaval in South Europe has never been worse; 
unemployment in the Eurozone, especially among the young, has never been higher, the state debt has never 
been more alarming, and the state governments have never been less inhibited to break treaties and to put into 
question the criteria of stability. The old parties have sacrificed the future of Europe to rescue the Euro and the 
banks. The Alternative for Germany calls for a departure from a policy of centralism toward a process as close 
as possible to the citizenry. The principle of subsidiarity must be re-established. The Alternative for Germany 
is committed to review the division of powers between the EU and the Member States in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity and, wherever possible, to enforce a return of powers to the individual countries. In 
addition, as an expression of the weight of Germany in the EU, the German language must be practiced as a 
language of equal value for negotiation and procedure. As a party committed to democracy, we reject that 
essentially democratic decisions are made in bodies that are not legitimised democratically. At the EU level, the 
shortcomings in this regard are obvious”, (Alternative für Deutschland 2016).
22  For more on the position of the Five Star Movement see, Beppe Grillo’s interview with Reuters, see: Casilli 
2015.
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the “old parties” that support it for playing significant roles in the decline of the economy and 
for contributing to what they believe are dysfunctional democracies. Demands for greater 
participation in European decisions and for censuring the European and international financial 
elite are also expressed by Syriza, Podemos, and Juntos Podemos. Their criticisms, however, do 
not extend to European currency; instead, they focus on Troika and the austerity policies imposed 
by the European Union and Germany. As Takis P. Pappas and Paris Aslanidis observe, the populist 
discourse of Syriza is “couched in battle terms . . . the party identifies itself at the forefront of 
a struggle against the German order in Europe,” (2015, p. 194). According to the programme 
presented at Greece’s Thessaloniki International Fair in September 2014,23 Syriza would have 
led the country to recovery by gradually reversing all of the EU Memorandum injustice in three 
steps: 1) writing off the greater part of the public debt—as was done for Germany in 1953; 2) 
launching a so-called European New Deal; and 3) rebuilding the welfare state. The position 
of Podemos is very close to that of Syriza, since Podemos aims to renegotiate the country’s 
debt with its international creditors in the same way Syriza promised. Within Podemos’s party 
program, available on its website (Podemos, 2016), two key goals stand out: reforming statutes 
of the European Central Bank and other EU institutions in order to democratize political and 
economic decisions in the Eurozone and establishing a European conference in order to discuss 
coordinated public debt restructuring within the Eurozone.
Therefore, there are two distinguishable populist movements.
  The anti-European movement includes the so-called right-wing populist parties (FN, UKIP, 
AfD, LN) but also encompasses groups like the Finns Party and the Five Star Movement 
that evade the traditional classification of right-wing populism or leftist populism.24 All 
of the anti-European movement actors seek a drastic reduction in the European Union’s 
influence or advocate that their state leave the Eurozone and return to a national currency. 
Some of them also wish to leave the European Union.
  The movement for a different Europe includes the so-called leftist populist parties and 
groups represented by Syriza, Podemos, and Juntos-Podemos. Unlike the Eurosceptic 
parties in the anti-European movement, populist actors in the movement for a different 
Europe do not blame the euro, but—as these groups were born in countries more afflicted 
by the economic crisis—they are fighting against austerity policies and ask that these 
measures be renegotiated in the name of solidarity among European people and in order 
to create a more balanced European Union.
Despite the differences between these two types of populist movements, and among 
the various populist movements spread across the whole of Europe, it is possible to identify 
23  Syriza 2014.
24  As Bobba and McDonnel (2015, pp. 173-174) underscore, “The M5S is hard to classify ideologically due 
its short history, its eclectic mix of policies and its unique organisational characteristics . . . Nonetheless, there 
has already been broad agreement among scholars that M5S discourse – and particularly the statements of 
its founder, Beppe Grillo, both before and after the movement’s foundation – is classifiable as populist . . . The 
M5S is not, however, a case of right-wing populism: in its policies it combines a range of themes from different 
ideologies (left, right, environmental) and there is no clear identification—and denigration—of ‘the other’ in its 
discourse.”
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some common features among them. The first common feature they share is a demand for 
greater national sovereignty. One expression of this claim for greater sovereignty is the call for 
national referendums concerning their member state’s participation in the Eurozone and in the 
European Union (as required by anti-European populists) or concerning other important issues, 
as happened in Greece with the referendum held on July 5, 2015 on the bailout conditions 
in the austerity policies imposed by EU institutions.25 Another significant common feature 
shared among Europe’s populist movements is an aspiration to change the Eurozone and the 
European Union’s structure: anti-European movement actors seek to dissolve the Eurozone 
and the EU, while the movement for a different Europe actors advocate renegotiations. Both 
movements reject the dominant European dogma of neoliberalism, perceiving it as a barrier to 
social justice or to introducing protectionist measures. Additionally, both movements identify 
a corrupt elite in the traditional parties and in the European bureaucracy and technocracy and 
they frequently refuse to cooperate with other political forces—as illustrated in the behaviour 
of the Five Star Movement in Italy.
So, from the perspective of Europe’s contemporary populism, the European Union is a 
common enemy (Diamanti 2015). Indeed, in the view of these populist actors, “Europe is against 
the people’s will,” (Pinelli 2011, p. 14). These movements have acquired force as opposition 
parties, they hold the power to blackmail the majority and to influence the government. It 
is clear that UKIP pressured Cameron’s government to hold a referendum on the continued 
membership of the United Kingdom within the European Union (the so-called Brexit). The 
negative consequences of this political choice are currently unfolding. The unexpected June 
23, 2016 victory of the 51.89 per cent of Britons who voted to leave the EU (over the 48.11 
per cent who voted to remain) demonstrates the dangers of direct democracy during such 
critical phases—a danger Italian constitutionalist Gustavo Zagrebelsky explains so very well 
in his discussion of the trial of Jesus and the people’s decision to save Barabbas in his book Il 
«crucifige!» e la democrazia ( 1995). Some of these populist parties have even managed to 
steer the state: Greece’s Syriza made the whole European establishment shiver with its OKI 
in the July 5, 2015 referendum and the Finns Party is participating for the first time in the 
governmental coalition. The serious problem with populist party influence on government is 
that the populist parties agitate the people, but instead of putting forth a clear and efficacious 
program, they present an idea to destroy something (in the case of the first group) or with 
promises that they are not able to keep (in the case of the second group). In fact, with regard 
to anti-European populism, leaving the Eurozone or the European Union will not restore an 
ailing economy and will not isolate the economy of one state from another; the market is 
global. With regard to the populist movement for a different Europe, Syriza is once again 
paradigmatic. Despite its clamour, the OKI vote victory in the Greek referendum did not result 
in any changes, and the leader of Syriza was aware of the impotency of that outcome before 
holding the referendum. The will of one state’s people could never have prevailed on the will 
of the other EU member states. The Greek government, in order to remain in the Eurozone, 
25  For a critical analysis of this referendum, see: Sygkelos 2015.
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was forced to accept a bailout package that contained deeper pension cuts and greater tax 
increases than the package rejected by Greek voters in the referendum—a demonstration of 
the voice of the people going unheeded. Nevertheless, the failure of the program is proven by 
the resignations of Gianīs Varoufakīs on July, 6 2015 and of Alexīs Tsipras on August 20, 2015. 
Though their resignations were tactical moves to maintain party power, this failure is further 
evidenced in the inauguration of a more moderate position that could be defined as deferential 
to European guidelines. The voter turnout in the subsequent September 20, 2015 election—a 
mere 56.57 per cent—was the lowest in Greek history and shows that the principal effect of 
the Syriza experiment in government was an increase in political disaffection.
5. CONCLUSION
While the development of the European Union is experiencing deadlock for many reasons, 
contemporary populism encourages further depoliticizing the integration process and depriving 
the dream of the European Fathers of any meaning—a path that leads to widespread populism.26 
Yet, to solve Europe’s issues—a failing economy, social inequality, immigration, etc.—more 
Europe is needed in the form of a common political project, not less Europe, reduced to an 
empty container of rules.
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POPULIST DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: 
A CASE STUDY OF ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT  
ORGANIZATIONS IN LITHUANIA
Jogilė Stašienė
ABSTRACT
Today’s party democracy crisis coincides with an increasing influence of populist political actors. This 
article— prompted by notions of populist understandings of politics as expressions of the people’s will and 
of the populist idea of an antagonism between the people and the elite—explores whether populism and 
party democracies are compatible. Assertions, that populism contradicts party democracies, should rest on 
research of populist understandings of political representation. This case study, of the populist discourse 
of Lithuania’s anti-establishment organizations, fills this research gap in the literature on populism’s 
compatibility with party democracies. The qualitative analysis of this case study focuses on how political 
representation is perceived and presented. The study provides new insights for theoretical debate on 
the compatibility of populism and party democracy and also presents a nuanced picture of populist 
perceptions of political representation. 
Keywords: party democracy, political representation, populism, framing. 
INTRODUCTION
The crisis of representative democracy has been acknowledged many times (Diamond and 
Gunther, 2001; Rosanvallon, 2008). Trends cited as evidence of this crisis often include citizens’ 
declining confidence in parliament (Levi and Stoker, 2000; Catterberg and Moreno, 2006) and 
decreases in voter turnout (Gray and Caul, 2000; Blais, Gidengil and Nevitte, 2004). However, in 
discussing the crisis of representative democracy, many scholars are most concerned with the 
diminishing position of political parties (Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg, 
2000; Dalton, 2004). Some observers note that political parties may no longer be serving as 
mediators between a nation’s government and its citizens (Poguntke, 1996; Norris, 1999; 
Dalton, 2004), while others describe a shift in political parties’ functions—from representing to 
governing (Mair, 2006; Katz and Mair, 1995). It has even been claimed that political parties no 
longer represent citizens, but act as representatives of the state (Mair, 2011, p. 8). Moreover, 
Bernard Manin, in his review of the condition of representative democracy, concludes that 
there is “a crisis of a particular form of representation, namely the one established in the 
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wake of mass parties,” (1997, p. 196). If party democracy is not in crisis, then it is undergoing 
a transformation.
These changes to the party democracy model go along with a growing number of populist 
political actors who are exerting greater influence (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012). This rise in 
populism is especially evident in the prevalence of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe 
(Mudde, 2007, 2013; Norris, 2005). The results of the 2014 European Parliament election 
confirm a trend towards populism (Mudde, 2014). Although only three Eurosceptic parties 
achieved a “reasonable share of the vote” in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the last 
European Parliament election (Savage, 2014), these countries are not necessarily resistant to 
this populist trend. Political party systems in CEE are often challenged by anti-establishment 
populist parties (Učeň, 2007), unorthodox, new, or centrist populist parties (Pop-Eleches, 2010), 
and anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk, 2014). New or centrist populist actors 
mainly campaign against “under-performing and morally failing established parties” (Učeň, 2007, 
p. 54). They base their election campaigns on demands for more open and accountable policies 
and plan projects imbued with “newness” (Sikk, 2009) to counter voters’ disappointment with 
the mainstream parties’ governance (Pop-Eleches, 2010). Hence—whereas in Western Europe 
populist actors rise because political parties are not able to represent the citizens any longer—in 
CEE, populist challengers rise due to the poor institutionalization of the party system (Kriesi, 
2014) and disappointment with mainstream political parties. 
So far, many studies have researched populist parties’ features (De Lange and Art, 2011) 
and common characteristics of populist actors (Pauwels, 2011, Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; 
Rooduijn, 2013). Because the implications of populist politics for the party democracy model 
should be researched more thoroughly, this article analyses how political representation is 
perceived and presented by activists by studying populist ideas and discourse. 
This research is especially relevant for two additional reasons. Firstly, the theoretical question 
of whether (and if so, how) populist ideas are compatible with the principles of party democracy 
has not been resolved. One group of scholars considers populism and populist movements 
dangerous to democracy (Pasquino, 2007; Urbinati, 2014). Other researchers conceive populism 
as a part of representative democracy—possible only in representative democracies—and as 
a tool for improving democracy (Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000; 2004). Secondly, the ideas of 
populist actors in CEE are especially worth examining. The assumption that the populist actors 
(and anti-establishment actors in general) in CEE have the same ideas as their counterparts in 
Western Europe has not been justified. 
This article introduces theoretical debate on the compatibility between populist ideas 
and the principles of party democracy before presenting empirical qualitative research on the 
discourse of Lithuanian populist organizations—research which provides new insights on the 
theoretical debate regarding the populism’s compatibility with party democracies.
POPULIST DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL REPRESENTATION... 55
1. THEORY: POPULISM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
In this article, representative democracy is regarded as party democracy1. A classic party 
democracy, as described by Bernard Manin (1997), has at least four distinct features. First, in 
a party democracy, society is seen as divided into different groups according to socio-economic 
features. These groups have different—and often contradicting—interests that provide the 
basis for political parties. Second, political parties mobilize voters during elections. Voting 
expresses a citizen’s trust in a party; it is not necessarily an expression of trust in the particular 
policies promoted by a party. Third, political parties express public opinion by denouncing the 
political decisions of their opponents and by organizing protests. Finally, party position is first 
deliberated among the party members and then implemented during the decision-making 
process in accordance with party discipline. Consequently, the most important discussions take 
place prior to parliamentary debates. To sum up, political parties act as the main organizers of 
representation in a party democracy (Manin, 1997).
Populism seems to contradict this set of representative democracy features. Populism 
not only acquires different shapes in different contexts, but definitions of the very concept 
of populism vary.  Populism has been defined as a style (Canovan, 1999; Moffitt and Tormey, 
2014), as a strategy (Weyland, 2001; Jansen, 2011), and as a thin-centred ideology (Canovan, 
2002; Mudde, 2004). In this article, populism is understood according to Cas Mudde’s definition 
of populism as a set of ideas “that considers society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which 
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” 
(2004, p. 543). As far as populism in party democracies is concerned— according to populist 
actors—there is a tension between the general will of the people and the interests of different 
groups within a society (as in a party democracy). Respectively, the idea of a homogeneous 
elite, as seen by populists, contradicts having different political parties representing separate 
groups’ interests in a party democracy. 
According to Gianfranco Pasquino (2007), populism ignores the inner divisions of a 
homogeneous unit of the people while it simultaneously objects to political parties’ political 
and institutional mediation. Instead, leaders are presented as inadequate in their ability to make 
decisions for the people. While representative democracy is based on compromise, populism 
expresses such strong opposition to the other—to the political elite—that compromise becomes 
impossible (Pasquino, 2007). Likewise, Nadia Urbinati (2014, pp. 128-170) claims that populism 
is dangerous for democracy because it attempts to centralize power and rejects democratic 
procedure. The procedure of holding an election and the procedure of engaging in discussion 
offered by political forums are necessary components of representative democracies as these 
procedures provide opportunities for voters to reflect on and choose among competing ideas. 
Populism opposes a pluralism of opinion in that it perceives the people as a whole as the only 
“part” that should be represented. Even more than it opposes a pluralism of opinion, populism 
1  “ . . . the literary theory or the dominant ideal-type or myth of democratic government in Western Europe 
has been the model of party government,” (Katz, 1986, p. 32); and “ . . . modern democracy is unthinkable save 
in terms of the parties,” (Schattschneider, 1941, p. 1).
56  jogilė stAšienė
rejects democratic procedures and the institutions that serve to separate as well as connect 
a government with its citizens. Instead, populism requires implementing a majority rule—the 
rule of the people—via the direct rule of the leader. As populism objects both to mediation 
and institutions, scholars argue, populism rejects representation (Urbinati, 2014, p. 128-170).
Others claim that populism is not simply a danger for representative democracy but has 
emerged because of democracy or at least because of how representative democracies function 
today. Margaret Canovan (1999) claims that democracy can be understood as having two sides or 
two styles of politics – redemptive (popular power) and pragmatic (rules and institutions). Ideally, 
these two sides should be in a balance. However, when pragmatic politics trump redemptive 
politics, populism appears. The appearance of populism is a turn towards a redemptive style of 
politics, a reaction to unsuccessful representation (Canovan, 1999). On one hand, populism has 
positive aspects, when it expresses a primary concern with the common people. On the other 
hand, populism harbours anti-institutional impulses, encourages a break with the pragmatic 
side of democracy, and seeks to position the people as the only legitimate source of power 
(Canovan, 1999). Populism’s suggestions that a democracy give up on its institutions, rules, 
principles, and decision-making processes render populism a threat to democracy. Populism can, 
though, function as a self-regulatory mechanism of democracy when new institutions change 
or improve former institutions. Moreover, Paul A. Taggart (2000, p. 115) notes that “populism 
is a gauge by which we can measure the health of representative political systems.” According 
to Taggart, populism can gain strength only in representative democracies (2004). The main 
object of populist critiques are political parties—the essence of representative politics. Thus, 
populist actors express anti-institutionalist positions and attempt to create organizations which 
are different from the democracy’s political parties (Taggart, 2000). It follows that populism 
opposes dividing the people into groups, organizing on the basis of interests, and associational 
politics in general. However, populist actors must become institutionalized to participate in the 
political process and—as a result of this participation—transform into political parties (Taggart, 
2000). Instead of forming a political party, populist actors often opt for strong leadership or use 
the tools of direct democracy—in addition to representative politics (Taggart, 2000). 
To sum up, there is no simple way to determine the implications populism holds for party 
democracies. Populism can be seen as an attempt to unite the people into one body through 
a strong leader, or it can be understood as a demand for politics based on idealism. Academic 
debates on the subject assert that populism is seen as contradicting with party democracy not 
simply because populism rejects political parties, but because populism rejects a particular 
type of representation—party representation—and consequently, representation as such. 
This assertion, however, requires further research of populist understandings and perspectives 
of representation. Hence, the empirical analysis in this case study focuses on conceptions of 
political representation in the populist discourse of anti-establishment organizations in Lithuania.
2. ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT ACTIVISM IN LITHUANIA
Lithuanian society has been described as distrustful and passive; Lithuania’s levels of political 
trust, civic engagement, and political participation are low (Imbrasaitė, 2004, Žiliukaitė, 
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2006). Political representation in Lithuania also faces some issues because of weak ideological 
congruence between voters and political parties (Ramonaitė, 2009). Since 2000, a fragmentation 
of Lithuania’s political party system has been observed: new political parties successfully 
participated in every parliamentary election (Jastramskis, 2010). These emerging parties avoided 
declaring their ideological positions, and consequently, they were often regarded as populist 
(Ramonaitė, 2009). Lately, even though there are no strong radical right-wing parties in Lithuania 
(Zaremba, 2013), two parties with populist ideologies—the Order and Justice Party and the Way 
of Courage Party—have entered the national parliament since the 2012 elections (Pabiržis, 2013).
Since 2011, a new wave of anti-establishment activism appeared in Lithuania. Firstly, public 
protests took place due to two political scandals. The protests evolved into two non-traditional 
political parties (The List of Lithuania and The Way of Courage), and The Way of Courage Party 
was able to win seven seats in the parliamentary elections of 2012 (The Central Electoral 
Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2012). Many of the protesters active in 2011 and 2012 
later organized a citizen initiated mandatory referendum on three constitutional amendments.2 
The referendum had two primary goals: 1) to restrict the sale of agricultural land to foreigners; 
and 2) to make it easier for Lithuanian citizens to initiate referendums. The referendum, held in 
June 2014, failed due to low voter turnout (The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic 
of Lithuania, 2014a). Afterwards, an anti-establishment candidate, supported by activists and 
former protesters, won 9.32 per cent of the vote in the 2014 presidential election (The Central 
Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014b). Finally, in the 2015 municipal council 
elections, non-partisan electoral committees (public election committees) garnered 10.71 
per cent of the vote, 118 of Lithuania’s municipal council seats, and mayoral positions in four 
of Lithuania’s ten largest cities. It should be noted that the municipal elections of 2015 were 
the first direct mayoral elections in Lithuania. This institutional change stimulated debates on 
self-government and encouraged non-partisan candidates to run for office.
During the five-year period of 2011 to 2015, several anti-establishment organizations 
emerged and some existing organizations became involved in anti-establishment activism. These 
anti-establishment organizations varied from less formal groups like the For Justice movement 
to proper political parties such as The Way of Courage and The List of Lithuania. As it is often 
noted, anti-establishment actors are spontaneous, poorly institutionalized, and exist only for 
a short term, characteristics that usually complicate research on these actors (Schedler, 1996). 
While some of Lithuania’s anti-establishment organizations withdrew from the political arena 
after the 2012 parliamentary elections, others persisted by supporting or participating in the 
referendum initiative, endorsing the anti-establishment candidate in the 2014 presidential 
elections, and participating in the 2015 municipal council elections. 
For this case study, three organizations, that have existed for at least two years and have 
continued their activity until today, have been selected for research: the United Democratic 
2  At least 300,000 signatures—equivalent to ten per cent of Lithuania’s eligible voters—must be collected 
within a three-month period in order to initiate a referendum (Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania). This 
referendum was only the second citizens’ initiated referendum since the restoration of Lithuania’s independence 
in 1990. 
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Movement, Movement TOGETHER, and the List of Lithuania Party. Each of these three groups 
is formally registered and has a formal statute to set the organization’s goals and regulate 
internal decision making processes. These three organizations also host communication portals 
such as websites3 and Facebook profiles. The organizations are based in Lithuania’s largest 
cities: the United Democratic Movement is based in Kaunas, the Movement TOGETHER in 
Panevėžys, and the List of Lithuania in Vilnius. Two of the researched organizations, the United 
Democratic Movement and the List of Lithuania, have branches in other regions as well4. All 
three organizations have expressed strong anti-establishment positions and supported an 
anti-establishment presidential candidate, while two, the United Democratic Movement and 
the List of Lithuania, were active initiators of the aforementioned referendum. 
All three organizations participated in Lithuania’s 2015 municipal council elections. The 
List of Lithuania won four seats in Vilnius’s municipal council and is now part of the city’s 
governing coalition. Movement TOGETHER won the majority of the votes and the mayoral office 
in Panevėžys. The United Democratic Movement did not win any seats in the 2015 municipal 
elections. It should be taken into consideration that participation in the municipal elections 
could have directed the focus of each organization.
According to the definition of populism presented earlier, populist discourse is based on 
the following set of ideas: 1) society is divided into two homogeneous groups—the people 
and the elite; 2) the relationship between people and the elite is antagonistic; and 3) politics 
should be based on the general will of the people (Mudde, 2004). The organizations examined 
in this study employ all three of these tenants of populist discourse. First, they demand for a 
wider inclusion of the people in decision-making processes.5 Each of the three organizations 
identifies themselves as of the people and as representatives of the interests of the people as 
a whole.6 Second, these three organizations take anti-establishment positions and reject the 
political elite. Third—and this characteristic separates these three organizations from those of 
previous waves of populism—they express strong anti-party sentiments and call for a return 
to morality and principles. They embrace principled politics over pragmatic politics.7 Hence 
3  United Democratic Movement: <http://www.judejimas.eu> [Accessed on 15 January 2016]; “The List of 
Lithuania”: <http://lietuvossarasas.lt/apie/> [Accessed on 15 January 2016]; Movement TOGETHER <http://
www.judejimaskartu.lt/> [Accessed on 15 January 2016].
4  See <http://www.judejimas.eu/kontaktai.html>, <http://lietuvossarasas.lt/apie/> [Accessed on 14 January 
2016].
5  “Since its founding the movement declared the importance of returning governing power to the people” 
(Račkauskas, Navickas, 2015); “The List of Lithuania Party offers, in these elections, a unique alternative to politics 
which is cynical and has lost moral sensitivity. Instead of rushing to govern, the [List of Lithuania] party is trying 
to restore the power of the citizens,” (Kuolys, 2012). 
6  “ . . . real, bottom-up, self-government . . . the voice of the common people would always be heard, and 
government would serve the people, would be responsible and accountable for their promises to voters,” 
(Zabielienė, 2015);  “ . . .  ensure a real citizens‘ right of self-government—as the natural right of people to create 
and manage their daily lives, to unite positive people seeking to change society irrespective of their ideological, 
political, religious, or cultural beliefs,” (Movement TOGETHER, 2014); 
7  “Parties, which have trampled the principle of politics–justice–act like a gang of robbers plundering the city 
(state) budget,” (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015a); “The first round results reflected the desire to get rid of the parties’ 
dictate, the necessity of positive changes,” (Račkauskas, 2015).  
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these organizations promise to address what they claim is a malfunctioning representative 
democracy, reject political parties, and present themselves as movements or non-party political 
organizations. (The List of Lithuania, for example, is formally registered as a political party but 
presents itself as a movement, not as a party.)
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In this case study, the goal of the empirical data analysis was twofold. The first aim of the study 
was to show how the analysed organizations understand and discuss representation. Second, 
the study aimed to apply framing theory to the collected data. Framing theory was deemed 
very suitable, because this theory provides tools for understanding how particular ideas are 
configured. 
The first step of the case study was qualitative content analysis. To determine populist 
understandings of representation, articles from the three organizations’ websites were 
analysed.8 The underlying assumption in this approach is that the members of organizations 
treat their websites as important communication and information channels and that they regard 
their websites as alternatives to Lithuania’s mainstream media. Therefore, the messages and 
articles posted online reflect the understandings and ideas of the organizations hosting the 
website (unless the organization has stated otherwise). After the first overview of the posts on 
each of the organizations’ websites, articles with in-depth information about the ideas behind 
the organizations’ activism were selected for deeper qualitative analysis. Authorship of these 
articles was taken into the consideration during the selection process. Some of the articles 
were written by supporters (not members) of the organizations. To ensure that only the ideas 
posted by the activists of the case study’s three organizations were examined, articles on the 
organizations’ websites authored by those who are not members of the organization were 
eliminated from the pool of articles selected for further analysis. 
The selected articles were coded with a start list of codes using qualitative analysis software, 
MAXQDA. Fragments of text, from one sentence to a whole paragraph, were coded. For the 
purpose of this study, three general and broad coding categories related to representation were 
used: representation, representatives, and election. The goal was to identify the particular 
text fragments that addressed representation. Therefore, arguments concerning who or what 
should be represented, who the representatives should be, and how representation should be 
implemented were coded. Then, the text fragments were coded again to identify each fragment’s 
specific theme. The secondary coding revealed descriptions of: the government (and political 
parties), of the ideas and actors that should be represented, of legitimate representatives, of 
what the procedure for choosing representatives should look like, and of how representation 
should be implemented. 
 “Yes, The List of Lithuania has correctly criticized and criticizes all political parties, which in recent years 
have been in power, for the party nomenclature’s behavior, their moral insensitivity, indifference to civil rights 
violations, authoritarian tendencies, [and for] their conformism and dependency,” (Bingelienė, 2015).
8  See Annex.
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In the second step of the analysis, the tools of framing theory were applied. Framing theory 
provides a means for understanding the selected organizations’ ideas and the configurations 
of these ideas underlying the text. Oliver and Johnston (2000, p. 45), define framing as “the 
cognitive process wherein people bring to bear background knowledge to interpret an event 
or circumstance and to locate it in a larger system of meaning.” Framing is understood as a 
purposeful—and intentional rather than manipulative—way to structure ideas according to a 
particular intention or task. The core tasks of framing Snow and Benford (1988) identify are: 
diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing refers 
to the identification of a problem and the actors responsible for it. Prognostic framing, on the 
other hand, articulates a solution to a problem. Finally, motivational framing outlines why a 
particular group of people should engage in collective action. In this case, motivational framing 
is understood as an explanation as to why the case study organizations, or members of these 
organizations, believe they are better representatives than other political actors. 
4. RESULTS
In this section of the article, framing of the selected organizations’ discourse and ideas 
is presented. The data and analysis are presented by framing task—diagnostic, prognostic, 
or motivational. Insights into the organizations discourse regarding representation are 
substantiated by the organizations’ published website text. 
4 . 1 .  D i a g n o s t i c  f ra m i n g 
The task of diagnostic framing is to identify the main problems with political representation in 
Lithuania. This involves framing general and specific problems as well as identifying the primary 
actors responsible for these problems.
To begin with, the researched organizations’ website publications express disappointment 
with the government.  Movement TOGETHER asserts that “The wall of impunity isolates the 
government from the citizens who elected it,” (2013a). The United Democratic Movement 
website declares, “Kaunas residents are once again frustrated with the government’s actions,” 
(Zabielienė and Žiliukas, 2012). The organizations’ complaints about the national or municipal 
government are rather general and abstract: the government either has not kept election 
promises or has made poor decisions. Though dissatisfaction with specific government 
institutions is expressed, this was not within the scope of this analysis.
On the other hand, the organizations in this study frame Lithuania’s political parties as 
the most prominent source of Lithuania’s problems. The organizations present Lithuania’s 
political parties as embodiments of power and as the main source of their grievances. This 
could be because political parties are less abstract and easier to imagine and conceive than 
the government, thus the organizations associate political parties with a place of power. The 
organizations expressions of abstract disappointment with the government differ from the 
more tangible grievances the organizations direct at Lithuania’s political parties. When the 
organizations studied frame political parties as embodiments of political power, they present 
Lithuania’s political parties in two main ways. First, they describe the political party structure 
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as a stagnated bureaucracy. The List of Lithuania Party writes: “Yes, The List of Lithuania has 
correctly criticized and criticizes all political parties, which in recent years have been in power, 
for party nomenclature behaviour, for their moral insensitivity, for their indifference to civil 
rights violations, for their authoritarian tendencies, and for their conformism and dependency,” 
(Bingelienė, 2015). In a similar vein, according to Movement TOGETHER, “Nothing will ever 
change as long as politics is perceived as an exclusive space of political parties‘ power, and 
self-government—as the area of business actors only,” (Urbšys, 2015). 
When political parties are framed as closed bureaucratic organizations, they acquire an 
almost material form as a defined, structured system. Framed as such, the parties are presented 
as a stagnated system of power, which acts and makes decisions as a united body. The selected 
organizations present political parties as controllers of decision making processes who converged 
with the government and consequently become a part of the system of power. This presentation 
is related to political parties being rather closed organizations in the party democracy. Without 
being a member of a political party, grasping the internal decision making processes and logic of 
party discipline is difficult (Manin, 1997). Therefore, political parties appear to be well organized 
structures that are not recognizably related to the people or to the electorate.
A second way of framing political parties noted in the study was anthropomorphizing them, 
giving political parties human form. When the selected organizations frame political parties in 
this manner, political parties are presented as having undesirable human characteristics; they 
are arrogant, sarcastic, and hypocritical. Moreover, the organizations argue that Lithuania’s 
political parties lack clear political and moral principles and are bereft of political ideologies. 
In the website discourse published by the organizations, these undesirable characteristics 
and immorality make all the political parties appear to be the same. The power political 
parties are capable of wielding, as depicted on the organizations’ websites, seems unlimited; 
the organizations even used authoritarian or dictatorial to describe political parties. The 
organizations argue that instead of following moral and ideational grounds, political parties 
pursue their own interests—money and power. The organizations’ website publications contend 
that even though political parties are expected to defend the interest of all, they use their 
power to act against the general interest, and, therefore against the people. Examples of such 
discourse include the United Democratic Movement’s claim that: “Their [the Conservatives’] 
arrogance, sarcasm, and primitive intimidation by external enemies often transcend (sane) 
limits,” (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015a). The United Democratic Movement also holds that, “Greed 
for money is common to all of the ‘traditional’ parties . . . because they are primarily money 
parties, rather than the representatives and defenders of the general interest. (As they are 
supposed to be.) Such parties have one goal—to take the city’s economy, its businesses and 
finances, and all [of] the [city’s] inhabitants into their own hands, to ensure themselves a 
saturated life and to convert the city’s residents into hostages of their aspirations for years,” 
(Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015b). And, on their own website, Movement TOGETHER writes of the 
political parties, “For a long time the ideological differences [between the parties] have not 
been followed, after every election [the parties] gather and share ‘warm seats [of power]’” 
(Maskoliūnienė, 2015a). 
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To sum up, the selected organizations applied two frames to present the political parties as 
embodiments of political power as a closed system of power or as poorly behaved individuals 
who wield power immorally. The organizations in this study perceive political parties as a 
homogeneous unit lacking the differences between them that a party democracy requires 
to function. Moreover, these organizations write that the political parties use their power to 
pursue their own selfish interests, not the common interest of the people. It follows that the 
organizations conclude that the people have common interests that need to be defended 
and that as the political parties are not pursuing the interests of the people as a whole, the 
parties are in opposition with the people. As a result, political representation is framed as 
dysfunctional because the current representatives (the political parties) have failed to act as 
proper intermediaries and have monopolized decision making.
4 . 2 .  Pr o g n o s t i c  f ra m i n g 
The researched organizations express disappointment with the governing elite in general and 
the political parties in particular. According to the discourse of the organizations, the current 
model of representation is not functioning properly because unsatisfactory representatives 
have seized decision-making power. Therefore, the roles of both the representatives and the 
people are framed as problematic; prognostic framing offers solutions.
To begin with, the organizations in this study frame the role of the government clearly: to 
serve the people. They explain that the government, as a representative of the people, should 
serve and act in the interests of the people. Furthermore, they believe that governmental 
discretion should be limited and guided by decisions made by the people. For example, the 
United Democratic Movement provides a framing of the role of government in asserting that 
in a “One of the fundamental principles of the Constitution—the government must serve the 
people—has been betrayed this way,” (2010). 
In addition, the organizations in this case study framed successful representation as a restored 
relationship between the government and the people. The government should be closer to the 
people and should know and understand the issues in a particular place. In their websites, the 
organizations relay a shared belief: that the link between the government and the people should be 
grounded in partnership and trust and developed through frequent contact. This prognostic framing 
advocating restoring relations between the government and the people is evident in Movement 
TOGETHER’s claim that “. . . to pursue effective communication between citizens and institutions of 
local and central government that would help to identify, to coordinate, and to respond to different 
citizens’ interests, needs and development visions,” (Movement TOGETHER, 2013b). This framing 
is seen again in their assertion that the relationship between the people and their representatives 
would be restored if “the elected municipal council members would get closer, [and attend] directly 
to the problems of particular residential area,” (Urbšys, 2014). These sentiments are also echoed in 
the prognostic framing the List of Lithuania Party offers: “Let’s get the democratic state back, let’s 
restore the moral contract between the citizens and the government . . . We understand that this 
idea requires different political behaviour— not a brutal struggle for power, but building confidence 
and certainly a shared concern for the destiny of the nation,” (Molytė, 2013). 
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Given that the organizations frame the purpose of the government as serving the people, 
and assuring this service though frequent contact, adequate representation—as framed by 
the organizations—cannot be achieved through elections alone as the government should, 
throughout  the governing term, constantly refer to the preferences of the people. This 
framing of representation resembles the classic conception of representation, which Hanna 
F. Pitkin (1967) calls substantive. According to Pitkin, substantive representation occurs when 
representatives act on behalf of, in the interest of, as an agent of, and as a substitute for the 
represented. This conception implies that representatives are obliged to act according to the 
preferences of the citizens. In addition, the representatives also have a duty to explain their 
decisions when the constituency is dissatisfied. The representatives have to persuade the people 
that the representatives’ decisions were based on the interests of the represented (Pitkin, 
1967). However, this requirement to explain decisions and the obligation to act according to 
the interests of the citizens should not be equated with acting according to the decisions made 
by the people. In the party democracy model, presented by Bernard Manin (1997), political 
parties maintain independence from the represented. Party democracies are not based on a 
congruence between the preferences of the voters and the policies implemented. Instead, 
voters express their trust in political parties, which—after an election—have full discretion to 
implement policies. Thus, once in power, the parties are independent from the voters and the 
decisions of the elected are only constrained by party discipline (Manin, 1997). 
Moreover, according to the conception of substantive representation, voters hold their 
representatives accountable by either re-electing them or by punishing them by voting for 
other candidates. Therefore, voting decisions are based on the previous behaviours of the 
representatives, on whether the people feel the elected representatives have represented 
them successfully or not (Pitkin, 1967). In the discourse of the organizations in this case study, 
it seems that accountability can only be assured through a constant relationship between the 
elected and the voters in the interim between elections. Given this, the time between elections 
is a very important time for voters to get to know representatives, to choose appropriate 
representatives, and to develop trust in their representatives. Nadia Urbinati (2006) states 
that election does not guarantee fair representation. Representation in its different forms 
during the governing term is much more related to deliberation than to the simple act of 
voting (Urbinati, 2006). Deliberative representation—representation undertaken in constant 
communication with the electorate—ensures that a link will develop between the people and 
the government; it also builds trust and allows the electorate to get to know the appropriate 
representatives. This deliberative side of representation acquires a specific form in the party 
democracy model, where most discussions take place within political parties (Manin, 1997); it 
seems that an additional place for communication, deliberation, and trust building is required 
for successful representation. 
Furthermore, not only do the organizations studied suggest the need for a very 
communicative government, they also frame a better organized self-government as a necessary 
attribute of a highly-functioning democratic government. Self-government is a sphere of daily life 
which is close to the people. Movement TOGETHER even calls self-government “the natural right 
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of [the] people to create and manage their daily lives,” (2013b). In this self-government sphere, 
decisions relevant to the people are made. In their analysed website text, the organizations 
framed a model self-government as one in which people can and should be consulted on 
relevant issues. This framing implies that the decision-making power should to be returned to 
the people. Self-government is presented as a means for providing the people with the power 
to make their own decisions on matters that are their own affairs. Even though governance by 
the political parties is highly resisted in the analysed populist discourse, the organizations in this 
case study do not object to representation in general. In fact, their websites reveal that they 
prefer representatives to the direct rule of the people, even in the sphere of self-governing. 
On their page, the United Democratic Movement writes, “The next step in strengthening real 
self-government is electing elders and local community councils directly from people living 
nearby” (Dzežulskis-Duonys, 2015b). Similar sentiments can be found on the List of Lithuania’s 
page, “ . . . to restore the first commercially autonomous self-government level in Lithuania 
as it is in Europe . . . the municipal council should be elected not according to party lists, but 
directly, in single-member constituencies,” (The List of Lithuania, 2015). 
The organizations’ websites framed fair representation as representation offered by familiar, 
trustworthy representatives elected on the basis of their personal qualities. In this framing, 
trust in the government can be developed through voters getting to know their representatives 
as individuals. Moreover, according to the organizations’ websites, representatives should 
identify with the people, not with a political party. In the organizations’ discourse, it seems 
a person can be either from the people or be a member of a political party; belonging to 
both groups appears to be impossible. According to Bernard Manin (1997), the relationship 
between political parties and the electorate is based on trust and loyalty in party democracy. 
The principle of trust is maintained in the case study organizations’ discourse, but trust is 
developed with familiar individuals instead of with political parties as collective organizations. 
While the government sphere is framed as being controlled by the political parties, the sphere 
of the self-government belongs to the people. Therefore, respected people should be elected 
as representatives not from party lists, but from single-member constituencies. As long as good 
representatives are framed as being from the people, democratic representation is more about 
seeing the people’s own representatives in power than it is about opposing representation in 
general (Kaltwasser, 2013). 
The demand to expand self-government is not unusual, especially regarding the context 
these organizations are emerging from. Each of the three researched organizations participated 
in municipal elections, which partially explains their common focus on self-governance; the 
debate on the character of local government has been stimulated by the introduction of direct 
mayoral elections in Lithuania. It is interesting, though, that these organizations frame self-
government as something more substantial than simply expanding institutionalized participation 
in municipal government. Self-government is framed as a decision-making process that increases 
the people’s responsibility not only for a particular district or a city, but for the whole country. 
For example, the United Democratic Movement writes, “ . . . real, bottom-up, self-government 
. . . [the] voice of the common people would always be heard, and government would serve 
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the people, would be responsible and accountable for their promises to voters,” (Zabielienė, 
2015). This framing of self-government as a promotion of the people’s responsibility for their 
country can also be read in Movement TOGETHERS words: “Only a citizens’ self-government can 
create the political leaders who represent the interests of the people,” (Urbšys, 2014). Finally, 
the List of Lithuania Party is even more explicit in this framing, stating, “ . . . Lithuanian citizens 
would become the owners of their locality and their Homeland,” (The List of Lithuania, 2012).
All three organizations share a belief that the people should not only be responsible for 
decision making, but should also be encouraged, supported, and nurtured. Self-government 
is framed as a sphere in which future national leaders should be nurtured and the power of 
the nation should be strengthened.
Given this, how do these organizations envision the role of representatives? The deliberative 
aspect of representation and of responding to the wishes of the constituency leads to a 
question, if representatives do not start manipulating their supporters and the people. Jane 
Mansbridge (2003) assesses democratic representation by the representatives’ interactions 
with those they represent. Representatives, she argues, can either manipulate or educate 
their constituency. When representatives intend to deceive the constituency, they resort to 
manipulation. Representatives who opt to educate voters seek to make constituents’ interests 
more understandable and visible (Mansbridge, 2003). Education, in this case, is framed not 
only as a means of revealing the true interests of the people, but also as a way to encourage 
constituents to take responsibility for their own governance; it also implies that representatives 
are responsible for making decisions in the peoples’ interests as well. Even though the 
representatives make their decisions based on the preferences of the people, the constituency 
is also responsible for representatives’ decisions. 
To summarize, in the discourse of the organizations examined, self-government does 
not mean rejecting representation in general. The three organizations’ websites frame self-
government as a sphere that provides the people with the power to make decisions about 
their own affairs. Furthermore, the people in this self-government sphere can be educated 
to be responsible for themselves and for the whole country. While the organizations reject 
party representation, they frame successful representation as a trusting relationship between 
the people and the government. This relationship is supposed to be developed through 
constant communication and through the election of familiar individuals. These prognostic 
frames, indicating how representation should be organized, contradict several aspects of party 
democracy Bernard Manin presents (1997). The preferred organization of representation that 
the analysed websites frame is based on a trust between the people and known representatives 
who have emerged from the people. In the populist framework, as long as political parties are 
perceived as not of the people, they cannot be successful representatives and a relationship of 
trust cannot be developed between political parties and the people; in fact, it does not seem 
that trust can be established with any collective organization. In addition, when representation 
is framed as based on a representative engaging in constant communication and continually 
referencing the peoples’ decisions, the independence of political parties in the party democracy 
cannot be maintained. Finally, the organizations, in their discourse, have required constant 
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communication and deliberation to ensure representatives’ accountability to the people. This 
requirement, however, implies introducing additional places for deliberation (probably at the 
local self-government level) in addition to the political parties. 
4 . 3 .  M o t i va t i o n a l  f ra m i n g 
Finally, the motivational framing in the three organizations’ discourse evident on their respective 
websites was also analysed. All three framing tasks—diagnostic, prognostic and motivational—
interconnect. Framing problems often goes hand-in-hand with framing solutions. Therefore, 
on their websites, the activists frame themselves as good representatives because they have 
diagnosed problems, suggested solutions, and are willing to take up the task of solving the 
indicated problems. In doing this, Movement TOGETHER announces, “Since its founding the 
movement declared the importance of returning governing power to the people,” (Račkauskas, 
Navickas, 2015) Likewise, the List of Lithuania Party states, “In these elections the List of Lithuania 
Party offers a unique alternative to politics that are cynical and have lost moral sensitivity. Instead 
of rushing to govern, the party is trying to restore the power of the citizens,” (Kuolys, 2012). 
Finally, the United Democratic Movement writes, “It is gratifying to still have civic-minded and 
unselfish people in Lithuania, who work for the benefit of society; it is a delight to interact and 
to share information with them,” (Zabielienė, 2014). 
The activists propose a twofold alternative: political and moral and their suggested reforms 
make them similar to anti-establishment reform parties (Hanley and Sikk, 2014), which ground 
their political platforms on newness and reforms. However, the researched organizations in 
Lithuania frame newness as a moral renewal—it does not imply that the entire political elite 
should be replaced by new and unknown actors. On the contrary, the activists express trust 
in the people they personally know, people with known personal characteristics and former 
activities are their proposed representatives. In the populist discourse analysed, being part of 
the people is what makes a particular actor a good representative; thus, to ensure adequate 
representation the activists intend to be a voice for the people and to maintain constant 
communication with the people. 
In addition to these qualities, the organizations’ websites revealed that being a former 
member of Lithuania’s independence movement, Sąjūdis, is a very desirable, if not necessary, 
trait for a representative to have. Each organization touted a connection to Sąjūdis. The United 
Democratic Movement does so: “ . . . is known as a very sensitive and responsible fighter of 
Sąjūdis,” (Zabielienė, 2015)  A reference to Sąjūdis can also be found on Movement TOGETHER’s 
website: “I was [a member] of the initiative group [of Sąjūdis], a city council member of Sąjūdis, 
a chairman of organizational committee from the beginning,” (Maskoliūnienė, 2015b). Finally, 
the List of Lithuania party also mentions Sąjūdis in endorsing a representative as, “. . .  the 
son of a deportee, a man of the Sąjūdis, an underground Sietynas publisher, a Šėpa theatre 
creator, Citizens Charter unifier, an honest citizen, and an ironic analyst of the Lithuanian 
political spectacle,” (Kuolys, 2012).
The moral alternative the three organizations suggest includes a turning back to the moral 
values of the Lithuanian independence movement Sąjūdis. This suggestion of a moral renewal 
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in the form of returning to the values of the Sąjūdis movement resembles what Paul Taggart 
termed “heartland,” an idealized community populist actors refer to when they discuss the 
people and the morals they serve (2002). Sąjūdis was a time of moral politics in Lithuania’s 
history, a time that represents a strong link between the people and their representatives. It 
is a time, when representation was implemented successfully. The organization’s references 
to Sąjūdis are a call to return to idealism. By moving away from the pragmatic and cynical, 
these organizations suggest politics should be conducted by moral representatives with good 
characteristics, proven intentions, and positions grounded in the Sąjūdis. The organizations in 
this study interconnect the previous independence movement’s idealistic and moral politics 
with an idea of the people as a unit. The rise of political parties since Lithuania’s independence 
was restored seems to have brought pragmatism to politics and separated politicians from the 
people as a whole. The political parties, instead of being connected to the main principles of a 
party democracy, a plurality of interests, and political actors (Manin, 1997), are presented by 
the organizations in the case study as symbols of political decline in Lithuania. Therefore, these 
organizations suggest that the only trustworthy path is a return to the heartland.
CONCLUSIONS
Today’s party democracy crisis coincides with the growth of populist democracy in the form of an 
emerging radical right in Western Europe and populist challengers of another kind in CEE. Since 
2011, a wave of anti-establishment activism has appeared in Lithuania. Even though populist 
parties are not new to Lithuania’s political arena, this recent swell of anti-establishment activism 
is much more focused on anti-party politics and the moral renewal of politics than Lithuania’s 
previous populist actors. The ideas of populism—such as politics as an expression of the will of 
the people and of an antagonism between the people and the elite—leads to the question of 
whether populism and the party democracy model are compatible. On one hand, populism can 
be considered a pathology, or a dark side of democracy. On the other hand, populism can be 
perceived as a tool for improving democracy. This case study was conducted to shed new light 
on this sort of theoretical debate and to obtain needed empirical research on the perspectives 
of populist political actors. The study reveals how anti-establishment organizations in Lithuania 
understand representation. The study also identifies both the actors’ populist discourse on 
problems with the party democracy model and the solutions they offer. The study applies 
framing analysis to focus on how the case study’s selected organizations perceive and present 
political representation and whether their conceptions of representation actually contradict 
the principles of party democracy.
As far as the results are concerned, diagnostic framing expresses a populist perception 
of political parties as the embodiment of political power. The first frame defined political 
parties as a closed system of power. In the second frame, the case study organizations regard 
political parties as immoral and poorly behaved persons. In both frames, the organizations 
perceive political parties as a homogeneous unit, lacking differences between them. Analysis 
of the organizations websites has revealed a belief that, as long as the political parties do not 
pursue the general interest of the people as a whole, they are in opposition to the people. 
68  jogilė stAšienė
The organizations frame political representation as dysfunctional because the political parties 
have seized decision-making power. The research reveals that the organizations analysed do 
not consider the logic of party discipline or internal decision-making processes democratic 
strengths. After analysing the organizations’ discourse and applying the first two frames, it is 
clear that: 1) the organizations perceive political parties as a homogeneous unit lacking the 
internal differences necessary for the functioning of party democracy (Manin, 1997); and 2) 
the organizations believe political parties stand in a strict opposition to the people. 
Prognostic framing revealed that the organizations believe the relationship between political 
actors and the people should be restored by changing the role of representatives. The decision-
making power, these organizations argue, should belong to the people and representatives 
should serve the interests of the people. The organizations suggest that a link between the 
people and their representatives should be established through constant communication in 
order to allow the people to know and build trust in their representatives-to-be. Furthermore, 
the organizations suggest that this arrangement could be created through self-government—as 
long as political actors do not assume full responsibility as the people should be given the 
responsibility to make decisions regarding their own matters. The organizations studied write 
that the sphere of self-government is where political communication and deliberation should 
take place. As long as a democracy’s main deliberations take place within political parties in a 
party democracy (Manin, 1997), additional deliberation forums at the local level would only 
supplement the party democracy model. The analysis of organizations’ prognostic framing 
reveals that this deliberative aspect of representation might improve party democracy. 
Deliberation also involves educating the people to take up political responsibility. However, 
strong opposition to political parties suggests replacing them with individual representatives. 
When the representatives are from the people, mediation through ideas or other collective 
organizations becomes unnecessary. According to the organizations in this case study, only 
knowing and trusting—as well as controlling—a particular representative can guarantee fair 
representation and proper decision making. Such a perspective does contradict with the party 
democracy model and could only lead to local level governance when nation-wide ideas and 
ideologies (as well as national political parties) become unnecessary. It should be noted that 
this kind of discourse could be at least partially related to the debate surrounding the recent 
introduction of direct mayoral elections in Lithuania. Therefore, an analysis of populist discourse, 
regarding national elections in particular, requires further research.  
Finally, motivational framing interrelates with the previous framing tasks: the activists 
present themselves as the ones to take up the responsibility of representation for the benefit of 
all. In addition, the organizations studied base the ability to be good representatives on positive 
individual characteristics and on participating in Lithuania’s independence movement. Therefore, 
in the discourse of these organizations, Sąjūdis is cast in the role of a heartland (Taggart, 2002) 
and represents the ideal community that Lithuania should return to. This return to idealistic 
politics signalled by the groups’ adoption of the values of Lithuania’s former independence 
movement Sąjūdis implies a turning back to the redemptive side of democracy (Canovan, 
1999). The role that the collective memory of a national independence movement plays in 
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anti-establishment activities in post-communist countries should be explored in future research.
The discourse of the researched organizations provides a complicated picture of populist 
ideas. While political parties are framed as closed and inaccessible, the activists suggest 
turning from pragmatic and well-institutionalized politics back to politics based on idealism—a 
redemptive side of the democracy. In addition, the political tools the organizations propose 
wielding, such as local level deliberation, could supplement party democracy. However, if 
political representation is understood as implemented by familiar individuals, and if mediation 
through ideas or other collective organizations is rejected, this could lead to setting aside party 
democracy and concentrating only on local level issues—the issues that really matter. 
ANNEX
S o u r ce  o f  d a t a
Name of the organization Website of organization
Time period covered 
by the articles
Last accessed on
Movement TOGETHER www.judejimaskartu.lt/ 11/2013 - 03/2015 15-01-2016
The List of Lithuania http://lietuvossarasas.lt/ 02/2012 - 03/2015 15-01-2016
United Democratic Movement http://www.judejimas.eu/ 02/2011 - 03/2015 15-01-2016
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CYBERSECURITY IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE:  
FROM IDENTIFYING RISKS TO COUNTERING THREATS
Agnija Tumkevič
ABSTRACT
Today, ensuring security in cyberspace is a top priority of national security policy for most states. 
States’ approaches to cybersecurity can be divided into two categories: those that regard cybersecurity 
as a civilian task; and those that involve their militaries in creating or implementing cybersecurity 
policies. Those states that have incorporated cyberwarfare into their military planning and organization 
perceive cyberattacks as a threat to their national security, while states that charge their civilian agencies 
with domestic cybersecurity missions classify cyber intrusions as security risks for only particular sectors. 
Adopting the framework of securitization theory, this article theorizes both civil and military approaches 
to cybersecurity and threat perceptions and their sources. The theoretical framework is then applied to a 
study of the cybersecurity policies of Central European countries and the Baltic States.
Keywords: cybersecurity policy, civil-military approach, securitization, militarization, criminalization.
INTRODUCTION 
Today, cybersecurity is increasingly regarded as a national issue affecting all levels of society 
(ENISA, 2012). Consequently, securing cyberspace has become an integral part of states’ national 
security policies. Cyberthreats have revolutionised the way people think about security and the 
rules and methods for safeguarding national security (Świątkowska, 2012). Although, defining 
cyberthreats seems to be problematic, almost all states agree that cyberspace threats and risks 
need to be specifically addressed in their national security policies. Countries around the world 
are, therefore, formulating cybersecurity strategies, usually by devising some kind of national 
legal act or programme to respond to cyberthreats and protect critical networks (The Cyber 
Index, UNIDIR, 2013). However, priorities for national cybersecurity policies vary by country. 
Some countries have a very clear vision of the cyber environment and its main referent objects 
such as critical infrastructure (CI), have formulated a comprehensive perception of issues that 
pose threats to cybersecurity and national security, and have identified the most dangerous 
source of cyberthreats. As a result, in these countries, tasking government agencies with 
cybersecurity management is a key condition for implementing effective cybersecurity policies. 
In contrast, states with a prevailing civil approach to cybersecurity are mainly concerned with 
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cybercrime. The potential sources of cybercrime risks are more diffused and primarily related 
to private property and the proper functioning of the economic sector. 
The roots of states’ different approaches to cybersecurity can be analysed from a theoretical 
point of view. There are competing doctrines for viewing cybersecurity issues. The so-called 
national security paradigm reflects the traditional role of the state in securing countries’ borders 
and enforcing the rule of law (Newmeyer, 2015). According to Harknett and Stever (2009), the 
cybersecurity issue is unique multifaceted, establishing cybersecurity requires states to secure 
public, private, and economic cyber activities. Cybersecurity is considered fundamental to a 
state’s military and economic security and as such is approached with traditional national 
security arguments based on protecting the homeland (Harnett and Stever, 2009). In other 
words, this approach emphasizes the link between the protection of critical infrastructure 
and those public and private systems that are important to the operation of the government. 
The national security paradigm refers to the top-down approach of managing and securing 
cyberspace risks in a manner that may result in increasing the military’s influence on cyberspace 
policies (Dunn Cavelty,2013). Therefore, the concept of cyberspace militarization can be analysed 
through the national security paradigm. 
In contrast to the military approach, the civil approach can be analysed through an economic 
lens. In this regard, the economic paradigm reflects the growing influence of the internet on the 
state’s economic well-being (Newmeyer, 2015). While the national security paradigm excludes 
all other sectors but the military from the processes of formulating cyberspace policies, the 
economic perspective emphasizes the importance of the participation of other sectors and 
institutions in the formulation of cybersecurity policies. According to Moore (2010), from 
the economic perspective, there are two necessary conditions to implementing a national 
cybersecurity strategy: 1) internet service providers should be held accountable for eliminating 
malware-infected computers on their systems; and 2) companies and other agencies should be 
required to disclose data breeches and control system intrusions. The economic paradigm refers 
to a decentralized approach among a group of agencies and actors responsible for cybersecurity 
management. In this approach, the burden of taking measures to protect systems as a whole 
is shared by the individual, service providers and the government. 
Both paradigms, national security and economic, suggest frameworks for a theoretical 
analysis of the process of creating and implementing cybersecurity policies. A variety of optional 
theoretical approaches could still be highlighted. The framework used in this paper is the 
securitization framework of the Copenhagen school. As Hansen and Nissenbaum note (2009), 
the understanding of security as a discursive modality with a particular rhetorical structure 
and political effect renders the Copenhagen school’s framework well suited to a study of the 
formation and evolution of cybersecurity discourse. Therefore, this article—based on the results 
of a qualitative study of the four Visegrad states (Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and 
Hungary) and the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia)—aims to: 1) investigate 
how the civil and military approaches correlate to securitization processes; and 2) contribute 
to understandings of differences in states‘s cyberspace behaviours and cooperation patterns 
in cyberspace.
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1. THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL AND CYBERSECURITY
In the 1990s, securitization theorists such as Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde did not perceive 
cybersecurity as an existential threat to states. However, as a consequence of the growing 
dependence of human societies on cyber networks, cybernetic issues are now securitized, 
suggesting that the materialization of this process is highlighted through an analysis of policies, 
institutional and strategic responses (Lobato, 2015). Thus, it is important to analyse, how states, 
acting as securitizing actors, become alert to the risks of cyberattacks and then establish a 
specific agenda to deal with threats. In this context, maintaining a secure cyberspace legitimizes 
the use of extraordinary measures.   The ability of an actor to successfully securitize an issue 
is highly dependent on their position. According to Buzan, security has, to some degree, been 
institutionalized and, therefore, “some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of 
being generally accepted voices of security, by having the power to define security.” (Buzan, 
Weaver, de Wilde, 1998). A government’s cybersecurity policy would therefore seem to be 
an ideal vehicle for mobilizing, and perhaps also legitimizing, a securitizing move. A policy 
represents an administration’s official stance on an issue understood to be a problem and 
proposes solutions based on technical knowledge and research. In this regard, cybersecurity 
policies reflect in strategic documents, such as the national and cybersecurity strategies, the 
processes of defining cyberspace as a realm requiring security measures. 
Given this, I operationalize both military and civil approaches of cybersecurity in order to apply 
the Copenhagen school’s theoretical framework to my cybersecurity analysis. Thus, in countries 
with a military approach, the referent object is the protection of critical infrastructures and of 
governmental digital resources. Countries implementing this approach are usually technologically 
advanced, have larger economies, and rely heavily on cyberspace. With this dependency comes 
vulnerability and maintaining critical cyber infrastructure is considered the main condition for 
maintaining national security. Conversely, there is no specific referent object identified by civil-
oriented countries. These countries believe that cyberattackers are seeking immediate financial 
gain or seek to steal sensitive or provocative information. Since cyberthreats are closely linked to 
criminal acts, the main referent object varies from personal information to the proper functioning 
of information, economic, and social spheres, and other so-called soft sectors.
The second point made by the Copenhagen school is that the concept of security 
encompasses not only military, but also political, economic, and social aspects. Consequently, 
the perception of threats has also been expanded. Hence, in this article, it is important to analyse 
how countries perceive potential cyberattacks. Thus, states with a prevailing military approach—
due to their heavy dependence on their CI—view cyber issues as matters of national security 
and include cyberwarfare in their military planning and organization. It is worth mentioning that 
dimensions of national cybersecurity were established when computer intrusions (a criminal 
act) were clustered together with more traditional and well-established espionage discourse. 
In this regard, civil-oriented countries perceive particular cyber issues as security risks for only 
a particular sector, such as financial, social, or private spheres. 
According to the Copenhagen school, security discourse refers to the identification of the 
main source of threat. Although, the architecture of cyberspace makes it difficult to clearly 
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determine who initiated a cyberattack, the military approach usually focuses on foreign 
governments and rogue non-state actors as the sources of threat, while the civil approach 
concentrates on hacktivism and cybercrimes as the main sources of threat. Consequently, 
countries with a prevailing civil approach are less likely to envision external threats to 
cybersecurity. The actors posing the greatest threats in countries with a civil approach may be in 
the business of stealing personal identities to commit fraud, a crime that in the inter-connected 
world of cyberspace, renders everyone a potential victim.
Another stage of the securitization process is the acceptance and legitimization of the 
extraordinary measures offered by the securitizing actor. Therefore, based on this logic, the 
active engagement of military institutions in cybersecurity policy creation and implementation 
could be seen as one such extraordinary measure undertaken by countries with a prevailing 
military approach. The so-called militarization of cyberspace refers to the growing pressures 
on governments to develop the capacity to fight and win wars in this domain (Deibert, 2011). 
Therefore, the militarization of cyber space shall be considered a result of the securitization 
process. When cyber space is perceived as a source of threats to national security, governments 
strengthen their capabilities to offensively fight these threats. Meanwhile, civil-oriented 
countries are more likely to respond to perceived cybersecurity threats with civilian capacities, 
structures, and instruments as cybersecurity issues ultimately fall within the remit of interior 
ministries and civilian agencies.
While cyberspace is not specifically addressed by Buzan, Weaver, et al., the securitization 
theory could serve as the theoretical framework for the analysis of civil and military approaches 
to cybersecurity, their relevant premises are demonstrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Presumptions of military and civil approaches 
Civil Approach Military Approach
Referent security object 
Cyberattack perception  
Sources of cyberthreats
Private security, information and 
communications technology (ICT)
Criminal acts, security risks
Non-state actors, cybercriminals, 
hacktivists
Critical infrastructure, ICT  
National security threats 
Rogue states and non-state 
actors, cybercriminals, hacktivists
Institutions responsible for 
cybersecurity management
Interior ministries and civil 
agencies, etc.
Ministries of defence, other 
military agencies
2. OVERVIEW OF CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES AND THE INSTITUTIONAL  
STRUCTURING OF CYBERSECURITY POLICIES
In the hierarchy of strategic documents, cybersecurity strategies are part of the national 
security or defence strategies and are connected to several other institutions’ strategies due 
to the all-encompassing impact of cybersecurity on society as a whole. The main goal of this 
section is to provide an overview of cybersecurity strategies of seven selected countries and 
the institutions engaged in the implementation of cyber policy objectives. 
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2 . 1  E s t o n i a
Estonia‘s strategic documents on cybersecurity and its institutional structures for maintaining 
cybersecurity have contributed to its mature and comprehensive cybersecurity culture and 
policies. This is a country where strategic planning comes first, ensuring the cohesion of the 
entire cybersecurity architecture. In response to a series of extensive hacking attacks in 2007, 
Estonia, in 2008, became one of the first countries in the world to adopt a national cybersecurity 
strategy. The hacking episode Estonia faced in 2007 has been called the first cyberwar, raged 
as a politically motivated assault, on a country’s digital infrastructure. After this “Cyber War I,” 
Estonia’s Ministry of Defence drafted a national cybersecurity strategy. Estonia has also published 
and launched Digital Agenda 2020 to create an environment facilitating the use of ICT and the 
development of smart solutions (Digital Agenda 2020 for Estonia, 2013).
Estonia has the most extensive range of institutional cybersecurity policies in the Baltics. 
The responsibility for coordinating Estonia’s cybersecurity policies overall was transferred from 
Estonia’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) to its Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 
in 2011. As an interagency body, Estonia’s Cyber Security Council of the Security Committee of 
the Government has been supporting strategic level interagency cooperation and overseeing 
the implementation of the country’s cybersecurity strategy objectives. The Ministry of Defence 
is the coordinating authority for cyber defence in the area of national defence. In addition to 
the MOD, national cyber defence is supported by the Estonian Defence League’s Cyber Defence 
Unit that includes cybersecurity professionals from both the public and private entities. Since 
2008, Estonia’s defence forces have also hosted the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre 
of Excellence—an international military organisation focusing on enhancing the cyber defence 
capabilities of NATO and its sponsoring nations. 
2 . 2  L a t v i a
The Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia for 2014-2018 was adopted in 2014 (Cyber Security 
Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018, 2014). The strategy highlights the ICT security incidents in Latvian 
cyberspace and predicts that the country may be subject to increased cybersecurity risks in the 
future (Cyber Security Strategy of Latvia 2014-2018: 2014). The strategy also appeals to the 
Law on the Security of Information Technology which determines basic security requirements 
for state, municipal institutions, and providers of public electronic communications services, 
as well as supervisors of critical ICT infrastructure. Both documents reflect an integrated 
approach to the protection of Latvia’s cybersecurity and national security that prioritizes critical 
infrastructure and public services. 
Latvia’s elaborate and efficient institutionalization of its cybersecurity policies is well on the 
way to becoming a model system. Latvia’s National Information Technology Security Council 
coordinates the development of national cybersecurity policies and the implementation of the 
policies’ objectives and measures. The Council is the central national authority for the exchange 
of information and cooperation between the public and private sector and the Ministry of 
Defence coordinates the development and implementation of information technology security 
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and cyberspace protection policies. Naturally, there are some other entities—such as other 
ministries and a computer emergency response team (CERT)—that also implement Latvia’s 
cybersecurity policies. 
2 . 3  L i t h u a n i a
Lithuania’s management of cybersecurity threats has gone through a long evolution, starting 
from the creation of Lithuania’s first institutions for dealing with cybersecurity, to the recent 
passing of an overarching law on cybersecurity (Butrimas, 2015).. Lithuania is the only country 
in the Baltic region that has not approved a national cybersecurity strategy. However, Lithuania’s 
Seimas (parliament) approved a national security strategy, which declared cybersecurity a 
priority of national interest.  In order to ensure the security of Lithuania’s cyberspace, the 
Lithuanian government approved The Programme for the Development of Electronic Information 
Security for 2011-2019. The programme has three main objectives: 1) to strengthen the security 
of state-owned information resources; 20 to ensure that critical information infrastructure 
functions efficiently; and 3) to ensure the cybersecurity of Lithuania’s citizens and residents 
and persons staying in Lithuania (Resolution Nr. 796, 2011).  These objectives have been 
carried over to and further developed by Lithuania’s law on cybersecurity, approved in 2014. 
The significant outcomes of this law include transferring of coordinating national cybersecurity 
policies to the Ministry of National Defence (MoND), the establishment of a new operational 
National Cybersecurity Centre (NCC) and the creation of an Advisory Council on Cybersecurity 
chaired by the MoND (Law on Cyber Security of the Republic of Lithuania, 2014).
2 . 4  Po l a n d 
Poland enacted a long list of comprehensive changes to its cyberspace defence system Poland 
and managed to publish and implement a cybersecurity strategy. Furthermore, cybersecurity 
also became an integral part of Poland’s national security efforts and is frequently mentioned 
in other national strategic documents. 
The cybersecurity issue in Poland’s strategic documents was first mentioned in the National 
Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland in 2007. The document noted a direct relationship 
between cybersecurity and the country’s ability to function properly (National Security Strategy 
of the Republic of Poland, 2007). Later, the Strategy of Development of the National Security 
System of the Republic of Poland 2011-2022 detailed and developed the issues related to 
cyberspace protection in Poland (The Strategy of National Security of Poland, 2012). However, 
the first document dedicated solely to cybersecurity, Cyberspace Protection Policy, was not 
published until 2013 (Cyberspace Protection Policy of the Republic of Poland, 2013). In 2015, 
Poland’s National Security Bureau (BBN) published a cybersecurity doctrine (Świątkowska, 2012). 
The document further lays out work to be completed in order to improve national security in 
the realm of cyberspace. The doctrine also maps out tasks for state institutions, notably for 
security agencies, the armed forces, the private sector, and NGOs (Doctrine of Cybersecurity of 
Poland, 2015). The National Security Bureau, functions as the main entity—together with the 
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Ministry of Administration and Digitisation, the Internal Security Agency, and CERT—responsible 
for achieving cybersecurity objectives. 
2 . 5  T h e  C z e c h  R e p u b l i c 
The Czech National Strategy for Information Security approved in 2005 marks the Czech 
Republic’s first attempt to regulate its national cyberspace (National Strategy for Information 
Security in the Slovak Republic, 2005). In 2011, the National Security Strategy identified 
cybersecurity as one of the main priorities of the Czech government and placed cyberthreats on 
the same security-threat level as regional conflicts, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction 
(Security Strategy of the Czech Republic, 2011). In 2011 the Czech Republic approved its cyber 
security strategy and action plan for 2011 to 2015. The strategy primarily aimed to protect ICT 
systems in the Czech Republic and mitigate damage caused by cyberattacks (Cyber Security 
Strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011). In 2015, the Czech government 
approved its updated national cybersecurity strategy for 2015 to 2020. This strategy for the 
latter half of the decade includes a comprehensive set of measures that for achieving the 
highest possible level of cybersecurity (National Cyber Security Strategy of the Czech Republic 
for the Period from 2015 to 2020, 2015).
In the Czech Republic, civilian agencies are charged with implementing cybersecurity policy. 
The overall responsibility for national cybersecurity rests with the country’s National Security 
Authority. The National Cyber Security Centre, an agency within the National Security Authority, 
is part of the country’s national and international early warning system. Additionally, The 
Ministry of the Interior promotes cybersecurity issues at the political level while the Ministry 
of Defence only addresses cybersecurity issues cooperatively with NATO. 
2 . 6  S l o va k i a 
Slovakia developed a legal framework for cybersecurity in 2008 by adopting the National 
Strategy for Information Security of the Slovak Republic (NSIS) for 2009 to 2013. The strategy 
was drafted by the Ministry of Finance, Slovakia’s agency responsible for securing unclassified 
public administration information. In 2012, Slovakia launched its National Cybersecurity Strategy. 
The strategy was accompanied by the Action Plan, a report on the tasks of the NSIS.  Slovakia 
issued an information security plan for each year from 2009 to 2013. 
Slovakia’s National Security Authority manages classified information, while the Ministry 
of Finance manages the rest. Mutual communication is facilitated by the Ministry of Finance‘s 
Committee for Information Security, which has an advisory and coordinating role, preparing 
strategic and technical materials on information security. Some specific topics are supervised 
by the Security Council, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence. Thus, the Ministry 
of Defence does not have a direct role in national cybersecurity management. 
2 . 7  H u n g a r y
In 2013, Hungary adopted a national cybersecurity strategy which expressly states that protecting 
Hungary’s sovereignty in Hungarian cyberspace is a national interest (Government Decision on 
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the National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary, 2013). Being aware of the fact that threats and 
attacks emerging in cyberspace may escalate to a level requiring allied cooperation, Hungary 
considers it highly important that cybersecurity has become an issue for a collective defence 
under Article 5 of the founding treaty of NATO. It is also worthwhile to note that cyberthreats 
are also prioritized in Hungary’s national security strategy adopted in 2012 (Government Decree 
on the Hungary’s National Security Strategy, 2012).
The main agency responsible for the coordination and implementation of cyber-related 
policies in Hungary is the National Cybersecurity Coordination Council. Additional institutions 
charged with aspects of cybersecurity: the Cybersecurity Authority (an agency within the 
Ministry of National Development), The National Security Office (an agency within) the Ministry 
of Public Administration and Justice, and CERT (an agency within).
2 . 8  Cy b e r s e c u r i t y  s t ra t e g i e s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  o v e ra l l
This overview of the national cybersecurity strategies in the seven countries examined reveals 
that the region’s cybersecurity strategies are becoming integrated and comprehensive. The 
strategies approach cybersecurity in a holistic manner and encompass economic, social, legal, 
law-enforcement, military, and intelligence-related aspects of cybersecurity. Some strategies, 
such as those implemented in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, support a more flexible approach 
and emphasize the economic and personal (individual) dimensions of cybersecurity policy. 
Moreover, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary belong to a group of countries where 
civilian agencies are mainly in charge of ensuring cybersecurity. In this regard, cybersecurity 
in these countries can be described as civil-oriented. Military agencies are more active in 
coordinating and implementing cybersecurity policies in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. 
3. CYBERSECURITY AND ITS REFERENT OBJECTS
When using a securitization framework to analyse cyberspace defence, the referent object—that 
which is existentially threatened—is critical infrastructure. However, as Deibert and Saco have 
argued, cybersecurity is a terrain on which multiple discourses and (in)securities compete 
(Deibert, 2002; Saco, 1999). Therefore, discussions of cybersecurity hinge on competing ideas 
regarding cybersecurity’s referent objects (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). According to 
Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 1161), the key to understanding the potential magnitude of 
cyberthreats lies in acknowledging and understanding just how highly networked and integrated 
computer systems have become. These networks provide critical digital infrastructure: they 
regulate electricity, financial activities, energy use and even traffic patterns.  These networks 
are identified as a collective referent object and are usually securitized first, since their damage 
would present a threat to national security. 
The economic sector is also rich in referent objects including the private sector’s fear 
of hackers’ abilities to steal large sums of money and intellectual property owners’ worries 
that file sharing compromises their rights and revenues (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). In 
this regard, an individual approach to cybersecurity—stemming from cyber-libertarianism 
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prioritizing personal (or individual) security—prevails.1 As Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009: 
1163) have argued, in private security discourse the individual is not a referent object, instead 
the individual is linked to societal and political referent objects. In other words, cyber privacy 
defence has to be mediated through a collective referent object, either a political-ideological 
one—prompting questions regarding an appropriate individual-state balance—or a national-
societal one, which would mobilize values core to community identity. Similarly, securing critical 
infrastructure cannot stop at the infrastructure itself: the implications of a network breakdown 
imply other referent objects: society, the regime, and the economy (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 
2009). In order to link a theoretical perspective on the variety of referent objects with a study 
of cybersecurity in the Baltic states and Visegrad countries, requires an analysis of the referent 
objects identified by the states themselves. 
All seven countries acknowledge a link between the cyber- and national security sectors 
and are aware that cybersecurity issues—such as the destruction of the ICT system or critical 
infrastructure—can damage national security, adversely impact citizens’ lives, and threaten the 
assets and the proper functioning of the national economy and public services. Consequently, 
a collective security discourse prevails in all seven countries’ strategic documents. However, 
the countries—such as Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and to some degree, the Czech 
Republic—that articulate a strong need to intensively defend their cyberspaces also present, 
as reflected in their strategic documents, more comprehensive and clearer visions of their 
main referent objects. For instance, Lithuania’s national security strategy emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring the security of informational, economic, and social infrastructure as the 
key objective of national security policy (National security strategy of the Republic of Lithuania, 
2012). Meanwhile, the national cybersecurity strategy of the Czech Republic mainly prioritizes 
the protection of information infrastructure essential to Czech economic and social interests 
(Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for years 2011-2015, 2011); it also focuses on 
the protection of rights of internet users. However, the Czech Republic’s national security 
strategy presents a more comprehensive concept of critical infrastructure and its vulnerabilities 
coming from cyberspace than its national cybersecurity strategy does. The national security 
document states that critical infrastructure as a whole is exposed to a number of threats with 
natural, technological, and asymmetric aspects. Examples of such threats include cyberattacks, 
economic crime, and sabotage among others (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic 
for years 2011-2015, 2011). In other words, countries which are keen on securitizing their 
cyberspace, are more likely to prioritize the safety of critical infrastructure as a key condition 
of national security. Because national security is linked to critical infrastructure as the referent 
object, the actors with power to identify objects that require security and defence may claim the 
right to use extraordinary means in the name of security. For example, Poland’s cybersecurity 
doctrine emphasizes the importance of critical infrastructure and a direct relationship between 
1  More information on cyber-libertarianism can be found for example here: Hofman, J.,‘‘The Libertarian 
Origins of Cybercrime: Unintended Side-Effects of a Political Utopia‘‘. Centre for analysis of risk and regulation 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010. http://www.lse.ac.uk/accounting/CARR/pdf/dps/
disspaper62.pdf
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cybersecurity and the country’s proper functioning, including its economic development and 
the ability to operate effectively in the military sphere (Cyber security doctrine of the Republic 
of Poland, 2015). What is more, Poland is the only country which is willing to develop not 
only defensive but also offensive cyber capabilities in order to deter potential opponents in 
cyberspace (National security strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2012). Thus, Poland’s approach 
reveals that the more articulated the process of identifying and defending against cyberthreats 
is, the more militarized it becomes.
On the other hand, countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, also mention critical digital 
infrastructure as a referent object. However, these countries do not view potential attacks on 
critical infrastructure as a threat to national survival, as cybersecurity in these two countries is 
thought to be just one of several national security sectors. Hungary and Slovakia focus mainly 
on information security. The objectives of Slovakia’s information security strategy focus on 
protecting human rights and freedom, improving information security management, and 
defending state ICT in order to support the state’s critical infrastructure (National strategy for 
information security in the Slovak Republic, 2008). The concept of referent objects in Hungary’s 
cybersecurity strategy remains even more ambivalent, it lacks any direct reference to primary 
referent objects. The strategy only mentions protecting national data assets and the “operational 
safety of the parts of its critical infrastructures linked to cyberspace.” (Government decision on 
the National cyber security strategy of Hungary, 2013). Neither Slovakia nor Hungary identify a 
specific referent object that should be protected first within cybersecurity, as a consequence 
both countries have a decidedly civil approach to cybersecurity. 
4. PERCEPTIONS OF CYBERTHREATS
The securitization of cyber issues is based on different discourses, most commonly in 
national security discourse. Therefore, cyber issues usually arise when agents, such as foreign 
governments or non-state actors, with rogue intentions attempt to gain access to financial, 
energy, or public-safety systems and the prospect of cyberattacks is presented as a threat that 
requires an urgent response. Perceiving and presenting cyberattacks in this manner leads to 
intense security measures. Consequently, in countries where a national security discourse 
prevails, the threat of cyberattacks are regarded as a top priority and there is a military approach 
to cybersecurity. 
However, threats to cyber- and national security do not arise from external sources alone. 
Hence, cyberattacks can also arise from systematic threats. These systemic threats, defined 
by Hundley as ‘‘cyberspace safety’’ stem from the inherent unpredictability of computers and 
information systems, which ‘‘create unintended (potentially or actually) dangerous situations 
for themselves or for the physical and human environments in which they are embedded’’ 
(Anderson and Hearn, 1996). A more common issue, however, is intentionally provoked 
systematic threat invoked by criminal syndicates or individuals. In this regard, technical discourse 
is accompanied with a criminal one and is linked to cybersecurity discourse. In this discourse, 
cybersecurity can, in short, be seen as safeguarding computers from criminal activity and 
cyberattacks are perceived not as national security threats, but as common risks in the cyber 
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sector. Consequently, countries that perceive potential cyberattacks as a risk for a particular 
sector are less keen to define cyber issues as issues of national security and can be identified 
as civil-oriented states. 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the Czech Republic have a multi-layered approach 
to cyberattacks. First, they evaluate risks to their national security and task state institutions 
with preventing cyberattacks. Secondly, they identify cyber-related challenges to the integral 
components of their national security: the economic, financial, and private sectors. This 
comprehensive approach to cyberattacks is reflected in Estonia’s cybersecurity strategy. Estonia 
claims that it has a growing number of state actors tasked with countering cyber espionage and 
protecting both internet-connected and closed networks, with the additional aim of collecting 
information on security and economic interests (Cyber Security Strategy of Estonia 2014–2017, 
2014). National security is also the prevailing discourse in Poland’s cybersecurity doctrine. 
The cyberthreats identified in Poland’s doctrine include attacks against telecommunications 
systems important to national security, and cybercrime—specific cybercrimes mentioned in 
the doctrine include “cyber violence, destructive cyber protests and cyber demonstrations,” 
data and identity theft, and private computer hijacks (Cyber Security Doctrine of the Republic 
of Poland, 2015). The same discourse is seen in Lithuania and Latvia‘s strategic documents. For 
example, Lithuania’s state defence concept groups cyberattacks as a national threat together 
with terrorism and organised criminal activities (The State Defence Concept of the Republic of 
Latvia, 2012). It is worth mentioning that Latvia’s newest national security concept highlights 
cyberattacks as one of eight primary national security threats (Press release, 2015).
The four countries mentioned above have a comprehensive approach to cybersecurity 
based on precise evaluations of the potential impact of cyberattacks on different sectors and 
on national security overall. Since the cyberattacks are perceived mainly as threats to national 
security, these countries have responded with a military approach. 
Slovakia’s updated cybersecurity concept for 2015 to 2020 also presents a complex 
perception of cybersecurity. Slovakia claims that cybersecurity should not be seen as an isolated 
problem of the Slovak Republic or as an issue isolated to one or even several sectors and that, 
due to its global nature, cybersecurity is a society-wide phenomenon (Cyber Security Concept 
of Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). The document also identifies the core problem of 
Slovakia‘s cybersecurity policy: that cyberthreats are not generally seen as a sufficiently urgent 
problem and are not explicitly or validly addressed in Slovak law (Cyber Security Concept of 
Slovak Republic for 2015–2020, 2015). While this document is instrumental in its nature, as it 
offers a model for managing cybersecurity policies, it lacks a complete vision of cybersecurity 
challenges. As a result, potential cyberattacks are seen mainly as risks to unnamed targets. 
The strategy of the Czech Republic mentions risks such as cyberespionage (industrial, military, 
political, or other), organized crime in cyberspace, hacktivism, intentional disinformation 
campaigns with political or military objectives, and even—in the future—cyberterrorism (Cyber 
security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 2011). These risks are seen 
mainly as dangerous tendencies in the global cyberspace that have not yet threatened Czech 
society. The security discourse that prevails in the strategic documents of the Czech Republic 
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mainly refers to systematic threats and “computer safety.” In this regard, the Czech Republic’s 
cybersecurity strategy focuses mainly on building a credible information society by safeguarding 
access to services, protecting data integrity, and promoting the confidentiality of the Czech 
Republic’s cyberspaces (Cyber security strategy of the Czech Republic for the 2011-2015 period, 
2011). Meanwhile, Hungary also emphasizes the criminal element of cyberattacks. Thus, Hungary 
claims that dynamically developing new technologies, like cloud computing and mobile internet, 
lead to the continuous emergence of new security risks, such as illegal acquisitions of critical 
information and personal data (Government decision on National cyber security strategy of 
Hungary, 2013). Moreover, Hungary avoids identifying cybersecurity challenges with threats. 
It prefers to name cyberthreats as risks to the cyber sector. 
The perceptions of cyberthreats and cybersecurity in general, determine the civil approach 
to cybersecurity management that prevails in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. 
5. SOURCES OF CYBERTHREATS
The cyberspace’s architecture facilitates anonymity and hinders attempts to track the sources 
of cyberattacks, constituting an additional factor of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
analyse the sources of cyberattacks and cyberattackers, who may operate as functional actors. 
The logic of such analysis would be similar to what representatives of the Copenhagen school 
sketch out in analysing the pollution of the environment: these actors directly influence the 
dynamic of the cyber sector, but they are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors, though 
they may contribute to actions that impact the perception of the threat (Buzan, Wæver, and 
de Wilde, 1998). In a civil-military dichotomy, external cyberthreats such as foreign states or 
non-state actors, including cyberterrorists and cyberespionage agents, clash with internal actors: 
hacktivists,cybercriminals, malware authors, cyber scammers and corporations. As mentioned 
previously, countries that are actively securing their cyberspaces, emphasize the political 
motivation of cyberattacks and external cyberthreats. This attitude dictates a military approach 
to cybersecurity management as the most effective. Conversely, focusing mainly on internal 
cybersecurity threats means that the main referent object is the economic sector or private 
data. To fight these threats, a civil approach to cybersecurity policy is thought to be sufficient. 
Further analysis of how the sources of cyberthreats are understood by particular countries 
brings us to the conclusion that all countries acknowledge that there are many actors in 
cyberspace; however, only a few states make a distinction between nature, objectives, and 
methods of these actors. For example, Estonia‘s cybersecurity strategy claims that national 
cybersecurity is affected by the actors operating in cyberspace with various skills, targets, 
and motivations and that cybersespionage—with the intent to collect national security and 
economic information—is increasing. Estonia’s strategy also emphasizes that the number of 
states capable of and actually initiating cyberattacks is increasing (Cyber security strategy of 
Estonia 2014-2017, 2014). This distinction between internal and external threats is also made in 
the Polish doctrine. External threats listed by the doctrine include cyber crises, cyber conflicts, 
cyberwar, and cyberespionage involving states and other entities, “threats (for Poland) coming 
from cyberspace include extremist, terrorist and international criminal organizations whose 
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attacks in cyberspace can have ideological, political, religious, business or criminal motivations.” 
(Cyber security doctrine of the Republic of Poland, 2015).
Lithuania and Latvia, in contrast, haven‘t identified specific cyberattackers, but their strategic 
documents refer primarily to external threats, such as neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, both 
Slovakia and Hungary have quite a blurred and fragmental vision on the sources of cyberthreats. 
For example, Hungary focuses on technological (internal) vulnerabilities and their effects to 
the proper functioning of the state‘s economy without any deeper analysis of their causes and 
actors engaged into the process. The cybersecurity strategy of Hungary states that in addition 
to the damage caused by external factors, the inadequate regulation of the operational security 
of the information and communication systems constituting cyberspace poses a further risk. 
„Dynamic emerging new technologies, such as cloud computing or mobile Internet, lead to the 
continuous evolution of new security risks.“ (Government decision on National cyber security 
strategy of Hungary, 2013). The civil approach to the sources of cyber threats is also common 
to the Czech Republic. The National Security Strategy of the Czech Republic identifies a wide 
range of potential cyber challenges, however, almost all of them are criminal or technological 
in nature. These are hackers stealing personal or sensitive data, technological failures, botnets 
and DDoS/DoS attacks etc.  
The perception of cyber threats is closely linked to the sources of the perceived threats. 
The more securitized a view of cyber threat prevails, the more precisely the source of a threat 
is identified. What is more, countries that securitize cyber threats, such as Estonia, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Latvia, make a distinction between external and internal cyberspace actors. 
Meanwhile, countries that emphasize the criminal element of cyberthreats think about them 
as internal challenges and limitations of cyberspace. It is noteworthy that almost all of the 
analysed countries make a distinction between internal and external sources of cyber threats 
in their strategic documents. However, the countries that are described as civil-oriented are 
not keen on elaborating this distinction further and focus mainly on internal threat sources as 
the most common and probable in their security environment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The qualitative analysis of the cybersecurity policies of the four Visegrad countries and the 
three Baltic states shows that each of these countries have cybersecurity strategies and 
corresponding laws to address cybersecurity issues. All of the documents analysed refer to 
higher-level national security or defence strategies and present the legislative environment, 
although there are significant differences in their profundity. Different cyberspace entities and 
the potential threats these entities generate are also addressed in the documents. In most 
national cyberspace security strategies, threats to critical infrastructure and cybercrime play 
a prominent role and indicate increasing economic damage wrought by cyberattacks. In the 
formal sense, the domain of cyberspace is already included in the security agendas of all states 
and could be called “securitized.”
However, there are differences of securitization among countries. Cybersecurity differs by 
how countries: 1) define a referent object (what should be protected); 2) perceive primary 
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threats and risks; and 3) identify the sources of threats and risks. In accordance with these 
differences, countries can be classified into two categories. The first category, that of countries 
that militarize cybersecurity issues, includes Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, and, to some degree, 
Latvia. These countries that have militarized cybersecurity discourse are more precise in 
identifying specific referent objects and in articulating the defence of these objects as national 
priorities. This tendency elevates cybersecurity to the highest national security level and 
focuses on safeguarding ICT and governmental information resources. Poland, Estonia, and 
Lithuania tend to identify cybersecurity challenges as threats to the proper functioning of the 
state, and identify attacks from foreign states as the most dangerous sources of such threats. 
Consequently, in these states, the responsibility of responding to cyberthreats is handed over 
to military and defence institutions (Table 2). 
The second category of securitization discourse refers to the criminalization of cybersecurity 
issues. The Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary rely on a civil approach to maintain 
cybersecurity. Their referent objects are diffused and mainly related to the proper functioning 
of the state’s economic system and private property. The ICT and governmental digital resources 
have no priority over other legitimate referent objects. As a result, countries with a prevailing 
TABLE 2. Civil and military approaches in the states’ cybersecurity policies 
Referent Object
Cyber Attack 
Perception
Threat Source Institutions
Militarization/ 
Criminalization
Hungary
Digital informational 
infrastructure
Risk to national 
cybersecurity
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil 
Criminalization 
approach prevails
Czech 
Republic
Critical & 
informational 
infrastructure;
rights of internet 
users
General risk 
of a global 
cyberspace
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil
Criminalization 
approach prevails 
with military 
elements
Slovakia
Digital informational 
infrastructure, 
human Rights & 
freedoms
Risk to the 
national 
cybersecurity 
Internal 
technological 
vulnerabilities
Civil 
Criminalization 
approach prevails
Poland
Critical & 
informational 
infrastructure
National threat 
External & internal 
actors
Military 
Militarization 
approach prevails
Lithuania
Informational, 
Economic & Social/
Critical Infrastructure
National threat
Usually external 
actors
Military
Militarization 
approach prevails
Latvia 
Critical & 
Informational 
Infrastructure
National Threat
Usually 
external actors, 
neighbouring 
countries
Military 
Militarization 
approach prevails 
with criminal 
elements 
Estonia 
Critical & 
Informational 
Infrastructure
Threat to 
economic, 
political & 
other sectors
E External & 
internal actors
Extensively 
militarized
Militarization 
approach prevails
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civil approach are mostly concerned with criminal activity conducted in cyberspace and describe 
cybersecurity issues as “risks”. Potential sources of such risks are also fragmented and include 
not only external international actors, but also internal actors such as hackers, hacktivists, 
criminal organisations, and even the unintentional disruption of networks. Civil institutions in 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are charged with monitoring cybersecurity risks and 
coordinating state response to cyber incidents (Table 2).
The conclusions of this article, the categorisation of cybersecurity approaches as civil or 
militarized may lead to a better understanding of cybersecurity as a phenomenon. It could 
contribute to the explanation of obstacles for cooperation between states dealing with 
cybersecurity issues on the international level. Furthermore, the identification of different 
approaches to cybersecurity could explain specific state‘s actions in cyberspace. Understanding 
states’ differences in perceiving cyberthreats, referent objects, and potential adversaries 
constitutes a background to discussions of the so-called cyber-identities of states and non-
governmental actors. This could be a useful theoretical tool for analysing potential cyber 
conflicts and cooperation patterns in further studies.
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ANTIDIPLOMACY IN RUSSIA’S POLICIES REGARDING 
RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC STATES1
Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik
ABSTRACT
Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, frequently 
prefers hard power to powers of attraction. In addition to traditional economic pressure and military 
policy, Russia also employs antidiplomatic tools to influence the Baltic states. Though Russia officially 
proclaims itself a democratic state, it has been developing a broad spectrum of antidiplomatic methods 
to legitimise Russia’s interests in post-Soviet spaces inhabited by large numbers of Russian-speakers. The 
clearest example of these methods appears in Russia’s use of international and regional organizations’ 
conferences to express and articulate its interests in protecting Russian diasporas—a phenomenon that 
first appeared in the Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy as part of his efforts to construct a negative image of 
the Baltic states, affect the Baltic states’ domestic policies, and subtly discredit their governments. Russia is 
positioning itself as the protector of a Russian diaspora wounded by the Baltic states’ anti-Russian policies.
Keywords: Antidiplomacy, Russia, Baltic States, Russian-speakers.
INTRODUCTION
Exploring the concept of antidiplomacy in social history and in the history of theology and 
philosophy, where it appears explicitly, is a valuable heuristic exercise. Although the ontology and 
etymology of antidiplomacy derive from the French Revolution (as the notion of antidiplomacy 
appeared in modern history simultaneously with diplomacy), references to antidiplomacy in its 
early metaphysical conceptions can be found in Christian and Islamic theologies. Furthermore, 
a secularized reformulation of antidiplomacy was put forth by classic utopian thinkers and 
antidiplomacy has been examined by philosophers from Hegel to Marx (Cornago, 2013). 
Antidiplomacy is traditionally defined by contrasting it with diplomacy. James Der Derian defines 
diplomacy as the “negotiation between states while antidiplomacy is propaganda among 
people” (1987). In other words, ”the purpose of diplomacy is to mediate estranged relations: 
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antidiplomacy’s aim is to transcend all estranged relations” (Der Derian, 1987). This plurality of 
meanings, and the opposition between diplomacy and antidiplomacy, impedes consensus on the 
definition of antidiplomacy. Because of this flexibility in defining antidiplomacy, antidiplomacy 
is used time and again in diplomatic statements, journalists’ articles, political experts’ discourse, 
academic papers and internet discussion groups. 
In this article, Russia’s foreign policy methods used in its relations with the Baltic states—
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—presented by Russia as advocacy for Russian-speakers  residing 
in these three states, will be considered antidiplomatic. In Russian studies, with few exceptions, 
the concept of antidiplomacy has hardly been used to interpret Russia’s foreign policy. Łukasz 
Adamski offers one such exception; he notes Russia’s extremely emotional and audacious attitude 
towards Poland, where Soviet monuments of gratitude to the Red Army have been dismantled 
(2015). In contrast, most analysts invoke soft power and public diplomacy approaches as they 
explore the relationships between Russia and its compatriots abroad (Grigas, 2012; Maliukevičius, 
2013; Russkaya Soft Power analysis, 2014; Simons, 2014; Panova, 2015; Rostoks & Sprūds, 2015; 
Kuczyńska-Zonik, 2016). According to Joseph S. Nye (2014), however, Russia compels others 
to advance its interests through coercion and payment rather than attraction. Thus, Russia 
strategically combines soft power resources with hard power assets such as economic and military 
power, as was exemplified in Ukraine. Additionally, a few years ago, Russian military operations 
along the Baltic borders were viewed as insignificant (Żurawski vel Grajewski, 2011), whereas 
today they are deemed as potential threats to the governments of the Baltic states. Currently, 
Russia seems to be developing an alternative model of conduct in international relations and 
appears to be applying the concept of antidiplomacy. Russia’s relations with its compatriots 
abroad in the Baltic states indicate Russia’s intentions: to exert pressure on post-Soviet spaces. 
Russia’s policies regarding Russian-speakers in the Baltic states are neither complex nor 
ambiguous. The Baltic states’ historic memories and regional interests render their relationships 
with Russia neutral at best and occasionally hostile. The great number of Russian-speakers 
residing in the Baltic states complicate Russia’s relations with its Baltic neighbours. Russia has 
never fully abandoned the idea of bringing the Baltic states back into its sphere of “privileged 
interest” (Auers, 2015). Hence Russia’s policy towards the Russian diasporas in the Baltic states 
is motivated by a Russian nostalgia for the USSR and a longing to build a historical, cultural, 
and linguistic transnational community—essentially, a longing to create a Russian world (or 
as this concept of a Russian world is known in Russian, a русский мир) (Laruelle, 2015). From 
the Russian perspective, this idea of building a Russian world justifies Russia’s antidiplomatic 
engagement in post-Soviet regions as the concept reconnects Russia’s Soviet past with the 
Russian diaspora’s current situation. The Russian diaspora is a crucial instrument in Russia’s 
articulation of its interests in international forums. In this paper, I cite examples of Russia’s 
international and regional activities that confirm Russia’s strategies are pursued an effort to 
destabilize the Baltic region. I apply content analysis method to these examples to examine 
the meanings, contexts, intentions, and influences of Russia’s messages to the Baltics in order 
to identify and analyse Russia’s: 1) techniques and antidiplomatic methods; 2) goals; and 
3) relationships with the Baltic states and the international community.
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1. ANTIDIPLOMACY AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The definition of antidiplomacy used in this paper is grounded in Corneliu Bjola and Markus 
Komprobst’s (2013) representational perspectives for examining antidiplomacy. In this paper, 
antidiplomacy is defined as a set of practices, instruments, and processes that significantly 
challenge diplomatic competences in communication, legitimate representation, the 
management of public goods, and international cooperation, which implies the erosion of 
dialogical diplomacy. In other words, antidiplomacy aims to subvert or even delegitimize the 
sovereignty of political communities and may also challenge the security of these communities 
(Bjola, 2011). 
While there is no consistent definition for the term antidiplomacy, it is usually recognized as 
an ideological and practical counterforce to diplomacy. In most common contexts, antidiplomacy 
is understood as a lack of cooperation and dialogue, a disrespect for other voices, or even 
aggression. Antidiplomacy can also be used to negatively qualify a government’s foreign policy. 
Because of the term’s plurality of meanings, it is difficult to objectively designate it. Der Derian 
(1987), instead of suggesting any straightforward definition of antidiplomacy, briefly compares 
diplomacy and antidiplomacy (Table 1). While diplomacy describes interactions among (more or 
less) equal states, antidiplomacy seems to recognize reciprocity among non-state entities. Der 
Derian treats states’ foreign relations as relations of estrangement, expressed in cultural and 
linguistic differences. In contrast, antidiplomacy rejects any forms of distinction, as in Christian 
universalism and various utopian writings (Warren, 1989). 
TABLE 1. Der Derian’s comparison of diplomacy and antidiplomacy 
Diplomacy Antidiplomacy
Relationship between subjects Horizontal Vertical
The nature of relationships Between states Between strata within states
Interaction conditions 
Particular political entities—
states—are estranged but 
mutually equal
Idealistic, utopian ideas—state 
boundaries and differences 
among entities are rejected 
Aim To mediate foreign relations The destruction of segmentation
Source: Der Derian, 1987.
Der Derian adds an additional term, paradiplomacy, a form of antidiplomacy that can easily 
fall into the perversions of the revolutionary or even terror diplomacy, the latter being either 
the diplomatic practices of terrorist organizations or the endeavours of diplomats to destabilize 
countries or overthrow governments. Additionally, he points out that given new technological 
conditions, the old rules of the diplomatic game have changed and a new antidiplomacy has 
been generated (Der Derian, 1992).
For Martin Wight, antidiplomacy is not a political doctrine compatible with the realities 
of international politics, but a moral ideological attitude that could even bring about the 
abolition of diplomacy itself. Diplomacy can easily and peacefully transform into a dangerous 
antidiplomacy. The value of Wight’s work lies is his recognition of the theoretical and practical 
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fluidity between some forms of utopian political doctrines and their possible effects, such as 
fascism and communism (Wight, 1991). 
In his article, Noe Cornago (2013)  circumscribes antidiplomacy’s ambiguity by citing and 
examining various diplomatic notes, memories, historical narratives, literature, political papers, 
intelligence reports, academic writings, and internet discussions before concluding that the 
various meaning of antidiplomacy can be understood as complex connections between political 
beliefs, actions, and actual historical events. In tracing the use and meanings of antidiplomacy, 
Cornago refernces Polish writer and diplomat Jan Potocki’s 1805 use of antidiplomacy concerning 
the reinforcement of Russia’s diplomatic mission along the eastern borders of its empire; 
Potocki used the phrase “antidiplomatic manners,” to describe Russia’s progressive political 
force (Cornago, 2013:204). Cornago also cites Juan Valera’s—former Spanish Ambassador to 
Portugal, Belgium, Austria, and the United States—use of the term in a diplomatic note in 1897. 
Valera referred to the evolution of events in Cuba as antidiplomatic and incompatible with some 
aspects of diplomatic culture (Cornago, 2013, pp. 195-196). Although a positive connotation 
of antidiplomacy emerged in 1840 when a patriotic people’s movement was recognized as an 
”antidiplomatic congress” (Cornago, 2013, pp. 2015-206), the term antidiplomacy has been 
regarded as a criticism implying imperialism or foreign interventionism since the mid-nineteenth 
century. This negative connotation of antidiplomacy remains relevant to the United States, 
as the US’s antidiplomacy negates governments’ foreign policies towards powerless states 
(Cornago, 2013, pp. 206-209). 
Perceptions of current international relations, however, suggest a clear opposition between 
diplomacy and antidiplomacy will no longer be observed. Despite their asymmetrical character, 
both notions will be frequently exchanged—or even reversed despite their seemingly distinct 
positive and negative connotations. For example, Michael Stohl (1984) uses the term coercive 
diplomacy and refers to elements of the “diplomacy of violence.” Similarly, Noemi Gal-Or (1993), 
in her analysis of terrorist diplomacy as a special form of diplomacy consisting of elements 
of deterrence and coercion, assumes that limited political violence has become, at least, 
tolerable. She claims diplomatic methods are ambivalent as they are evolving into permissible 
antidiplomatic instruments of political activity. 
Gal-Or’s arguments about the contradictory nature of antidiplomacy are echoed on popular 
news websites. For website commentator Fiona Clark (2016), antidiplomacy is a synonym for 
the militarization of NATO-Russian relations. Yet Marc Owen Jones (2014) calls attention to 
another phenomena, celebrity antidiplomacy, or the immoral encouragement of human rights 
violations supported by actors, athletes, and musicians visiting authoritarian regimes. 
2. THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA’S POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS 
It wasn’t until the 1980s that the compatriots issue appeared in Russia’s political discourse. 
Launched in 1989, the so-called Russian card was played to prevent the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. For Gorbachev, guaranteeing protection to Russian diasporas, diasporas created 
with the collapse of the USSR, was a significant but difficult to implement priority. In contrast, the 
diaspora issue was, at least initially, less important to Yeltsin. During his first term as president 
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he only signed bilateral agreements, including the protection of the Russian diaspora’s rights 
and freedoms in post-Soviet spaces. Later, in response to the military conflict in the Republic of 
Moldova and the Baltic states issuing their naturalization policies2, Yeltsin’s position changed and 
he sought to protect the Russian diasporas’ rights (Horska, 2009). One of the first documents 
concerning this issue of the dispersion of Russian compatriots residing in what were now post-
Soviet spaces was Russia’s Compatriot Policy Act, issued under Yeltsin in 1994. In the act, Russia 
expressed support for Russians who wished to return to their motherland or obtain Russian 
citizenship. Further, the decree offered the Russian diaspora protections of their national 
identity by legal, political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural instruments (Compatriot Policy 
Act of the Russian Federation, 1994). By 1995, Yeltsin had founded the Council of Compatriots. 
However, Russia’s productive actions were not justified as an extension of Russia’s policies in 
favour of Russian-speaking diasporas until Vladimir Putin’s presidential period; Putin achieved 
this by joining hard and soft powers with elements of Soviet style propaganda (Conley and 
Gerber, 2011). The diaspora has become a convenient tool for promoting a positive image 
of the Russian state and for articulating its interests in the international arena, particularly in 
Russia’s areas of historic interests.
The current situation of the Russian-speaking diasporas in the Baltic states has been 
formed by cultural, historical, and political factors—the most important of these factors are 
associated with the Baltic states’ Soviet periods and the Baltic states’ naturalization policies. All 
of the factors have influenced the educations and the political, linguistic, and social statuses of 
Russian-speakers in the Baltics and are regarded as discriminatory and humiliating by Russia. 
Though Russia has not accepted its loss of the Baltic region, it has had to formulate a new 
foreign policy towards Russian-speaking residents in the region’s three independent countries.
Russia primarily uses language to identify its diasporas in the Baltic states. Russian is the 
mother tongue of 8 per cent of the residents of Lithuania, 33.8 per cent of the residents in Latvia, 
and 29.6 per cent of the residents in Estonia (CIA, 2015). Although Russia is associated with 
tragic episodes of history in the Baltic states, Russian is still the most popular second language in 
Lithuania according to the Lithuanian Department of Statistics (True Lithuania, 2015). Likewise, 
in Latvia and Estonia, (Centrālā Statistikas Pārvalde, 2011; Eesti kultuurministeerium, 2015), 
most of the older generations are fluent in Russian because of its ubiquity and obligatory use 
during the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states. Nowadays, the use of Russian is decreasing. 
Today English is the most popular foreign language to learn (Eurostat, 2015). While private 
hotels and restaurants still offer menus in Russian and employ Russian-speakers, this is largely 
to accommodate the large number of Russian tourists who visit the Baltic states, a number 
that statistics reveal is declining (Lithuanian State Department of Tourism, 2016; BBN, 2016; 
BNN-NEWS, 2015).
2 Latvia and Estonia granted citizenship only to those who had been citizens before June 1940 and to their 
descendants. As a result, a third of residents in Latvia and Estonia became non-citizens in the early 1990s (Smith, 
Aasland&Mole, 1994). While naturalization processes was introduced in the 1990s and prior to EU accession, it 
remains a very slow process.
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3. RUSSIAN-SPEAKERS IN THE BALTIC STATES AND RUSSIA’S ANTIDIPLOMATIC  
TECHNIQUES IN THE BALTIC STATES
Though Russia is a classic realist power, Russia, as its recent actions in Ukraine reveal, 
frequently prefers hard power to powers of attraction. However, recent research (Grigas, 2012; 
Maliukevičius, 2013; Simons, 2014; Panova, 2015; Rostoks & Sprūds, 2015) has shown that in 
addition to applying traditional economic pressure and military policies, Russia has extended 
various instruments of influence in the Baltic states and has justified its interests in post-Soviet 
spaces as due to its advocacy for the Russian diasporas living there.
Russia uses international and regional organizations and conferences, appropriate forums 
for Russia to articulate its interests regarding Russian-speaking communities, to sway public 
opinion in its favour. In such forums, Russia portrays itself as the protector of a diaspora 
wounded by the anti-Russian policies of the Baltic states. In this context, Russia’s statements 
to the international arenas regarding Russian-speakers in the Baltic states subtly discredit the 
governments of the Baltic states. This phenomenon has appeared simultaneously with Vladimir 
Putin’s construction of negative images of the Baltic states intended to affect their domestic 
policies (Denisenko, 2015). Russian attempts to undermine the integration and adaptation of 
Russian-speaking diasporas in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia indicates that Russia prefers for 
these states to continue to grapple with internal national divides (Saari, 2014).
3 . 1 .  Acc u s a t i o n s  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  v i o l a t i o n s  a n d  e t h n i c  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
In the early 1990s, Latvia and Estonia’s citizenship policies were met with particularly strong 
criticism from the OSCE, the EU, and the Council of Europe (Auers, 2015). The Russian 
government also actively participated in debates regarding the citizenship policies of the Baltic 
states and repeatedly accused the Baltic states of committing human rights violations. In 1999, 
after Tatyana Ždanoka’s disqualification3 from running in Latvia’s 1998 parliamentary and 
municipal elections, Russia’s State Duma cited Ždanoka’s exclusion as a human rights violation 
committed by the Latvian government (Russian Parliament in case of Ždanok Act, 1999). Russia 
made an international appeal for the condemnation of the Latvian government (European Court 
of Human Rights, 2006; Lich, 2008). The European Court of Human Rights ruled that  Ždanoka’s 
human rights were not violated (European Court of Human Rights, 2006).
The rights of Russian-speakers in Latvia and Estonia were among the most contentious issues 
the two countries faced during their ascensions to the EU. For instance, the EU recommended 
that Latvia and Estonia consider changing the minimum language requirements for elderly 
people and granting citizenship to children born in the independent states. Eventually, the 
governments of both countries were forced to accept a few EU institutions’ demands, which 
made the EU less popular in Latvia and Estonia than it was in Lithuania. Russia’s constant criticism 
of Latvia and Estonia’s relationships with their Russian-speakers can be interpreted as a way to 
3  Ždanoka was ruled ineligible to stand as a candidate in the parliamentary elections. Her exclusion was based 
on her former membership of the Communist Party of Latvia. She complained that her right to stand for election 
had been infringed upon. 
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question the effectiveness of the European institutions to ensure democracy and rule of law. 
An adaptation of Edward Lucas’s whataboutism4 (2008) seems to be an element of Russia’s 
broader public diplomacy strategy of trying to counter criticism of its increasingly authoritarian 
political system by deflecting attention to allegedly undemocratic practices within the EU. 
However neither the European Court of Human Rights nor the UN Human Rights Council 
has found evidence of the systematic abuse of human rights or ethnic discrimination in the 
Baltic states (Conley and Gerber, 2011). Amnesty International (AI), which due to its non-
government status may more independently observe Russian-speakers in the Baltic states, has 
criticized the citizenship policies of the Baltic states as discriminatory. AI has also criticized the 
three countries’ language and education policies as restrictive for Russian-speakers. Finally, 
AI pointed to the unfavourable economic situation of Russian-speakers in the Baltic states 
caused by limited political rights and social factors—such as the Russian-speakers  lacking the 
ability to speak the national language of the particular Baltic country they reside in (Amnesty 
International, 2006). In a 2009 report, AI condemned the Estonian government force used to 
quell demonstrations in the capital in April 2007 (Amnesty International, 2009). Although the 
number of Russian-speakers in Estonia lacking Estonian citizenship has decreased, thanks to 
the Estonian government’s effective policy of adaptation, in February 2011, Russia criticized 
an Estonian citizenship policy as discriminatory at a meeting of the UN Human Rights Council. 
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov described designating Russian-speakers as non-citizens in 
Estonia as a “shameful phenomenon” that “demands greater attention”5 (NEWS ERR EE, 2011).
In February 2012, Latvia held a referendum on whether to amend the Latvian constitution—
which held that the only official state language was Latvian—to adopt Russian as the country’ 
second official language. Seventy per cent of Latvian citizens participated in the referendum 
and almost seventy-five percent voted against making Russian Latvia’s second official language. 
According to the representatives of the Russian-speakers in Latvia, the referendum’s outcome 
did not reflect the actual situation as Latvia’s almost  300,000 Russian-speaking residents ( non-
citizens of Latvia) did not have the right to vote. The Russian Federation’s delegation did not have 
observer status at the referendum, which the Russian government qualified as Latvian ignorance 
of international law (TVP.INFO, 2012; Gazeta Prawna, 2012). Russian-speakers accuse the Baltic 
governments of implementing anti-minority education policies that reduce the availability of 
instruction in the minority language (Buzayev, 2013). While bilingual instruction was offered 
at every level of education when the  Baltic countries were part of the Soviet Union (Batelaan, 
2002), almost all subjects are taught in the national language in public schools (and private 
municipal schools in Lithuania and Estonia as well) (The Baltic Times, 2015a; Zarenkov, 2013).
In Riga in September 2014, Konstantin Dolgov, the Russian foreign ministry’s commissioner 
for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, took part in a conference of Russian-speaking 
4  The concept defines a Soviet tactic: when being criticized by the West for Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, 
imprisonment of dissidents, or censorship, the Soviet Union answered “What about...” (apartheid South Africa, 
jailed trade-unionists, the Contras in Nicaragua) (Lucas, 2008).
5  Non-citizens in Latvia and Estonia are not defined as stateless according to the national legal definitions, 
and their rights and obligations significantly exceed the minimum rights set by 1954 Convention relating to the 
Status of Stateless Persons (Jeffries, 2004).
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communities from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Dolgov criticized the Baltic states’ treatment 
of Russian-speaking groups as that of second-class citizens. Specifically, he criticized Estonia and 
Latvia, where it is difficult for Russian-speakers to attain citizenship (Pravfond, 2014). Accusing 
the governments of Latvia and Estonia of adopting regulations that denigrate the status of 
the Russian language, Dolgov pointed out that Russian-speakers in the Baltic states cannot 
communicate with state officials in Russian (The Baltic Times, 2015b).6 Ukrainian journalists 
noted that Dolgov’s 2014 statements during the Baltic conference of Russian diasporas were 
eerily reminiscent of speeches he made regarding minorities in Crimea before Russia’s 2014 
occupation of the region. “This is the latest indication that Moscow may be planning an invasion 
into the Baltics in the near future” Centore and Babiak said (Centore and Babiak, 2014).
Dolgov has repeatedly called attention to human rights violations committed against 
Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states (Russian MFA, 2012). He called the situation 
faced by Russian-speakers residing in Latvia and Estonia “absolutely intolerable” (Dolgov, 2012). 
Dolgov indicated that he believed some Latvian and Estonian documents aimed to fully and 
unconditionally assimilate the Russian-speaking population (Dolgov, 2012). He also warned 
that the policies of the Baltic states were driven by extremist sentiments such as nationalism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism, racial and religious intolerance, and neo-Nazi ideas propaganda 
(Dolgov, 2012).
3 . 2 .  R u s s i a n  p r o p a g a n d a  i n  t h e  m e d i a
Russian-speaking media is one of the most influential Russian instrument in the Baltic states. 
Table 2 shows the reach of TV channels in the Baltic states. The fourth position of Russian-
speaking PBK in Latvia and Estonia indicates both its popularity and the size of the Russian-
speaking television audiences in Latvia and Estonia (MAVISE, 2013). Russian-speaking channels 
are less popular in Lithuania. In fact, Lithuania banned the Russian RTR Planeta broadcast in 
2015; Lithuania accused the broadcasters of inciting hatred between the Russia and Ukraine, 
of encouraging violence, and of violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Lithuania’s ban was 
precedential in the EU,(Lapėnienė, 2015; Reuters, 2014). Later, Latvia and Ukraine’s instituted 
bans to counter risks to their national and informational security (OSCE, 2015). Similarly, 
Gazprom-owned NTV Mir was banned in Lithuania in 2014 for three months for broadcasting a 
documentary, The Damned: Trap for the Alpha Group, on the eve of the anniversary of Lithuania’s 
declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. The documentary falsely reported that 
Lithuanian civilians killed by Soviet troops during the country’s struggle to attain independence 
were actually killed by undercover Lithuanians, not Soviet troops. In response to Lithuania’s bans 
on Russian media, Russia turned to the EU and OSCE. Dunja Mijatović, OSCE Representative 
on Freedom of the Media, responded by cautioning governments from responding to Russian 
propaganda by banning or blocking Russian radio and television signals, denying entry to Russian 
6 A recent statement from Latvia‘s State Language Centre urging the use Latvian at work was portrayed in the 
Russian media as a ban on speaking Russian in workplaces in Latvia. According to the centre, the initial statement 
was made in response to customers’ complaints about overhearing Russian in personal communications between 
service personnel (The Baltic Times, 2015b).
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journalists or evicting Russian journalists from governmental press centres in Ukraine (OSCE, 
2015). She made it very clear to all OSCE members that propaganda should not be countered 
with censorship, “Only a well-functioning open, diverse and dynamic media environment can 
effectively neutralize the effect of propaganda” (OSCE, 2015).
TABLE 2. Television channels’ daily reach, per cent
Source: TNS, Baltic Media Overview, 2011.
3 . 3 .  Acc u s a t i o n s  o f  N a z i s m  a n d  f a s c i s m  l e v i e d  b y  R u s s i a  a g a i n s t 
t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s
Russia has been keenly and officially focused on anti-Nazism since 2005, when Russia began 
submitting an anti-Nazism resolution—a resolution firmly against pro-Nazi demonstrations and 
the glorification of Nazism—to the UN General Assembly. However, the motion did not receive 
support from the other member states. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov specifically 
accused Latvia and Estonia of frequently allowing parades in honour of Waffen-SS veterans in 
their celebrations of veterans from the Latvian Legion and the 20th Estonian SS Division (RT, 2012).
A World Without Nazism (WWN), the Russian political organization founded in 2010 that 
presents itself as an international human rights protection movement is another means for the 
Russian state to present its values and interests in the international forum. A Word Without 
Nazism got its start at two international conferences—in 2009 in Berlin, and in 2010 in Riga— 
in which the members of veteran organizations as well as youth and regional associations, 
including several dozen from the Baltic states participated. The conferences were attended by 
over 360 members from 136 organizations in 28 countries (WWN, 2015). The organization’s 
title and motto, “A world without Nazism” refers to its work to halt the “false assessment” that 
the organization argues is the appropriation of WWII ideologies that render Nazism as heroic 
and restrict the cultural and religious rights of national minority groups. The idea of preventing 
the danger of ideological emptiness after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the need for 
protection from the harmful liberal policies of the West was supported by the Russian-speaking 
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national groups, extreme leftist and communist groups, and their affiliated youth and veteran 
organizations. WWN’s stated mission is to counter threats of Nazi and fascist forces in central 
and eastern Europe, threats supported by the governments of the countries in the region. 
There is no doubt the WWN’s creation was motivated by a Russian vision of the past, including 
the Third Reich’s responsibility for the outbreak of WWII and false accusations of the Soviet 
Union’s collaboration in these events. The symbolic date of the organization’s establishment—
June 22—is recognized by the Russian government as the anniversary of the outbreak of the 
Great Patriotic War. The organization provides Russia with opportunities to bring charges of 
discrimination against national minorities, especially in the Baltic states, to the attention of 
the Council of Europe, the UN, and other international institutions. The pseudo-independent 
institution often provides ways for Russia to pursue its own interests and to influence other 
countries (Kirchick, 2015). As the so-called war against terrorism served Russia’s actions in 
Chechnya, the WWN is another of Russia’s instruments of disinformation, propaganda, and 
falsification of history employed to convince international institutions that Russia must take 
radical action to protect security, stability, and peace in Europe.
3 . 4 .  R u s s i a  a cc u s e s  t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s  o f  s p r e a d i n g  d i s i n f o r m a t i o n  
a b o u t  R u s s i a’s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s
The protection of the rights of Russian compatriots residing in Ukraine was the legal basis for 
deploying the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Ukraine “in connection with the 
extraordinary situation” and due to “the threat to citizens of the Russian Federation” (Kremlin, 
2014). Fears of a Russian military intervention in the Baltics are frequently based on analogies 
to the conflict in Ukraine (Person, 2015). However these fears are also based more firmly in 
populist rhetoric than in a realistic threat. So far, there is no evidence that Russia will soon target 
the Baltic states to protect its diaspora. Former Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergei Ivanov—who served 
from 2011 to 2016—has described the threat of Russian military interventions in Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania as “nothing but raving nonsense” (The Financial Times, 2015). In an interview with 
The Financial Times, Ivanov suggested that only those with “a psychological disorder” would 
say that Russia will invade the Baltic states (The Financial Times, 2015). Expressing concern 
over the NATO activities near Russian borders and denying claims of involvement in Ukraine’s 
internal affairs, Ivanov accused the Baltic states’ governments of overplaying the threat of 
Russian intervention for their own financial benefit—to elicit money from NATO member states. 
According to Moscow, the Baltic states’ governments have been increasing defence spending 
and asking NATO members for assistance in response to an alleged “Russian threat”.
3 . 5 .  U n d e r m i n i n g  t h e  l e g a l  s o v e r e i g n t y  o f  t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s
At the end of June 2015, two Russian parliamentary deputies— Evgeniy Fedorov and Anton 
Romanov, both members of the ruling political party, Yedinaya Rossiya—asked the Russian 
prosecutor general’s office (the Genprocuratura) to review the legality of the State Council of 
the USSR’s recognition of the three Baltic states. In their point of view, recognizing the legality 
of independence of the Baltic states the State Council “violated the sovereignty of the vast 
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country” and “launched a mechanism for the collapse of the state” by its decision (Petrov,  2015). 
According to the deputies , the State Council’s rejection of a large and strategically important 
territory from the Soviet Union carried weighty consequences for the Soviet state, including 
the loss of seaports and the severing of economic ties with the former Baltic republics.
Lithuania’s foreign ministers described the Russian deputies’ request as an “absurd 
provocation” (BBC, 2015). Earlier, in late June 2015, the Genprocuratura announced that the 
transfer, within the Soviet Union, of Crimea and Sevastopol from the Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1954 had been illegal. 
The announcement was made in response to a query posed by Sergei Mironov, leader of the 
Russian political party, Spravedlivaya Rossiya (A Just Russia) (Mironov, 2015). It was admitted 
that the transfer had been unconstitutional and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
RSFSR had not had permission to transfer territories that were part of the RSFSR (Mironov, 
2015). The Genprocuratura’s decision has a significant impact on Russia and Ukraine’s relations 
because it provided a legal basis for annexation. In other words, the Genprocuratura’s ruling 
legalized and legitimized Crimea’s current status, based on the referendum of 16 March 2014, 
when the peninsula became a part of the Russia Federation. 
The Russian deputies’ arguments against recognizing the Baltic states’ independence are 
based on the State Council of the USSR not abiding by the Constitution of the USSR. At the first 
meeting, the State Council acknowledged the independence of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, 
but noted that the constitution had not officially been amended to reflect their independent 
status. Moreover, the deputies claim that referendums over the union republics’ secession 
from the USSR have not been held in the Baltic states, as they should have, according to Soviet 
law in 1990 (USSR Act, 1990). Given that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were occupied by the 
Soviet Union from 1940 until its collapse in 1991, it is not unreasonable for the residents of 
these countries to ask, “Will Russia view and act in the Baltic states in the same way that it 
has in Crimea?” Investigating the legalities of past events may show unexpected, astonishing, 
or inconvenient results. Likely, the Baltic states’ independence would also be declared illegal. 
Although the Russia’s authorities officially undermined the Baltic states’ independence, 
explaining that they does not support the deputies, the Genprocuratura started to investigate 
the issue (Petrov, 2015), but later dropped the investigation.
3 . 6  O f f i c i a l  p r o t e s t  a g a i n s t  d o m e s t i c  p o l i c i e s  i n  t h e  B a l t i c  s t a t e s
Despite the fact that Russia claims it has a friendly relationship with the Baltic states, Russia has 
engaged in supporting Russian-speaking diasporas, even in opposition to the Baltic governments. 
In 2000, Putin sent a letter to Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga to protest the Latvian court’s 
decision to convict a former Soviet partisan, Vasily Kononov, as a war criminal. On January 21, 
the Riga District Court sentenced seventy-seven-year-old Kononov to six years in prison. In 
Putin’s response to Kononov’s conviction on his official website, he writes, “I have received 
numerous messages from human rights and veteran organizations, as well as individuals, 
asking me to intervene on the side of justice and prevent a person from being convicted 
for fighting Nazism. This is the first time such an event takes place in world practice” (Official 
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Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 2000). Moreover, in 2003, Putin sent a letter to 
a schoolboy from Riga after the child asked Putin to help him receive an education in Russian 
(Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia, 2003). Putin’s interventions favour and 
encourage division in the Baltic states and reflect Russia’s desire to undermine the integration 
and acculturation of Russian-speaking communities in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. In fact, 
the idea of protecting the rights of Russian-speaking groups in the Baltic states, as articulated 
by Russia in the international arena, subtly discredits the governments of the Baltic states.
CONCLUSION
Russia’s policies towards Russian-speaking communities in post-Soviet spaces are complex and 
frequently unclear. Is Russia’s support for its diaspora just a propaganda technique to divert 
attention from Russia’s foreign policy and actions—like the 2014 attack on Ukraine? Does Russia’s 
focus on Russian-speakers in the Baltic states indicate that Russia cannot forgive and reconcile 
with the Baltic states now that they have regained their independence? A “Ukrainian scenario” 
in the Baltic states seems improbable, however, it is hard to predict what the consequences 
of Russia’s actions in Ukraine will be in the near future because  Russia’s compatriot policy is 
inconsistent and contradictory. However, the research has revealed the following conclusions:
1.  Russia uses antidiplomatic methods and instruments to significantly challenge 
diplomatic communication among states. These methods include, but are not limited 
to: criticizing, levying accusations against, negating the legitimacy of, undermining the 
rule of law in, and staging or supporting protests in post-Soviet states. Though Russia 
will use diplomatic instruments, like international organizations rooted in democratic 
values, it does not apply or abide by democratic rules. Russia’s antidiplomatic 
strategies contradict Joseph Nye’s (2004) concept of soft power, because it relies on 
disinformation, falsification of history, and the devaluation of Western values.
2.  In its relationships with the Baltic countries, Russia executes an antidiplomatic 
political strategy that is designed to: a) subvert the power of the Baltic states in the 
international arena; b) delegitimize the sovereignty of the Baltic states; c) undermine 
the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonians’ perceptions of their respective government’s 
authority; and d) destabilize the Baltic information space to generate division and 
promote misunderstandings. 
3.  Russia’s antidiplomacy has influenced international relations in the Baltic region. As 
Russia intensifies its use of authoritarian strategies, its relationships with the three 
Baltic states deteriorate. Yet, according to Russia’s prime minister, the hostile relations 
between Russia and the Baltic states have not improved since the USSR collapsed 
because the governments of the Baltic countries continue to promote images of 
Russia as an enemy (RG, 2015). However antidiplomatic strategy is not as effective as 
Russia wants it to be; Russia’s antidiplomacy impacts on the Baltics states, but not on 
international area.
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Olof Petersson, The Ordinarius: Herbert Tingsten1  
and Jörgen Westerståhl2 
INTRODUCTION
Swedish political scientist Olof Petersson has recently published two remarkable biographies, 
of Herbert Tingsten and Jörgen  Westerståhl, two professors who dominated political science 
in Sweden during the twentieth century. 
In 2011, Petersson introduced his biography of Jörgen Westerståhl, Statsvetaren: Jörgen 
Westerståhl och demokratins århundrade, (Political Scientist Jörgen Westerståhl and the 
Democratic Century). In 2013 Petersson presented yet another biography, Herbert Tingsten, 
vetenskapsmannen (Herbert Tingsten, Scientist). 
Though these well-written books would interest political scientists all over Europe and 
America, I believe Petersson’s analysis of these two men—of Westerståhl in Gothenburg and 
Tingsten in Stockholm—has a wider bearing on the structure of academia in Sweden, which is 
definitely more German than Anglo-Saxon, despite the Swedish government’s frenetic reform 
efforts during the 1960s and 1970s.  Petersson entices the reader to ask: What does it mean 
to be a full professor in a completely hierarchical academic structure? The answer: Power.
These two examples of an ordinarius—Tingsten and Westerståhl—are interesting from 
several perspectives. Petersson’s works invite comparisons between the two men’s personal 
lives, (Westerståhl was Tingsten’s pupil), their intellectual achievements (Tingsten outdistanced 
Westerståhl) and their academic influences (Westerståhl was regarded as having reached the 
top of the ranks in his discipline in Scandinavia, alongside Stein Rokkan in Bergen). Yet when it 
comes to access to political power, there is no comparison. Tingsten does not begin to compare 
with Westerståhl. In making my own remarks on these two major volumes in Nordic political 
science, I argue that the Anglo-Saxon model of professors as a community of equals limits the 
dysfunctional excesses of the Swedish model of ordinarien.
Petersson’s two books differ by content. Petersson’s biography of Westerståhl offers a 
fascinating life story, whereas his book on Tingsten is a penetrating intellectual biography, 
examining first and foremost Tingsten’s main books. 
JAN-ERIK LANE – Fellow at Public Policy Institute, Belgrade, janeklane@googlemail.com.
1 Petersson, O., 2013. Herbert Tingsten, Vetenskapsmannen [Herbet Tingsten, Scientist]. Atlantis Bokförlag.
2 Petersson, O., 2011. Statsvetaren: Jörgen Westerståhl och demokratins århundrade [Political Scientist: Jörgen 
Westerståhl and the democratic century]. SNS Förlag.
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1. TINGSTEN (1896-1973): THE PROFESSOR AS MASTER—OF WHAT?
Being professor for only eleven years at Stockholm University College (1935 to 1946), Tingsten 
was the political analyst as academic professor. Everything he wrote had a political overtone. 
Tingsten was an intellectual giant, an equilibrist, and a besserwisser, whose basic aim was to 
prevail in intellectual debates on politics and culture. As chief editor of the largest newspaper 
in Norden, Dagens Nyheter, Tingsten authored a mass of articles in the same style he used in 
his academic publications. 
1.1 T h e  N e g a t i v e  M e s s a g e
Following his political convictions already laid down in his academic books, he tried endlessly 
to propagate his political views against his opponents. Chiefly, his opponents were:
a) Enemies of democracy: Tingsten was an acute observer of political events and trends 
and often grasped the essence of things before anyone else. As a young man in central 
Europe, he saw democracy win an institutional fight, but he predicted democracy’s 
fragility. Tingsten emphasized that democracy is a political regime, not a social or 
economic one.
b) Fascism: In response to developments in central Europe, Italy and Spain, Tingsten 
presented a profound analysis of the fascist mind, linking it to the worship of violence.
c) Conservatism: Tingsten was a member of the Swedish Social Democratic Party until 
the mid 1940s, participating in its meetings about the party program. He rejected 
conservatism and wrote a major book analysing conservatism’s evolution from Burke 
onwards, the key idea of which was that conservatism entailed an unwarranted 
suspicion of reason and of the place of reason in political argument.
d) Communism: Tingsten slowly developed a hatred for communism. When he pursued 
his Dagens Nyheter campaigns against the Soviet Union and left-wing radicalism in 
the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, Tingsten was merely drawing from the 
conclusions of his two-volume study of the ideas of the Swedish Arbeiterbewegung, a 
study in which he discovered the contradictions of Marxism and the faulty reasoning 
of continental Europe’s great ideologues.
Tingsten wanted to intellectually defeat and even humiliate his opponents and often did 
so by linking them with the great creators of ideologies or systems of political ideas from 
the history of political thought. No one could disclose the flaws of these giants better than 
Tingsten who called his method “the critique of ideas.” With almost whatever he produced, 
social science or propaganda, for Tingsten there was a porous border between what is and 
what ought to be.
Petersson gives a brilliant recap of Tingsten’s books and of his rebuttals to his critiques—
but Petersson fails to mention a major rejection of Tingsten’s work. Economic historian Kurt 
Samuelson saw clear weaknesses in Tingsten’s conception of an ideology as merely a set of 
falsifiable hypotheses (Samuelson, 1973). No doubt, Tingsten was a master of finding errors, 
disclosing mistakes, and pointing out lacunas in the political thought of the great masters of 
political philosophy and the history of ideas. Tingsten even went so far as to state that political 
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ideologies were fundamentally statements about reality and thus falsifiable, as these basic 
statements were not value premises, neither moral convictions nor material self-interests. 
Very questionable indeed!
Tingsten became illustrious around 1940 when his major studies of the ideological 
development of the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) were published by the second wing 
of the Arbeiterbewegung, the central trade union organization, Landsorganisationen (LO)! 
Tingsten’s work was hardly what the socialists in power since 1932 had expected, namely a 
frontal attack against the strong Marxist element in the SAP’s party programs. Tingsten used 
the distinction between the long-run perspective (revolution) and the short-run perspective 
(parliamentary democracy) to claim that the ideology of the SAP contained a major contradiction, 
and that it was time for the SAP to scrap their long-run perspective. In doing so, Tingsten 
emphasized Bernstein’s basic message from 1899, “ . . . turn social reform from a means of the 
class struggle into its final aim.” The only Social Democrat to uphold the long-run perspective 
was Ernst Wigforss, Sweden’s so-called last socialist.
The best chapter in Petersson’s volume on Tingsten deals with Tingsten’s own theory about 
mature democracies in Western Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), namely with his hypothesis about the “end of ideologies.” Here, Petersson 
draws upon his profound knowledge about Swedish politics after the Second World War to 
make a balanced assessment of the pros and cons of Tingsten’s own message. 
“Democracy can only survive when the ideologies die,” Tingsten proclaimed, which led to 
a large public debate that included, among other politicians, Prime Minister Tage Erlander and 
Olof Palme. The New Left rejected Tingsten’s proclamation outright, pointing to the Paris events 
and student uproars. Tingsten had combined two of his most essential ideas, namely: 1) that the 
ideologies from the French revolution had been criticized and falsified—they consisted of flawed 
theories, not values; and 2) a democratic system of government can only survive if the central 
political parties share a conviction about the ends and means of democracy—a set of meta-beliefs.
After he left his professorship at Stockholm University Tingsten lived as a man of letters 
and as a public intellectual; he kept publishing up until he went blind. Petersson mentions 
that Swedish philosopher Ingemar Hedenius, famous due to his virulent attacks on Christian 
theology and Paulus, designated Tingsten’s distinction between the short-run and long-run 
perspectives in the ideological development of Swedish Social Democracy as his most prominent 
achievement from a scientific point of view. This is hardly accurate, as the strategic tension 
between these two concepts was much debated in the Marxist circles in Western and central 
Europe. In Sweden, only Wigforss kept dreaming of the idea long-term idea socialist society—of 
a foeretag utan aegare, firms without owners.
Now, Tingsten’s main scientific achievement is no doubt his pronounced and very original 
early thesis about the end of ideology, presented internationally in 1955. His argument has 
the following structure:
(1) Ideologies were all created in the wake of the French Rev0lution
(2) Ideologies are essentially systems of theoretical propositions about the future, the 
good, and the right for mankind
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(3) Ideologies contain grave intellectual errors
(4) Ideologies are actually dying and will die out soon.
Tingsten’s conclusion seems highly logical, as nobody would cherish incorrect ideas. Yet, 
his concluding prediction was shocking in 1955.
The first three assumptions though are too restrictive for critical scrutiny. Samuelson (who 
was grossly underestimated in Swedish academia) successfully attacked Tingsten’s second 
assumption by making the case for ideologies including values or subjective evaluations in 
Uppsala School’s Haegerstroem’s terminology. Furthermore, Tingsten’s first assumption appears 
arbitrary. Today we have great ideological debates between environmentalists and cornucopians 
as well as between neo-liberalism and liberal egalitarianism.
Tingsten died before the emergence of the great debates among liberal egalitarians (Rawls, 
Dworkin, Barry) and among neo-liberals (Nozick, Chicago School). These debates largely focused 
on real equality versus liberty. Ideological confrontation may not need the old faulty masters 
of the nineteenth century! And this dominant political debate today includes both theories 
and values!
Petersson finishes his masterful biography with an overview of Tingsten’s foreign contacts. 
Like Westerståhl, he did not participate much in international conferences. However, he is 
mentioned in the colloquium on The End of Ideology in 1955 with Seymour Martin Lipset and 
Daniel Bell.
1 . 2  T h e  Po s i t i v e  A r g u m e n t
It is true that Tingsten changed his political position several times, but a core focus evolved 
in both his research and his politics—namely the neo-liberalism of the Mont Pelerin Society, 
of which he was a founding member in 1947. He was attracted by its civilisation creeds: 
individualism, anti-authoritarianism, and market economics. In 1944, Tingsten replaced socialism 
with libertarianism, as the famous Swedish economist Ingemar Stahl did in the 1970s. By 
then, Tingsten had turned into a pure political propagandist, proclaiming: Sweden must enter 
NATO—there is no third position; Sweden must have nuclear weapons; Sweden must seek allies 
in the West to stand strong against Stalin; the welfare state must be shrunk; only a republic is 
a true democratic regime; and the state and religion must be separated.
As an outspoken atheist, Tingsten strongly supported his close friend (Uppsala University 
philosophy professor) Ingemar Hedenius’s, attack on the church and Christianity. Tingsten was 
also extremely negative towards the Soviet Regime and Stalin, he even succeeded in taking 
Gunnar Myrdal out of the government for his Soviet sympathies. It seems to me that Petersson 
does not fully realize how ideological Tingsten’s commitment was to neo-liberalism, or to 
Hayekianism; he anticipated much of what was to come in the 1980s (Hayek, Kirzner, Buchanan). 
Why could neo-liberalism not be critiqued with the approach used in the negative argument 
above? Is Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1944) really so good as Tingsten believed?
Yet, Tingsten was a man of contradictions, despite his ambition to disclose the mistakes of 
the greats: Smith, Bentham, Burke, Marx, de Maistre, Tolstoy, and Hegel among others. When 
the big political issue in post-war politics surfaced in Sweden—the Allman Tjanstepension (ATP) 
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pension question—Tingsten turned around for a final time, he abandoned his liberal stance 
and Dagens Nyheter, advocating the state solution of the socialists—not a road to serfdom? As 
a matter of fact, the ATP reform that consolidated the power in government for the socialists 
for almost twenty years has not turned out to be an economic success.
In his youth, Tingsten mastered much of political science. It was only after he had chosen 
his newspaper career that he focused exclusively upon the analysis of ideas. Thus, Tingsten 
made very interesting contributions to electoral enquiry and the study of constitutional law. 
After leaving Dagens Nyheter, Tingsten lived long enough to understand that he had understood 
little about the political attraction of the “great faulty thinkers,” or of the emotions and values 
of systems of political ideas. The 1960s corrected Tingsten and he saw radical socialism and 
anti-Americanism coming back in Sweden, and at Dagens Nyheter. Perhaps it is fair to conclude 
that today Tingsten is less out of tune with politics than he was in the 1960s as Sweden is now 
considering a NATO alliance and emphasizes allocation instead of redistribution.
What is stunning in Tingsten’s academic achievement is the speed with which he perceived 
how political events would combine to form major changes. He anticipated not only Popper, 
Berlin, and Avineri but also neo-liberalism—though his impatience and nervousness precluded 
profundity. One of Tingsten’s best acts was his fiercely attack against the government’s expulsion 
of war refugees from the Baltic States to Russia. His socialist opponent and Minister of Finance, 
the ideologue Ernst Wigforss, supported this shameful act; this decision to send the Baltics 
refugees back to Russia often resulted in tragedy as gulags awaited these people from the 
countries Sweden had once ruled. While Tingsten was an ordinarius in spirit with his arrogant 
and dominating demeanour, Westerståhl was an ordinarius in action.  Westerståhl and his 
associates alone almost constituted a think tank.
2. JÖRGEN  WESTERSTÅHL (1916-2006): THE PROFESSOR 
AS A RESEARCH ENTREPRENEUR
A Swedish ordinarius is not only the representative of a discipline at the university, but an 
ordinarius may act as an administrative officer in charge of all personnel and contracts. 
Ordinarien have less teaching duties than other professors as they often concentrate their 
instruction on PhD guidance. This provides ample time for taking various duties inside or 
outside academia. Often,  ordinarien participate in research bodies or research councils to 
procure money for the department or for themselves. Ordinarien have a very strong influence 
over the selection of other ordinarien, including their successors.
This hierarchical system originated in the period of the elite model university which typically 
had one chair, surrounded by assistants and clerks, in each discipline. When Swedish higher 
education was adapted to a mass model university, the role of ordinarius was maintained 
though modified slightly into the central role in a large department with many scholars, 
research personnel, and clerks. The socialist government no doubt wanted to limit the power 
of the ordinarien, but despite many top-down reforms, the government failed utterly in this 
regard. The transformation from elite to mass higher education changed the universities and 
colleges in all but one aspect, the prevailing prerogatives of the ordinarien. The Swedish full 
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professor combined two roles—that of a single representative of a discipline with the head 
of a department. The full professor became a large-scale entrepreneur managing research 
contracts in the millions with contract responsibilities for between fifty and up to one-hundred 
individuals on the department staff. No one personifies this transformation of Swedish academic 
departments more than Westerståhl.  Westerståhl built up the now dominant political science 
establishment in Gothenburg, anchoring almost everything in politics.
Westerståhl worked under Tingsten for a time as his assistant when Tingsten did electoral 
enquiry work. Coming from the larger family of Hjalmar Branting—the first Socialist premier, 
Westerståhl had a social democratic identity that he never abandoned. Teaching political 
thought from Tingsten’s approach, Westerståhl was somewhat unoriginal until he set out on 
his own and explored in great detail the virtues of empiricism and how data collection could 
be combined with the enormous intelligence needs of the growing welfare state and of the 
expanding ministries and agencies’ thirst for knowledge.  
Westerståhl re-educated himself around 1950 when he went to the US to pick up the tools of 
survey research and the spirit of behaviourism, there he spent time with the leading researchers 
of the 1950s. This was something new, something other than criticizing Hegel with Tingsten’s 
method of the critique of ideas. Westerståhl transferred the new methods in social science to 
his department in Gothenburg and started to take on huge data projects from various funding 
sources. Thus, electoral research, newspaper studies, and enquiries into government agencies 
were initiated on a long-term basis by Westerståhl and his brilliant new staff. Petersson knows 
all about this Gothenburg revolution, Petersson was one of its new scholars moving Swedish 
political science forward in the scientific world and endorsing behaviourism. The list of studies 
emerging from the constantly swelling Gothenburg institutes of politics and administration 
testifies to Westerståhl’s capacity and skill. Several PhD candidates guided by Westerståhl are 
now professors who continue to pursue his empiricist ideal within now institutionalized research 
programs such as electoral studies. As a matter of fact, Westerståhl became an almost recurrent 
figure in mass media; his large scale studies of objectivity, his neutrality, and the informative 
content of his contributions to news media drew much interest. The general public, newspapers, 
radio broadcasters, and television producers read his conclusions over the years.
Yet, Westerståhl became so successful in attracting funds for new research and so esteemed 
by the social democratic government for his capacity to conduct applied research that he 
somehow forgot his limitations. When this happened, none other than Tingsten was there 
to point out to these limitations in a most forceful manner that seriously hurt Westerståhl’s 
reputation. This occurred around 1960, when Tingsten was still vigorous enough to conduct a 
scientific attack of great amplitude. Westerståhl had accepted the responsibility of giving Sweden 
a new and updated constitution, as the famous 1809 dispensation was considered obsolete. 
But Westerståhl did not take the task with the seriousness required to become the reformer of 
the Swedish state. Perhaps it was just another contract to him? In any case, after Westerståhl 
had presented his proposal, Tingsten entered the scene with a booklet, Should the Role of the 
King be Reinforced? Tingsten’s assessment that Westerståhl had failed miserably in rewriting 
the 1809 constitution was a shock to all, not least to Westerståhl himself.
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This time, the government listened to Tingsten in spite of his socialist attacks launched 
from Dagens Nyheter. To redo Westerståhl’s failed job of rewriting the 1809 constitution, 
a new committee, headed by the best Swedish expert on constitutional law, ordinarius Nils 
Stiernquist. Stiernquist succeeded in transforming a constitutional monarchy into a real 
republican dispensation, headed by a completely powerless national symbol: the king. Why 
did Westerståhl accept this assignment? Late professor Par-Erik Back, another ordinarius once 
told me that Westerståhl had written an unpublished analysis of Hans Kelsen’s legal theory, 
adding that it was a masterpiece, inspired by the legal realism of Uppsala genius, philosopher 
Axel Hagerstrom. I have never seen it, but Westerståhl’s constitutional outline for Sweden was 
not inspired by Kelsen’s 1920 constitution for Austria—pure republicanism of course.
Westerståhl’s personality was different from Tingsten’s. Unlike Tingsten, he was rather 
timid or shy and attuned to details. He concentrated all of his efforts on empirical research, 
often on applied empirical research. By participating in the efforts after the Second World 
War, he came to know all of the key scholars in political science in Europe and in American 
election studies. However, he was to present a second great disappointment when he failed 
to support the Norwegian genius Stein Rokkan for a professorship at the national university 
in Oslo. Westerståhl knew Rokkan well from international conferences, but he forced him to 
go to Bergen University, which Rokkan made world famous for political science—sad for Oslo!
CONCLUSION
The Swedish ordinarius is a most prestigious figure who can speak truth to power. But, ordinarien 
can also conduct their own self-seeking agendas, as ordinarius Bo Rothstein did. It could be 
argued that this institution should be abolished entirely and that Sweden should move to the 
Anglo-Saxon model of professors as a community of equals with a rotating department chair. 
The most dismal aspect of the ordinarius’s role is the compulsory duty to write evaluations 
of ordinarien candidates.  As these evaluations are published in the journal Statsvetenskaplig 
Tidskrift, they provide a golden opportunity for crushing critiques and the settling of old scores. 
This practice, sakkunnigutlatande (expert statement), exists only in Swedish academia as an 
officially published document within political science. When an ordinarius opening comes up, 
then the only relevant question is: Who will the three experts be? It becomes a true game with 
lots of manoeuvring nationwide!
Petersson has done a great service to Swedish political science, not only by conducting a 
huge power investigation in the 1980s, but also by writing these two portraits of two dominant 
personalities. Tingsten wrote several books on the history of political thought at the highest 
international level, while Westerståhl concentrated on empire building in Gothenburg. The 
extraordinary influence they wielded upon Swedish society stemmed from the ordinarius 
position, a relic from the time when Sweden belonged under German culture and university 
ideals.
112  jAn-erik lAne
LITERATURE
Barry, B. 2005. Why social justice matters. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Bell, D. 1960. The end of ideology: On the exhaustion of political ideas in the fifties. Glencoe: Free Press.
Dworkin, R. 2000. Sovereign virtue: The theory and practice of equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Hayek, F.  1944. The road to serfdom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kelsen, H. 1925. Allgemeine staatslehre. Berlin: J. Springer.
Lipset, S. M. 1960. Political man: The social bases of politics. Garden City: Doubleday.
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, state, and utopia. New York: Basic Books.
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Tingsten, H. 1966. Från idéer till idyll: Den lyckliga demokratien. Stockholm: Norstedt.
Tingsten, H. 1966. Strid kring idyllen. Stockholm: Norstedt.
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Ainius Lašas
Klaudijus Maniokas, ed., Lithuania's First Decade in the EU  
Transformation or Imitation?1
For those who want to better grasp the political and socio-economic trajectory of Lithuania 
since its accession to the EU, this edited volume provides a wealth of information and insights. 
It touches upon a variety of themes ranging from the politicization of LGBT rights to Lithuania’s 
bumpy road to the eurozone. While this constitutes an interesting and informative read, the book 
sometimes struggles to maintain theoretical and conceptual cohesion throughout all chapters. 
As specified in the opening theoretical chapter by Klaudijus Maniokas, the volume sets three 
principal objectives. It seeks 1) to sketch a trajectory of Lithuania’s development since 2004; 
2) to determine the role of the EU in shaping the course of this trajectory and; 3) to analyse 
the extent to which Lithuania has developed, to use North, Wallis, and Weingast’s (2009) 
terminology, an “open access social order.” The transformation from limited to open access 
order serves as the principal macro-theoretical lens of the volume. However, the volume’s 
theoretical section also draws heavily on Europeanization literature to conceptualize the 
nature of the EU’s influence on national politics. The focus of the volume is exclusively on the 
downloading dynamics of Europeanization. While this combination of grand- and medium-range 
theories is intriguing, their interaction deserves closer critical attention. Does the European 
Union only limit or also open up domestic opportunities for patronage and corruption? Why do 
south European countries such as Greece or Italy show no progress towards attaining greater 
transparency—based on transparency indicators (CPI)—for years? Furthermore, given the 
limited temporal scope of this volume, is it reasonable to expect social order shifts in such a 
short period of time? 
In line with the work’s first objective, the second chapter—by Sabina Karmazinaitė, Klaudijus 
Maniokas and Darius Žeruolis—assesses Lithuania’s performance according to a wide range of 
quantitative indicators linked to the country’s national strategy paper, Lithuania 2030. These 
indicators include not only the typical international indices (e.g. World Governance Indicators), 
but also information on emigration flows, electricity and gas prices, the number of NGOs, and 
the differences between popular and elite perceptions of Lithuania’s progress over the last 
decade. Based on this plethora of data, the authors of the chapter conclude that Lithuania 
has made noticeable progress in its economic convergence with richer European countries, 
but achieved little in terms of structural indicators (e.g. income equality). These results fell 
well short of popular expectations, which resulted in high emigration flows and the public’s 
general scepticism. 
AINIUS LAŠAS – Kaunas University of Technology, ainius.lasas@ktu.lt.
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This causal linkage between EU membership-related expectations and emigration appears 
to be problematic. Given the fact that 2010 to 2011 figures are heavily skewed upwards by a 
newly introduced law requiring residents to pay mandatory health insurance fees, the highest 
emigration flows most likely occurred in 2004 and 2005. Thus, emigration during Lithuania’s 
initial years as an EU member had little to do with membership expectations, which should 
have been projected further into the future.
The next chapter, by Vytautas Kuokštis, provides another bird’s-eye view, this time of 
Lithuania’s political economy. Kuokštis’s findings are largely in line with the Maniokas and 
Žeruolis’s previous assessment. On the one hand, these findings highlight evidence of rapid 
economic growth facilitated in part by EU structural funds. On the other hand, they point to 
the limited political will to implement painful structural reforms after Lithuania’s EU accession. 
In his unique contribution, a chapter on the development of Lithuania’s welfare state, 
Liutauras Gudžinskas’s engages the topic of Europeanization in a more systematic way. 
Gudžinskas presents a discourse analysis of the governments’ annual reports to the parliament in 
order to determine whether more attention has been paid to social policy since EU membership. 
His findings do not support initial expectations, but do show clear links to partisan ideologies: 
left-leaning governments tended to pay more attention to social policy. In general, according 
to Gudžinskas, economic and energy security have become the dominant topics of discourse 
in Lithuania’s public sphere. The economic crisis further emphasized these issues.
Although analysing Europeanization is a stated objective of this volume, the chapter on 
the Europeanization of public administration, by Vitalis Nakrošis and Sabina Bankauskaitė-
Grigaliūnienė, is by far the most systematic and comprehensive in addressing this topic. The 
authors seek to determine to what extent and how the EU contributed to the agencification 
(proliferation of public agencies) and depoliticization of the public sector. Their results 
demonstrate that the EU has played a noticeable, but limited role in both processes. While the 
EU contributed to the proliferation of Lithuania’s new public agencies, Europeanized agencies 
managed to maintain a degree of autonomy and avoid politicization. Thus, while the public 
sector as a whole remained highly vulnerable to political pressures and exhibited limited levels 
of professionalization, Europeanized agencies bucked this trend. 
Next, the volume turns to the topic of Lithuania’s entry into the eurozone. In this chapter, 
Vilpišauskas looks at Lithuania’s monetary and fiscal policies since 2004 and identifies the 
reasons for Lithuania’s adoption of the euro. Perceived economic benefits played the most 
important role in political elites’ determination to adopt the euro followed by national security 
concerns. However, Lithuania’s first attempt to adopt the euro (in 2007) was unsuccessful due 
to elites’ lack of attention and understanding of how changes in fiscal policy related to the 
convergence criteria. In contrast, eight years later, both internal and external factors favoured 
Lithuania’s entry.  While this chapter provides interesting analysis and relates to the book’s first 
objective, it feels detached from the initial theoretical discussions. How is Lithuania’s adoption 
of the euro related to Europeanization debates? What does the failed attempt to change the 
commission’s negative assessment indicate about Lithuania’s uploading capabilities? Should 
Lithuania’s accession to the eurozone be interpreted as yet another step towards open access 
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order in Lithuania?  Answers to these and related questions would better integrate this chapter.
The book concludes with a case study of LGBT rights in Lithuania. Specifically, it looks at how 
and why this issue became increasingly politicized. Somewhat surprisingly, Liutauras Gudžinskas 
demonstrates that during EU accession negotiations surrounding LGBT-related issues generated 
little public attention and controversy in Lithuania. Growing politicization and polarization of 
LGBT issues came in 2008 with a new government, led by the Homeland Union-Lithuanian 
Christian Democrats party. Despite EU pressure, especially from the European Parliament, there 
is limited evidence of Europeanization in this policy area. While Lithuania has implemented 
some legal provisions against LGBT employment discrimination and provided guarantees of 
basic civil rights, the current political and popular climate is highly antagonistic toward the 
issue of LGBT rights. According to the author, there is little willingness to enact laws as practice 
and, at the same time, this is a great deal of political support for imposing further restrictions 
on the LGBT community. As in the case of public administration reforms, the role of the EU in 
influencing Lithuania’s domestic political agenda appears to be quite limited. 
The case studies of Lithuania presented in this volume demonstrates that the effects 
of Europeanization on Lithuania after its EU accession have been complex and uneven. As 
response modes to EU policies and demands, transformation and retrenchment are largely 
absent. Instead, the authors often observe absorption or partial accommodation. These baby 
steps must accumulate substantially before they can produce meaningful changes in Lithuania’s 
social order. However, by that time, the causal structure becomes much more complex and 
the isolation of Europeanization factors even more challenging. But to quote T.S. Eliot, “If you 
aren’t in over your head, how do you know how tall you are?”
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CORRIGENDA
In the previous issue of The Baltic Journal of Political Science (no. 4, 2015), Kamil 
Ławniczak, co-author of the article Poland’s International Relations Scholarly Community 
and its Distinguishing Features According to the 2014 TRIP Survey of International Relations 
Scholars, was misidentified as a “PhD student” in a footnote of page 94. Kamil Ławniczak 
possesses a PhD degree. We apologise to the author for this regrettable error.
Liutauras Gudžinskas,
editor-in-chief of The Baltic Journal of Political Science
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